

Chapter Four

Ōkawa Shūmei: "Various Problems of Asia in Revival," 1922

Christopher W. A. Szpilman

Ōkawa Shūmei (on Ōkawa in general, see Ōtsuka 1995; Szpilman 1998b; Takeuchi 1969) was born in 1886 in Sakata, Yamagata Prefecture, the son of a physician. He attended the Fifth Higher School in Kumamoto, after which he went on to study Indian philosophy with the famous scholar of Buddhism, Anesaki Masaharu (1873–1949), at the Faculty of Literature, Tokyo Imperial University. There he also attended lectures by the art historian and pan-Asianist thinker, Okakura Tenshin (see I:7 and I:8). Although Okakura's Pan-Asianism must have influenced him, both in *Fukkō Ajia no Shomondai* and in his postwar autobiography, Ōkawa traces the awakening of his Pan-Asianism to his chance discovery of Sir Henry Cotton's (1845–1915) *New India* (originally published in 1889): the book transformed him "from a complete cosmopolitan into an Asianist" (Ōkawa 1961: 804). By 1915 Ōkawa was involved in assisting Indian independence fighters taking refuge in Japan. One of them was Rash Behari Bose (see I:24), who introduced him to Mitsukawa Kametarō (1888–1936), the founder of the Rōsōkai (Old and Young Association), a study group with a vaguely renovationist orientation. In 1919 Ōkawa and Mitsukawa, dissatisfied with the unfocused nature of the Rōsōkai, founded the explicitly pan-Asian Yūzonsha (Society of Those Who Yet Remain; see II:2).

After the Yūzonsha disintegrated in 1923 as the result of a personality clash between Ōkawa and Kita, in 1925 Ōkawa founded the relatively long-lived Kōchisha (Society for Action on Earth) and wrote regular contributions for that body's monthly publication, *Nihon* (Japan). *Nihon* continued to be published until 1932.

Ōkawa's activities in the right-wing (reformist) movement were helped by the fact that, in 1919, he obtained a well-paid job at the prestigious Research Institute (Chōsabū) of the South Manchurian Railway Company (Minami

Manshū Tetsudō Kabushiki Kaisha), which gathered and analyzed political and economic information on Asia (Kobayashi 2005). He was so good at his job that by 1927 he had been promoted to the head of the by now independent institute. In addition to doing research, Ōkawa was also a teacher. In 1921 he became a professor at Takushoku University (Colonial University—briefly known at that time as Tōyō Kyōkai Daigaku, or Oriental Association University)—and also taught concurrently at the Shakai Kyōiku Kenkyūjo (Institute of Social Education, known subsequently as the Daigakuryō, or Great Learning Dormitory), located within the grounds of the Imperial Palace and patronized by notables such as Viscount Makino Nobuaki (1861–1949), Admiral Baron Yashiro Rokurō (1860–1930), and Colonel (later General Baron) Araki Sadao (1877–1966).

In 1926, Ōkawa's academic career received official recognition when he was granted the degree of doctor of philosophy by the faculty of law at his alma mater for a dissertation on the history of European chartered colonial companies. In addition to scholarly monographs, he also wrote prolifically for a popular audience, publishing throughout the 1920s an impressive number of relatively high-selling volumes such as *Shūkyō Genri Kōwa* (Lectures on the Principles of Religion, 1921), *Nihon Bunmeishi* (A History of Japanese Civilization, 1921), *Nihon oyobi Nihonjin no Michi* (The Way of Japan and the Japanese, 1926), and *Kokushi Gairon* (An Outline of the National History, 1929).

Neither his academic career nor his writing prevented Ōkawa from taking part in various political conspiracies and terrorist acts against the government. In 1932 he was arrested on charges of aiding and abetting the assassination of Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi and sentenced to fifteen years in prison. After various amnesties, Ōkawa spent only sixteen months behind bars, and his criminal record caused no damage to his social standing. When he was released from prison in 1937, he was appointed dean of the newly established Faculty of Colonial Studies at Hōsei University. His books were now more popular than ever, and *Nihon 2600 Nenshi* (A History of Japan over 2600 Years, 1939) became a runaway best-seller. He continued to write and publish throughout the Pacific War, extolling the traditional virtues of Japan and lambasting the evils of Western civilization, Britain, and America.

After Japan's defeat in 1945, Ōkawa was arrested as a class A war criminal but was not tried by the Tōkyō War Crimes Tribunal. Because of his erratic behavior, he was placed under medical observation and eventually released on grounds of mental incompetence. He spent the rest of his life in relative seclusion, passing the time by translating the Koran into Japanese (1949) and working on his autobiography, *Anraku no Mon* (The Gate to Serenity). He died in 1957.

Though Ōkawa published on a wide range of topics that included Japanese and world history, philosophy, and religion, Pan-Asianism was a constant interest throughout his entire adult life. Although *Fukkō Ajia no Shomondai*, which appeared in 1922, was the first book inspired by his Pan-Asianism, Ōkawa went on to publish several other books and articles on the subject.

Fukkō Ajia no Shomondai must be read in the context of World War I and the revolutionary upheavals that followed in its wake. While in Europe Oswald Spengler and other pessimists may have despaired over the collapse of Western civilization in the aftermath of the war, Ōkawa and his associates in the Yūzonsha welcomed the West's decline. Like his comrade, Mitsukawa Kametarō in his *Ubawaretaru Ajia* (Stolen Asia, 1921), Ōkawa saw Europe's fall as a golden opportunity for Japan to pursue its "divine mission" to liberate Asia. The success of such a mission would, he insisted, be contingent on Japan's ability to reform its political structures. This insistence on the primacy of domestic reform was a salient characteristic of radical Pan-Asianism in Japan as advocated by Ōkawa, Mitsukawa Kametarō, and Kita Ikki (see I:27). For, without comprehensive reforms at home, Ōkawa and other pan-Asian radicals reasoned, Japan's challenge to the Western powers and the liberation of Asia were doomed to failure. Given the urgent necessity of such reform, *Fukkō Ajia's* aim was to inform the Japanese public of the movements stirring throughout the length and breadth of Asia—India, Turkey, Central Asia, and so on—against white oppression and to demonstrate, first, that a golden opportunity for Japan on the Asian continent might be lost unless decisive reforms were introduced at home and, second, that the policy of the Japanese government in cooperating with the Anglo-Saxon powers at Versailles and Washington was mistaken.

Ōkawa, like other radicals, rejected Wilsonianism and despised the Versailles–Washington treaty system. He dismissed Wilson's "human way," "freedom," and "national self-determination" as hypocritical "slogans" made up by Anglo-Saxon imperialists to gain Asian support during the war (Ōkawa 1993: 164), and he condemned the League of Nations as a tool that the United States, Britain, and France had conjured up as a device to preserve the status quo (Ōkawa 1993: 40).

While deploring what he (and other radicals) regarded as the dilatoriness of the Japanese government in implementing the necessary reforms and assisting the various Asian independence movements, Ōkawa cast an admiring look at Bolshevik Russia, where Bolshevism provided the "greatest external stimulus to Asian revival" (Ōkawa 1993: 164). Ōkawa viewed the Bolsheviks as Japan's allies, a sympathy that had its origins in his own brand of Pan-Asianism. It was in Japan's interests to destroy the status quo—and the Bolsheviks, ever since they came to power, had been doing just that.

The Bolsheviks had been doing what the Japanese government should have been doing but had signally failed to do: assisting independence movements throughout Asia. In some quarters in Japan, the rise of Bolshevism had inspired fears that the revolution would spread to Japan. Ōkawa dismissed this fear. There was, as he saw it, no communist threat to Japan because Bolshevism—a phenomenon that had arisen in the West to address uniquely Western problems—was of no relevance to Japan or the rest of Asia, regions that were (in his view) historically completely different from the West. The Bolsheviks were the product of the West's own pathology, a specifically Western disease to which Japan, because of its own unique political and social structure, was impervious.

Ōkawa's positive assessment of the Bolsheviks was related to the remarkable breadth of his pan-Asian vision. In contrast to most earlier well-known Japanese advocates of Pan-Asianism, Ōkawa included in "his" Asia western Asia and even Islamic areas outside Asia, such as Egypt and parts of the Balkan Peninsula. This inclusion of western Asia forms a defining feature of Ōkawa's Pan-Asianism. In this Ōkawa was probably inspired by Mitsukawa's *Ubawaretaru Ajia*, which he praised enthusiastically in the introduction to *Fukkō Ajia* (Ōkawa 1993: 20) and which largely covers the same geographical areas as Ōkawa's book. But Ōkawa's brilliant style ensured that *Fukkō Ajia no Shomondai*, unlike Mitsukawa's book, was widely read. Ōkawa, whose pan-Asian ideas were influenced by Okakura Tenshin, Indian exile Rash Behari Bose, Paul Richard, Kita, and Mitsukawa, not only influenced in turn a number of Japanese pan-Asianists whom he took under his wing (e.g., Kasagi Yoshiaki) but also, thanks to his outstanding writing talents (where his real importance as a pan-Asianist lies), exerted a powerful influence on the Japanese public whose perceptions of Asia and Japan's mission in Asia were formed largely under the impact of his best-selling books.

Source (translation from the Japanese original by Christopher W. A. Szpilman)

Ōkawa Shūmei, *Fukkō Ajia no Shomondai*. Chūō Kōronsha, 1993 (originally published in 1922 by Daitōkaku), 23–26.

The Asian peoples (*minzoku*) must first of all obtain freedom. The Asia that obtains freedom must be completely and strongly unified. For some time to come, the most important problem that Asia will in fact confront is how to obtain its freedom and how to realize its unification. Today's Asia is Europe's slave. What problems can a slave have? What ideals can a slave hold? A slave is nothing but a machine made of flesh that obeys his or her master's

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wishes and works for his master's profit. That is why, in their true sense, the problems of Asia will only begin when Asia obtains its freedom.

Asia must rise as one and, first of all, throw off its enslavement. Asia has not always lain prostrate before Europe. Some Asian peoples possessed splendid cultures at a time when the English and the Germans were barbarians, eking out a living as hunters on the [European] plains. Some Asians were sailing the treacherous routes between the islands of the southern seas at a time when the Europeans were still hemmed within the narrow confines of Western Europe. Other Asian peoples trekked through the northern wastes to create a wonderful state in a land of extreme cold that had been considered unfit for human habitation. Heroes rising from amidst their ranks advanced out of Central Asia into Europe. They founded a state on the coast of the Black Sea and frequently crossed the Danube to threaten Eastern Europe.

Some Asians, moving with lightning speed, invaded Italy where, as a scourge of God, they made Western Europeans tremble in fear.

They demonstrated not only extraordinary powers of external expansion; internally, they also administered their home states through their unique political structures. They erected great walls and constructed vast canals that are without parallel anywhere in the world. They used the magnet earlier than the Europeans, invented the art of printing, and invented gunpowder and the gun. They created lofty literature, profound philosophy, and noble morality. Moreover, the great religions that exercise power over the minds of the peoples of the world all arose in Asia. That is why the Asians, whether seen from the point of view of their character as it manifests itself in history or from the perspective of their contributions to world culture, are in no way inferior to the Europeans.

But 300 years of military victories have given the Europeans self-confidence and pride, while 300 years of defeats have made the Yellow Men desperate and subservient.

The Russo-Japanese War, however, was a tocsin that sounded the self-awareness of Asia. Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War, moreover, marked the beginning of a new stage in world history. Our victory delivered the first blow to the people of the West who, for the previous 400 years, had never been defeated by a people of color. This was in fact the first stumble in their long victory march. At the same time the Asian peoples, who racially are the same as us, suddenly began to become self-aware. And not only the Asian peoples, but among every people suffering under the yoke of the Western powers resistance to them increased. For all the other Asian countries, it surpassed their wildest dreams that a small country of yellow people in the Far East (*kyokutō*) had stood up to and decisively defeated a state 60 times as large in area and three times as large in population, whose military power was feared by the entire world. Moreover, we made it possible for everyone

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to see what everyone had considered impossible. And this gave them the hope that "we too can do it."

Inevitably, this hope has manifested itself as an independence movement among the enslaved nations of Asia and as a state reform movement among those nations that nominally maintain their independence. It is not at all strange that Europe wants to suppress the independence of the nations that it has enslaved. The rise of the Asian peoples is the last thing Europe wanted. The history of the first twenty years of the twentieth century makes it abundantly clear that the European powers do not want a revival of Asia; that they do not want the introduction of a parliamentary system or the establishment of accountable governments in Asia. And why not? No sooner had the [Young] Turkish revolution [1908] succeeded and the old, exhausted state was replaced by a new, vibrant one than they did all they could to prevent [the Ottoman's Empire] development and, by means of the Italian-Turkish [1911-1912] and the Balkan wars [1912-1913], weakened its national power. Again, as the constitutional politics of Persia stood in the way of the ambitions of Russia and Britain, who wanted to partition the country into two, Persia's parliament was overthrown by foreign troops in an extremely brutal fashion.

When the Chinese revolutionaries, having adopted a new five-colored national flag [in 1912] to symbolize the fusion of the five races (*gozoku tōitsu*) of China [Chinese, Manchurians, Mongolians, Tibetans, and the Muslim Hui people], took steps to realize this ideal, Britain and Russia, which had occupied Inner Mongolia and wanted to gain control over China, were naturally unhappy about the Chinese revolutionaries' successes. Most sadly and shamefully, however, Japan, which should be acting as the leader of an Asian revival, became an instrument of British diplomacy. It helped ensure the success of Britain's divide-and-rule policy and spread the seeds of factional strife throughout China, causing an estrangement between Japan and China.

Thus even in recent times, the future of Asia has remained dark. Although there were faint stirrings of the Asian spirit demanding freedom and unity, aptly summed up in the phrase "Asia for the Asians," and desiring that they become the new ideals for Asia, developments on the international stage cast doubts on when these ideals would be realized.

Europe was still confident of its "holy mission" as ruler of the world and maintained its domination over Asia. Thus, the so-called "Asian question" in international relations boiled down to the question of exactly how the European powers would place Asia on the chopping board of their selfish interests, how they would cook it and how they would divide it up among themselves.

At this stage in the world-historical process the larger significance of the Russo-Japanese War [1904-1905] had not yet become clear. This was in fact clarified by the World War [that followed].

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Chapter Five

Sun Yat-sen: "Pan-Asianism," 1924

Roger H. Brown

Born to commoner parents in Canton (Guangzhou or Guangdong) near Macau, Sun Yat-sen (Sun Zhongshan, in Japan referred to as Son Bun, 1866–1925) received a Christian education in Hawaii and studied medicine in Hong Kong. In 1894, Sun established his first revolutionary organization in Hawaii and succeeded in attracting enough overseas support that agents of the Qing (Ch'ing) court considered him worthy of their attention and seized him in London in 1896. Saved from deportation and likely execution by British intervention, he emerged with his revolutionary credentials bolstered and became the most well-known expatriate opponent of Manchu rule. By 1905, Sun had taken up residence in Japan, and when the Qing dynasty collapsed in 1912, it appeared he might soon lead a new republican China based on his Three Principles of the People: nationalism, democracy, and the people's livelihood. However, although briefly proclaimed president in 1911, Sun was forced to give way to the powerful military leader Yuan Shikai (Yuan Shih-k'ai, 1859–1916) and, by 1913, was once again exiled in Japan.

Yuan's death in 1916 made possible Sun's return to China, where he began working to strengthen his Nationalist Party (Guomindang [GMD], or Kuomintang). In 1923, frustrated by his inability to complete the revolution in a country fractured by petty military rulers and disillusioned with the lack of progress in improving China's standing with the imperialist powers, Sun turned to the newly established Soviet Union for material assistance. While not a Marxist, he sought to take advantage of Soviet support in order to address the organizational weaknesses of the GMD. Moreover, the rejection by Soviet leaders of tsarist claims on China resonated with Sun's increasingly anti-imperialist nationalism. Sun thus in 1923 arranged a marriage of convenience between the GMD and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that would last until his successor, Chiang Kai-shek, broke violently with the CCP

on the cusp of establishing the Nationalist regime in 1927. Despite this fracturing of the alliance and the onset of endemic civil war between the GMD and CCP, both parties, as well as the Japanese-backed regime of Wang Jingwei (Wang Ching-wei, 1883–1944; see II:23), shared in using the memory of Sun to legitimize their respective claims to govern China.

Some Japanese also utilized Sun's memory and his ideas to articulate pan-Asian objectives, an endeavor facilitated by Sun's own Pan-Asianism and by his long-standing ties in Japan. Throughout the first two decades of the twentieth century, Sun received support from Japanese of divergent political ideologies, including the progressive Miyazaki Torazō (Tōten, 1877–1922; see I:11), the Genyōsha leader Tōyama Mitsuru (1855–1944; see I:3), and the party politician Inukai Tsuyoshi (1855–1932)—men who, despite their differences, incorporated pan-Asian elements into their respective agendas for Japan and its role in Asia (see Jansen 1954). Sun's enduring relations with these men were facilitated by the larger context of Western imperialism, resentment of white racism, and mutual belief in a revival of Asian civilization. However, any possibility of Sino-Japanese cooperation faded before Japan's own imperialist ambitions. Indeed, just as Sun defined Asian civilization and any renaissance thereof in Sinocentric terms and in line with his understanding of Chinese national interests, many Japanese took for granted the fundamental justness of their own empire and manifest destiny to lead Asia. The ultimate expression of this conceit came in the 1930s when Japanese used Pan-Asianism, including some of the same ideals articulated by Sun, in an effort to convince Chinese and other Asians to assume their proper position beneath the roof of an expanded Japanese Empire.

Nevertheless, in 1924 a mix of idealism and strategic considerations compelled Sun to continue to hope for accommodation between China and Japan in order to resist what he viewed as the larger threat of Western imperialism. Having recently brokered the GMD-CCP alliance and increasingly resentful of Western, particularly British, imperialism, he sought to convince Japanese to turn away from their imperialist ways and pave a path toward Sino-Japanese amity.

Leaving in his wake the intense hostility of the foreign community in Canton and Shanghai, Sun received the welcome of an honored guest in Japan and, on 28 November 1924, appeared before an audience at Kobe Prefectural Girls School to give one of his most famous addresses. Speaking in Chinese with a Japanese translation, Sun took as his subject Pan-Asianism (*Da Yaxiyazhuyi*, literally Greater Asianism) and restated his fundamental belief in the superiority of Asian culture and civilization, which he defined in Sinocentric terms based on the Confucian dualism of the Kingly Way (Chinese: *wangdao*; Japanese: *ōdō*), or rule through benevolence, and the Despotic Way (Chinese:

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wangdao; Japanese: *hadō*), or rule through force. Determining the relative virtue of Western nations based on their attitude toward China, he characterized these states as products of a derivative, materialistic civilization epitomizing rule through force. In a manner clearly reflecting Sun's understanding of China's national interest, he thereby designated British imperialism in Asia as exemplifying Western despotism and portrayed the Soviet Union's renunciation of imperialist treaty rights as evidence of governance reminiscent of Asian benevolence. Turning to Japan, Sun praised his hosts for having mastered Western material power while continuing to bear the virtues of Asian civilization and for having thrilled Asians with their 1905 victory over tsarist Russia and thereby demonstrated the possibilities of Asian revival; however, in his famous closing line, Sun challenged Japanese to resist the temptation of the West's Despotic Way and to embrace the East's Kingly Way.

Indeed, Sun's idealization of the Kingly Way was so central to his discourse on Pan-Asianism that a contemporary English translation of his lecture by Sun's secretary and interpreter Tai T'ien-ch'ou took as its title "The Kingly Way" rather than "Pan-Asianism." The speech exemplifies the blend of idealism and opportunism often found in commendation of the Kingly Way in particular and of pan-Asian ideals in general. For while the sincerity of Sun's Pan-Asianism is generally accepted, his casting of the Bolsheviks as converts to Confucian benevolence and of Japanese as bulwarks against white imperialism—not to mention his omission of Japanese imperialism in China—dovetailed obviously with his geopolitical conception of the Chinese national interest as it stood in 1924.

The later irony of Sun's reliance on such terminology is likewise clear: within a decade of his death Japanese ideologues were presenting the Kingly Way as exemplifying the Asian political values that might serve as the philosophical foundation of the new state of Manchukuo (Duara 2003; Komagome 1994) and, moreover, as the principles by which to guide a larger reordering of international relations in East Asia. As the 1930s progressed, Japanese officials and intellectuals used pan-Asian rhetoric to legitimize an "Asian Monroe Doctrine," a "holy war" against the GMD and CCP, and a "New Order" for East Asia. In short, rather than an Asian revival in line with Sun's Sinocentrism, Japanese offered a Japan-centered Asia liberated from Western imperialism and placed under the "benevolent rule" of the Imperial Way. This history, remembered with stark emphasis on Japanese opportunism, has deflected sustained attention from Sun's Pan-Asianism and from the appeal of pan-Asian ideas among Chinese in the years prior to the 1930s.

The following translation of Sun's Kobe address appears in a compilation of his speeches and statements published in Shanghai in 1941. The book in question, titled *China and Japan: Natural Friends—Unnatural Enemies*,

also includes a foreword and epilogue by Wang Jingwei and an appended pamphlet by General Itagaki Seishirō (1885–1948). Apparently translated by T'ang Leang-Li (1901–1970), an associate of Wang and compiler of the volume, the document largely accords with the postwar Japanese translation by historian Itō Teruo of a Chinese version found in Sun's collected writings (Son Bun 1974). The speech received wide coverage in Japan at the time, with reactions ranging from affirmation of Sun's indictment of white imperialism to criticism of his simplistic characterization of the materialistic West and spiritual East (see Chen and Yasui 1989). Although some newspaper articles covering the speech famously redacted Sun's closing challenge to Japan, the passage appears in the following version.

Source (English in the original)

Sun Yat-sen (1941), "Pan-Asianism." *China and Japan: Natural Friends—Unnatural Enemies*, Shanghai: China United Press, 141–51.

GENTLEMEN:—I highly appreciate this cordial reception with which you are honouring me to-day. The topic of the day is "Pan-Asianism" (*Dai Aji-ashugi*), but before we touch upon the subject, we must first have a clear conception of Asia's place in the world. Asia, in my opinion, is the cradle of the world's oldest civilization. Several thousand years ago, its peoples had already attained an advanced civilization; even the ancient civilizations of the West, of Greece and Rome, had their origins on Asiatic soil. In Ancient Asia we had a philosophic, religious, logical and industrial civilization. The origins of the various civilizations of the modern world can be traced back to Asia's ancient civilization. It is only during the last few centuries that the countries and races of Asia have gradually degenerated and become weak, while the European countries have gradually developed their resources and become powerful. After the latter had fully developed their strength, they turned their attention to, and penetrated into, East Asia, where they either destroyed or pressed hard upon each and every one of the Asiatic nations, so that thirty years ago there existed, so to speak, no independent country in the whole of Asia. With this, we may say, the low water mark had been reached.

When Asia reached this point, the tide started to turn, and the turn meant the regeneration of Asia. It started thirty years ago when Japan abolished all the Unequal Treaties that she had entered into with the foreign countries. The day when the Unequal Treaties were abolished by Japan was a day of regeneration for all Asiatic peoples. After the abolition of her Unequal Treaties, Japan became the first independent country in Asia. The remaining countries, such as China, India, Persia, Afghanistan, Arabia, and Turkey were not inde-

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pendent, that is to say, they were still dominated, and treated as colonies, by Europe. Thirty years ago, Japan was also a colony of the European countries. But the Japanese were far-sighted. They realized that the only way to power was to struggle with the Europeans and to abolish all Unequal Treaties, which they did, thus turning Japan into an independent country. Since Japan has become an independent country in East Asia, the various nations in this part of the world have been buoyed up with a new hope. They realized that since Japan has been able to achieve her independence through the abolition of the Unequal Treaties, they could do the same. So once again they have mustered courage to conduct their various independent activities with the hope of shaking off the yoke of European restriction and domination and regaining their own rightful position in Asia. This has been the prevailing thought in Asia during the past thirty years, which indeed gives ground for optimism.

Thirty years ago the idea was different. Men thought and believed that European civilization was a progressive one—in science, industry, manufacture, and armament—and that Asia had nothing to compare with it. Consequently, they assumed that Asia could never resist Europe, that European oppression could never be shaken off. Such was the idea prevailing thirty years ago. It was a pessimistic idea. Even after Japan abolished the Unequal Treaties and attained the status of an independent country, Asia, with the exception of a few countries situated near Japan, was little influenced. Ten years later, however, the Russo-Japanese war broke out and Russia was defeated by Japan. For the first time in the history of the last several hundred years, an Asiatic country has defeated a European Power. The effect of this victory immediately spread over the whole of Asia, and gave a new hope to all Asiatic peoples. In the year of the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war I was in Europe. One day news came that Admiral Togo had defeated the Russian navy, annihilating in the Japan Sea the fleet newly dispatched from Europe to Vladivostok. The population of the whole continent was taken aback. Britain was Japan's Ally, yet most of the British people were painfully surprised, for in their eyes Japan's victory over Russia was certainly not a blessing for the White peoples. "Blood," after all, "is thicker than water." Later on I sailed for Asia. When the steamer passed the Suez Canal a number of natives came to see me. All of them wore smiling faces, and asked me whether I was a Japanese. I replied that I was a Chinese, and inquired what was in their minds, and why they were so happy. They said they had just heard the news that Japan had completely destroyed the Russian fleet recently dispatched from Europe, and were wondering how true the story was. Some of them, living on both banks of the Canal had witnessed Russian hospital ships, with wounded on board, passing through the Canal from time to time. That was surely a proof of the Russian defeat, they added.

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In former days, the coloured races in Asia, suffering from the oppression of the Western peoples, thought that emancipation was impossible. We regarded that Russian defeat by Japan as the defeat of the West by the East. We regarded the Japanese victory as our own victory. It was indeed a happy event. Did not therefore this news of Russia's defeat by Japan affect the peoples of the whole of Asia? Was not its effect tremendous? While it may not have seemed so important and consequently have had only a slight effect on the peoples living in East Asia, it had a great effect on the peoples living in West Asia and in the neighborhood of Europe who were in constant touch with Europeans and subject to their oppression daily. The suffering of these Asiatic peoples was naturally greater than that of those living in the further East, and they were therefore more quick to respond to the news of this great victory.

Since the day of Japan's victory over Russia, the peoples of Asia have cherished the hope of shaking off the yoke of European oppression, a hope which has given rise to a series of independence movements—in Egypt, Persia, Turkey, Afghanistan, and finally in India. Therefore, Japan's defeat of Russia gave rise to a great hope for the independence of Asia. From the inception of this hope to the present day only 20 years have elapsed. The Egyptian, Turkish, Persian, Afghan, and Arabian independence movements have already materialized, and even the independence movement in India has, with the passage of time, been gaining ground. Such facts are concrete proofs of the progress of the nationalist idea in Asia. Until this idea reaches its full maturity, no unification or independence movement of the Asiatic peoples as a whole is possible. In East Asia, China and Japan are the two greatest peoples. China and Japan are the driving force of this nationalist movement. What will be the consequences of this driving force still remains to be seen. The present tide of events seems to indicate that not only China and Japan but all the peoples in East Asia will unite together to restore the former status of Asia.

Such a tendency is clearly evident to the eyes of Europe and America. One American scholar has written a book to discuss the rise of the coloured peoples [reference to Lothrop Stoddard's *The Rising Tide of Color against White World Supremacy*, 1920], where he maintains that Japan's defeat of Russia amounts to a victory of the Yellow race over the White race, and that such a tendency, if unchecked, will result in the unification of the entire Yellow race, which will be a calamity for the White peoples, and ways and means should therefore be devised to prevent it. Subsequently, he wrote another book in which he described all emancipation movements as Revolts against Civilization. In his view, emancipation movements in Europe should be regarded as revolts against civilization; even more so should such emancipation movements in Asia be regarded. Such views are common among the privileged

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classes of people in both Europe and America. A minority, they oppress the majority in their own continent or country. Now they wish to extend their evil practice to Asia, with a view to suppressing the nine hundred million people of Asia, and treating them as their slaves. This American scholar considers the awakening of the Asiatic peoples as a revolt against civilization. Thus, the Westerners consider themselves as the only ones possessed and worthy of true culture and civilization; other peoples with any culture or independent ideas are considered as Barbarians in revolt against Civilization. When comparing Occidental with Oriental civilization they only consider their own civilization logical and humanitarian.

From the aspect of cultural development during the last several hundred years, the material civilization of Europe has reached its height while Oriental civilization has remained stagnant. Outwardly, Europe is superior to Asia. Fundamentally, European civilization during the last several hundred years is one of scientific materialism. Such a civilization, when applied to society, will mean the cult of force, with aeroplanes, bombs, and cannons as its outstanding features. Recently, this cult of force has been repeatedly employed by the Western peoples to oppress Asia, and as a consequence, there is no progress in Asia. To oppress others with the cult of force, in the language of the Ancients, is the rule of Might. Therefore, European civilization is nothing but the rule of Might. The rule of Might has always been looked down upon by the Orient. There is another kind of civilization superior to the rule of Might. The fundamental characteristics of this civilization are benevolence, justice and morality. This civilization makes people respect, not fear, it. Such a civilization is, in the language of the Ancients, the rule of Right or the Kingly Way. One may say, therefore, that Oriental civilization is one of the rule of Right. Since the development of European materialistic civilization and the cult of Might, the morality of the world has been on the decline. Even in Asia, morality in several countries has degenerated. Of late, a number of European and American scholars have begun to study Oriental civilization and to realize that, while materially the Orient is far behind the Occident, morally the Orient is superior to the Occident.

Which civilization, the rule of Might or the rule of Right, will prove to be beneficial to justice and humanity, to nations and countries? You can give your own answer to this question. I may cite an example here to illustrate the point. For instance, between 500 and 2000 years ago, there was a period of a thousand years when China was supreme in the world. Her status in the world then was similar to that of Great Britain and America to-day. What was the situation of the weaker nations toward China then? They respected China as their superior and sent annual tribute to China by their own will, regarding it as an honour to be allowed to do so. They wanted, of their own free will, to

be dependencies of China. Those countries which sent tribute to China were not only situated in Asia but in distant Europe as well. But in what way did China maintain her prestige among so many small and weaker nations? Did she send her army or navy, i.e. use Might, to compel them to send their contributions? Not at all. It was not her rule of Might that forced the weaker nations to send tribute to China. It was the influence of her rule of Right. Once they were influenced by the "Kingly Way" of China they continued to send tribute, not merely once or twice, but the practice was carried on from generation to generation. This influence is felt even at the present moment; there are still traces and evidences of it.

There are two small countries situated to the north of India, namely, Bhutan and Nepal. These countries are small in size, but are inhabited by a brave, strong, and warlike people. During the present British rule of India, Britain often went to Nepal in search of soldiers in order to rule the Indians. A great deal of money by way of subsidies had to be spent before Britain was allowed to dispatch a political observer to Nepal. Even a great Power such as Great Britain had to respect her; Nepal was, in fact, a great Power in Asia. But what is the attitude of Nepal toward Great Britain during the past hundred years? Over [a] hundred years ago India was conquered by Great Britain, and during this period Nepal was able to live peacefully on the border of the British colony. Although [a] hundred years have passed, Nepal has never sent tribute to Great Britain. Great Britain, on the other hand, has to spend a large sum by way of subsidies to Nepal. But what is the attitude of Nepal toward China? The status of China has deteriorated to such an extent that it is now inferior even to that of a British colony. Though far away from China Proper and separated from her by Tibet, Nepal considered China as her suzerain State and up to 1911 Nepal sent annual tribute to China via Tibet. In that year, however, when the Nepal commissioners reached Szechuan and found communications interrupted, they returned to their country. The differential attitude of Nepal toward Great Britain and toward China is due to the difference between the Oriental and Occidental civilization. China has degenerated during the last several hundred years, yet Nepal still respects her as a superior State. Great Britain, on the other hand, is a powerful country, but Nepal has been influenced by Chinese civilization, which, in her eyes, is the true civilization, while that of Britain is nothing but the rule of Might.

Now, what is the problem that underlies Pan-Asianism, the Principle of Greater Asia, which we are discussing here to-day? Briefly, it is a cultural problem, a problem of comparison and conflict between the Oriental and Occidental culture and civilization. Oriental civilization is the rule of Right; Occidental civilization is the rule of Might. The rule of Right respects benevolence and virtue, while the rule of Might only respects force and utili-

tarianism. The rule of Right respects while the rule of Might respects measures. People who respect their superior State do not now willingly respect by force never submit. Britain with Egypt, the rule, Egypt and India, and separation from day, Egypt and India, dependence within five years, the Oriental

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Japan is the first nation of Europe. independent of Europe completely independent of Asia who joined with it conditioned after her failure to regain her territory attained her status of independence has only two independent nations. In other words, Japan is Asia. Now Persia, for example in arming itself not look down on other nations, and when her Power. We advocate by the unification of nations and virtue can they

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tarianism. The rule of Right always influences people with justice and reason, while the rule of Might always oppresses people with brute force and military measures. People who are influenced by justice and virtue will never forget their superior State, even if that country has become weak. So Nepal even now willingly respects China as a superior State. People who are oppressed by force never submit entirely to the oppressor State. The relations of Great Britain with Egypt and India form a typical example. Although under British rule, Egypt and India have always entertained the thought of independence and separation from Great Britain. If Great Britain becomes weaker some day, Egypt and India will overthrow British rule and regain their independence within five years. You should now realize which is the superior civilization, the Oriental or the Occidental?

If we want to realize Pan-Asianism in this new world, what should be its foundation if not our ancient civilization and culture? Benevolence and virtue must be the foundations of Pan-Asianism. With this as a sound foundation we must then learn science from Europe for our industrial development and the improvement of our armaments, not, however, with a view to oppressing or destroying other countries and peoples as the Europeans have done, but purely for our self-defense.

Japan is the first nation in Asia to completely master the military civilization of Europe. Japan's military and naval forces are her own creation, independent of European aid or assistance. Therefore, Japan is the only completely independent country in East Asia. There is another country in Asia who joined with Central Powers during the European War and was partitioned after her final defeat. After the war, however, she was not only able to regain her territory, but to expel all Europeans from that territory. Thus she attained her status of complete independence. This is Turkey. At present Asia has only two independent countries, Japan in the East and Turkey in the West. In other words, Japan and Turkey are the Eastern and Western barricades of Asia. Now Persia, Afghanistan, and Arabia are also following the European example in arming themselves, with the result that the Western peoples dare not look down on them. China at present also possesses considerable armaments, and when her unification is accomplished she too will become a great Power. We advocate Pan-Asianism in order to restore the status of Asia. Only by the unification of all the peoples in Asia on the foundation of benevolence and virtue can they become strong and powerful.

But to rely on benevolence alone to influence the Europeans in Asia to relinquish the privileges they have acquired in China would be an impossible dream. If we want to regain our rights we must resort to force. In the matter of armaments, Japan has already accomplished her aims, while Turkey has recently also completely armed herself. The other Asiatic races, such as the

peoples of Persia, Afghanistan, and Arabia are all war-like peoples. China has a population of four hundred millions, and although she needs to modernize her armament and other equipment, and her people are a peace-loving people, yet when the destiny of their country is at stake the Chinese people will also fight with courage and determination. Should all Asiatic peoples thus unite together and present a united front against the Occidentals, they will win the final victory. Compare the populations of Europe and Asia: China has a population of four hundred millions, India three hundred and fifty millions, Japan several scores of millions, totaling, together with other peoples, no less than nine hundred millions. The population in Europe is somewhere around four hundred millions. For the four hundred millions to oppress the nine hundred millions is an intolerable injustice, and in the long run the latter will be defeated. What is more, among the four hundred millions some of them have already been influenced by us. Judging from the present tendency of civilization, even in Great Britain and America, there are people who advocate the principles of benevolence and justice. Such an advocacy also exists in some of the barbarian countries. Thus, we realize that the Western civilization of utilitarianism is submitting to the influence of Oriental civilization of benevolence and justice. That is to say the rule of Might gives way to the rule of Right, presaging a bright future for world civilization.

At present there is a new country in Europe which has been looked down upon and expelled from the Family of Nations by the White races of the whole of Europe. Europeans consider it as a poisonous snake or some brutal animal, and dare not approach it. Such a view is also shared by some countries in Asia. This country is Russia. At present, Russia is attempting to separate from the White peoples in Europe. Why? Because she insists on the rule of Right and denounces the rule of Might. She advocates the principle of benevolence and justice, and refuses to accept the principles of utilitarianism and force. She maintains Right and opposes the oppression of the majority by the minority. From this point of view, recent Russian civilization is similar to that of our ancient civilization. Therefore, she joins with the Orient and separates from the West. The new principles of Russia were considered as intolerable by Europeans. They are afraid that these principles, when put into effect, would overthrow their rule of Might. Therefore they do not accept the Russian way, which is in accord with the principles of benevolence and justice, but denounce it as contrary to world principles.

What problem does Pan-Asianism attempt to solve? The problem is how to terminate the sufferings of the Asiatic peoples and how to resist the aggression of the powerful European countries. In a word, Pan-Asianism represents the cause of the oppressed Asiatic peoples. Oppressed peoples are found not only in Asia, but in Europe as well. Those countries that practice the rule of

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Chapter Seventeen

The Konoe Cabinet's "Declaration of a New Order in East Asia," 1938

Roger H. Brown

During the late 1930s, Japanese political and military leaders spoke increasingly of constructing a "New Order" within Japan and throughout East Asia. The key political figure in this development was the popular Prince Konoe Fumimaro (on Konoe's early career, see I:32), who assumed the position of prime minister for the first time in June 1937. Well-connected throughout Japan's governing circles, the prince received particularly staunch support at this time from those members of the political elite who sought to implement political and economic "renovation" (*kakushin*; cf. Itō 1978). Army officers seeking to realize a "high-grade national defense state" (*kōdo kokubō kokka*), reformist bureaucrats out to enhance their administrative authority, and various other advocates of comprehensive state control over the economy, politics, and society were convinced that Konoe was the one man who could help realize their objectives. For his part, Konoe sympathized with the objectives of renovating the domestic political order and enhancing Japan's position in East Asia, and the officials and intellectuals making up the premier's "brain trust," the Shōwa Research Association, busied themselves providing him with plans for a "New Order" that would promote political unity and national mobilization at home and Japan's pan-Asian destiny abroad (Berger 1977; Crowley 1971; Fletcher 1982; Itō 1983).

Although the prince eventually oversaw the establishment of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (IRAA), the institution meant to serve as the centerpiece of the "New Order," during his second administration (July 1940–July 1941), the path toward that accomplishment was both facilitated and frustrated by the war with China that began in July 1937. On the one hand, the outbreak of the "China Incident" facilitated implementation of the "National Spiritual Mobilization Campaign" in late 1937 and, over time, did the same for the National General Mobilization Law passed in April 1938.

On the other hand, the inability of Konoe to bring the war with China to a successful conclusion undermined his first cabinet, convinced him to give up on IRAA-centered political renovation during his second term and brought his third administration to the brink of war with the United States, a prospect that resulted in his resigning the premiership in October 1941 (Berger 1977).

The first Konoe cabinet relied heavily on pan-Asian thought to explain the greater historical significance of Japan's military campaign in China, thereby articulating a foreign policy that paralleled the domestic drive to create a new political structure. While these ideas had already proliferated in the early 1930s, the Konoe government's employment of them nonetheless marked a watershed in the official use of Pan-Asianism to legitimize Japanese military actions and diplomatic policies. In the wake of the Manchurian Incident of 1931, pan-Asian ideals had helped justify Japan's growing dissatisfaction with the international system established through agreements concluded at conferences in Paris (1919) and Washington (1921–1922). When the capture of the Nationalist capital of Nanjing (Nanking) in December 1937 failed to force the regime of Chiang Kai-shek to sue for peace, the Konoe cabinet used pan-Asian ideals to legitimize a national mission to replace the "Anglo-American"-dominated status quo with a Japan-led "New Order for East Asia." For the government and numerous ideologues, successful prosecution of the "China Incident" henceforth became a "holy war" (*seisen*) to renovate international relations in Asia.

The year 1938 thus saw the Konoe cabinet announce three policy initiatives that set the course of Japanese relations with China in the years leading up to Pearl Harbor. In January, the cabinet declared the Chiang administration to be nothing more than a local regime and announced that "the Imperial Government would no longer deal with the Nationalist Government." Then, in November and again in December, the government issued statements redefining the war in China as part of a greater struggle on the part of Japan to create a "New Order" in East Asia. Henceforth, pan-Asian ideals served to frame Japan's war goals and foreign policy in relation to China (see, for example, the 1939 radio address by Premier Hiranuma in II:21), which was called on, under either a new regime or a chastened Nationalist government, to end its resistance and cooperate with Japan and Manchukuo in constructing the "New Order," resisting the spread of communism, and furthering regional economic development. Meanwhile, Japan's ongoing war with China, declaration of a "New Order" for East Asia, and deepening ties with Germany and Italy worsened relations with the United States and Great Britain. In August 1940, the second Konoe cabinet expanded the vision of a "New Order" in East Asia to encompass a "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" (see also II:24) and, the following month, a formalized alliance with German and Italy

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via the Tripartite Treaty. From December 1941, the government of General Tōjō Hideki used the same pan-Asian rhetoric to legitimize expansion of the "China Incident" into the "Greater East Asia War."

The following sources exemplify the use of Pan-Asianism by the first Konoe cabinet to legitimize Japan's invasion of China and to mobilize the energies of the Japanese people in support of this war. The first document is the English version of the "Declaration of a New Order in East Asia" (*Tōa shinchitsujo seimei*) released by the Japanese Foreign Ministry on 2 November 1938. The second document, taken from an official English translation distributed by the Dōmei News Agency, is part of a radio address given by Konoe on 3 November explaining his government's policy to the public and underscoring the need for their full support in realizing Japan's destiny as the leader of Asia. The third document, released by the Foreign Ministry on 22 December, is the official declaration of the Konoe government's "three principles" for realizing Sino-Japanese relations in line with the proposed "New Order" in East Asia.

Sources: The following three texts are reproduced in U.S. Department of State, *Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, Japan: 1931-1941: Volume I (1931-1941)*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1931-1941, 477-81. Statement by the Japanese Government, November 3, 1938.

By the august virtue of His Majesty, our naval and military forces have captured Canton and the three cities of Wuhan; and all the vital areas of China have thus fallen into our hands. The Kuomintang Government exists no longer except as a mere local regime. However, so long as it persists in its anti-Japanese and pro-communist policy our country will not lay down its arms—never until that régime is crushed.

What Japan seeks is the establishment of a new order which will insure the permanent stability of East Asia. In this lies the ultimate purpose of our present military campaign.

This new order has for its foundation a tripartite relationship of mutual aid and co-ordination between Japan, Manchukuo and China in political, economic, cultural and other fields. Its object is to secure international justice, to perfect the joint defence against Communism, and to create a new culture and realize a close economic cohesion throughout East Asia. This indeed is the way to contribute toward the stabilization of East Asia and the progress of the world.

What Japan desires of China is that that country will share in the task of bringing about this new order in East Asia. She confidently expects that the

and order in the Far East by displaying their own individuality. It is a matter for deep regret, not only for the sake of Japan but also for the sake of the Far East, that the realization of this ideal between Japan and China was hampered by the wrong policy pursued by the Nationalist Government. The keynote of the policy pursued by the National Government is very superficial because it was based on the trends of the temporary reactionary period following the termination of the World War. This policy was not based on the tradition and intuition which are so characteristic of the Chinese nation. The National Government did everything in order to maintain its power and did not care for steady bolshevization and colonisation of China. This is not in accordance with the way pursued by China's zealous patriots who have fought at the sacrifice of their own lives for the construction of a new China. This is the reason why Japan which is so closely affiliated with China as one of the two greatest races in the Orient has risen in arms to crush the Chiang Kai-shek administration although she does not want to have a tragedy of fighting with the brother nation China. Japan sincerely desires that China will awake. Those who are jealous of the future in China should rise up for the execution of the common mission of the Far East by pointing the Chinese people to their destined path and guide the rejuvenated China. . . . The Chinese race which on many occasions during its history extending over five thousand years held a guiding torch for the civilization of the world should leave behind it a history compatible with the great deeds left by China's forefathers by bringing a new light to the civilisation of the world and sharing with Japan in the mission for the construction of a new Far East. If the National Government regains the original spirit of the Chinese race, effects changes in the policy it has pursued and the personnel and emerges as a new administration for the reconstruction of China, Japan would not reject the participation of the National Government. All countries of the world should have a clear recognition regarding the new situation in the Far East. History shows clearly that peace and independence in China have been frequently menaced as the result of the struggle for supremacy among foreign powers which was based on imperialistic ambitions. Japan sees the necessity of effecting a fundamental revision in this situation and desires to establish a new peace fabric in Far East on the basis of justice. . . . If the Powers understand the real intentions of Japan and devise a policy in accordance with the new situation in the Far East, Japan does not grudge to cooperate with them for peace in the Far East. The world knows that Japan is earnestly determined to fight it out with communism. What the Comintern intends to do is bolshevization of the Far East and disturbance of world peace. Japan expects to suppress in a drastic manner the sources of the evils of bolshevization and their subversive activities behind the so-called long-term resistance of the Chiang Kai-shek administration. Fortunately, both Germany

and Italy which are our allies on the anti-Comintern front understand the intentions of Japan in the Far East and have extended their moral support in the current incident which has greatly encouraged the Japanese nation. In this respect we extend our deep gratitude to these countries. The current incident had convinced us of the necessity of further tightening the bonds. Japan is determined also to cooperate in the reestablishment of world order guided by a common view of the world. What the world at present needs badly is the establishment of peace on a fair balance of power. There is no denying the fact that various principles in the past have forced the maintenance of the status quo marked by an unbalanced state. That the international treaty such as the covenant of the League of Nations has lost its prestige is fundamentally due to this irrationality. . . .

Japanese history shows that the vicissitudes of the country have always depended on the people's self-consciousness about the national structure. When we realize that the Imperial Throne is concerned about the establishment of permanent peace in the Far East we subjects cannot but feel that our moral mission is indeed heavy. The Japanese people at this very juncture must face their respective duties solemnly. They must also have a clear understanding and should not err in their recognition about what kind of sacrifice and preparation is necessary for the construction of a new fabric on a moral basis in the Far East. . . . Japan which is entrusted with the task of constructing a new Far East has entered upon a new stage of creation in all fields of human life. In this sense, the actual fighting has just started. In order to be a great nation we must proceed with the perfection of various preparations for reconstruction both at home and abroad with a firm faith and determination.

**STATEMENT BY THE JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER
(PRINCE KONOYE), DECEMBER 22, 1938**

The Japanese Government are resolved, as has been clearly set forth in their two previous statements issued this year, to carry on the military operations for the complete extermination of the anti-Japanese Kuomintang Government, and at the same time to proceed with the work of establishing a new order in East Asia together with those far-sighted Chinese who share in our ideals and aspirations.

The spirit of renaissance is now sweeping over all parts of China and enthusiasm for reconstruction is mounting ever higher. The Japanese Government desire to make public their basic policy for adjusting the relations between Japan and China, in order that their intentions may be thoroughly understood both at home and abroad.

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As regards economic not intend to exercise demand of China to meaning of the new seeks to render effective countries. That is to principle of equality of residence and trade with a view to progress in the light of the high China should extend resources, especially above gives the general object of Japan in understood, it will humanity for the costs of guarantee needed for in the establishment of China, but she is of the abolition of settlements—matters

Japan, China and Manchukuo will be united by the common aim of establishing the new order in East Asia and of realizing a relationship of neighbourly amity, common defence against Communism, and economic co-operation. For that purpose it is necessary first of all that China should cast aside all narrow and prejudiced views belonging to the past and do away with the folly of anti-Japanism, and resentment regarding Manchukuo. In other words, Japan frankly desires China to enter of her own will into complete diplomatic relations with Manchukuo.

The existence of the Comintern influence in East Asia can not be tolerated. Japan therefore considers it an essential condition of the adjustment of the Sino-Japanese relations that there should be concluded an anti-Comintern agreement between the two countries in consonance with the spirit of the anti-Comintern Agreement between Japan, Germany and Italy. And in order to ensure the full accomplishment of her purpose, Japan demands, in view of the actual circumstances prevailing in China, that Japanese troops be stationed, as an anti-Communist measure, at specified points during the time the said agreement is in force, and also that the Inner Mongolian region be designated as a special anti-Communist area.

As regards economic relations between the two countries, Japan does not intend to exercise economic monopoly in China, nor does she intend to demand of China to limit the interests of those third Powers, who grasp the meaning of the new East Asia and are willing to act accordingly. Japan only seeks to render effective the co-operation and collaboration between the two countries. That is to say, Japan demands that China, in accordance with the principle of equality between the two countries, should recognize the freedom of residence and trade on the part of Japanese subjects in the interior of China, with a view to promoting the economic interests of both peoples; and that, in the light of the historical and economic relations between the two nations, China should extend to Japan facilities for the development of China's natural resources, especially in the regions of North China and Inner Mongolia. The above gives the general lines of what Japan demands of China. If the true object of Japan in conducting the present vast military campaign be fully understood, it will be plain that what she seeks is neither territory nor indemnity for the costs of military operations. Japan demands only the minimum guarantee needed for the execution by China of her function as a participant in the establishment of the new order. Japan not only respects the sovereignty of China, but she is prepared to give positive consideration to the questions of the abolition of extra-territoriality and of the rendition of concessions and settlements—matters which are necessary for the full independence of China.

THE MINISTER
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Chapter Eighteen

Rōyama Masamichi and the "Principles of an East Asian Cooperative Community," 1938

Jung-Sun N. Han

In November 1938, the first Konoe Fumimaro cabinet declared that Japan would establish a "new order" in East Asia (see II:17). Confronting intensifying nationalist resistance in China to the Japanese invasion of 1937, the Konoe cabinet oscillated between nonrecognition and recognition of the Chinese Nationalist government. At a time of increasing confusion and disorder, the concept of an "East Asian Cooperative Community" (*tōa kyōdōtai* or *tōyō kyōdōtai*) was introduced to the world of politics and journalism as a guiding principle for the policymaking process regarding China. The term was popularized by Rōyama Masamichi (1895–1980), who at the time was a member of Konoe's "brain trust," the Shōwa Kenkyūkai (Shōwa Research Association).

A Tokyo Imperial University graduate, Rōyama was one of the leading political scientists in wartime Japan. Under the influence of his mentor Yoshino Sakuzō, a liberal and internationalist intellectual, Rōyama developed research interests in China within the context of a growing internationalism in the aftermath of World War I. In this period he was interested mainly in understanding the development of internationalism in global politics and assessing its repercussions in regional politics. Rōyama understood the contemporary development of internationalism from an evolutionist point of view. He regarded the formation of an international society as the culmination of an inevitable global historical process of evolution that advanced from "tribal society," through "ethnic society," and "national society" before it reached the final stage of "international society." While this evolutionary process was inevitable, it could be slowed by various factors, such as nationalism, which Rōyama regarded as a major obstacle to the development of international society. This was a particularly pernicious problem in the "Far East," which,

in his view, lagged behind the rest of the world in terms of historical development and was still stuck in the age of nationalism.

The concerns over nationalism led Rōyama to join the Japan Branch of the Institute of Pacific Relations in 1927. The Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) was an international nongovernmental organization established in Hawaii in 1923 to promote cooperation and secure peace in the Asia-Pacific region. Alarmed by intensifying anti-Japanese nationalism and frustrated by the ongoing political confusion in China, Rōyama reasoned that the “China problem” would leave Japan no option but to devise a new political order applicable to the “special” state of political development that marked the region.

Paradoxically, Rōyama’s experience with the IPR and its internationalist experiments led him to formulate a pan-Asianist regionalism characterized by the central notion of an “East Asian Cooperative Community” (EACC). Arguing that the world order created after World War I, with the League of Nations at the center, could not be applied to Sino-Japanese relations following the Manchurian Incident, Rōyama called for a new order that would rationalize relations between the two countries in the name of cooperative development and reciprocal progress. The EACC was different from other pan-Asianist concepts that called for an “East Asian League” in the sense that it did not emphasize a racial and cultural affinity between Japan and the rest of Asia. Rather, the EACC was based on an economic and developmentalist rationale. Translating political problems into the terms of mutual economic development, Rōyama proposed the notion of a regional bloc that was designed to promote Sino-Japanese economic cooperation while at the same time maintaining Japanese control over the developmentalist agenda. Propounding this self-serving scheme, Rōyama remained blind to China’s aspirations to regain its national independence and international respect. In the end, Rōyama’s notion of a regional economic community failed to resolve the conflict between China and Japan that ultimately led to the demise of the Japanese Empire.

Source (translation from the Japanese original by Jung-Sun N. Han)
Rōyama Masamichi, “Tōa Kyōdōtai no Riron” (The Principles of an East Asian Cooperative Community). *Kaizō*, November 1938, 6–27.

The recent China Incident [the Sino-Japanese War] has assumed the status of a holy war. Upon the outbreak of war, the government explained that “(Japan) does not have territorial ambitions” and that “what (Japan) seeks is Sino-Japanese cooperation.” Unlike the case with most international conflicts, (we have to) make it clear that the rationale for the China Incident does not lie in material motivations. The fact that enormous sacrifices have been

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made signifies that (the motives for) the incident lie beyond the calculation of gains in territory, resources, or markets. Even if such motives exist, they must only be secondary ones.

Yet the meaning of the holy war does not simply lie in the fact that material interests are not its primary goal. That would be too passive an explanation and fail to explain the true meaning of this holy war. As has been often repeated on all fronts, the [true significance of the war] lies in the moral goal of establishing a new order in East Asia. In other words, [the goal] is to establish and guarantee a permanent peace. For that purpose, [we are] making huge sacrifices and are prepared to endure great difficulties. . . .

The recent incident differs in essence from the wars undertaken in the pursuit of lesser goals. Such wars are characteristic of modern Europe, which has experienced the Great War and is now restricted by the League of Nations and the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War [Kellogg-Briand Treaty, 1928]. We can judge this from the fact that the incident does not allow a simple application of the principles of international law created in the aftermath of the Great War. This is because, as the recent incident shows, for the first time the Japan of the Orient has become aware of its mission to the world, independent of the guidance and intervention of the Western powers. In a nutshell, the reason for this situation is the awakening and unification of the Orient—two phenomena of global historical significance. Therefore, far from being a war of minor and restricted [importance], from a global historical perspective [the China Incident] displays an all-encompassing significance. . . .

However, the time for “the awakening of the Orient” at last has arrived. . . . Although on the one hand this turning-point represents the materialization of Western ideas by the League of Nations, meaning the continuing domination of the major powers, it is also the result of the Orient having found its place within a global system. If it had not been for the Great War and the postwar League of Nations, which led to a concrete conceptualization of the world, the Orient could not have awakened as the Orient. . . .

Ideally, the greatest significance of the recent incident should lie in an enhanced awareness by the peoples of the Orient toward the “unification of the Orient.” Yet, in reality, there are obstacles [to this unification] in the form of tragic conflicts between different ethnic groups and the confrontation with Western imperialist structures. As mentioned above, the lack of the single cultural order necessary for unification has hindered the unification of the Orient. However, the new unified cultural order and associated thinking cannot [yet] be realized in concrete terms as a result of the major obstacles that persist between different peoples. These obstacles are deformations produced by nationalism—the organizing principle of the Western world. Here lies the fundamental problem that has to be resolved first of all. That is, the East

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Asian problem needs to be crystallized in the form of war and politics before it can be crystallized in the form of culture and thought. The new order in East Asia must be created before the formation of a new Oriental ideology, in the smoke of powder and the hail of bullets. The Orient, baptized with fire and sword, will rationalize East Asian thought. . . .

In this respect, the unification of the Orient must begin by doing away with nationalism. But where will the engine needed for this process come from? The main engine for this task is to be found in the advancement of Japanese nationalism on the Asian mainland. . . .

However, the principle at the heart of the Japanese advance onto the [Asian] mainland is not imperialism, but regionalism pursued for reasons of security and development. . . .

In this respect, the theory of a regional cooperative community—Asia's destiny—which is already reflected in the actual process of Japan's advances on the Asian mainland, is the only principle that will awaken the Orient to embrace its world mission and realize the unification of the Orient. There is no doubt that this principle represents an ideology powerful enough to overcome the tragedy of the Orient created by perverse nationalisms. . . .

There are a few theoretical characteristics that mark [this regional cooperative community]. . . .

First, the Oriental regional cooperative community (*tōyōteki chiiki kyōdōtai*) must embrace a single new system. . . . This system should not be a territorial empire in which one ethnic group or one state dominates the others, but it should rather be a regional cooperative community whose natural political structure is a confederation.

Second, this Oriental regional cooperative community should respect existing differences among the various ethnic cultures represented, acknowledge different ethnic backgrounds, recognize its global cultural mission in relation to Western culture, and make an effort to creatively unify all these elements. . . .

Third, the Oriental regional cooperative community must implement rational plans and policies to guarantee and improve the welfare of its peoples. . . .

Fourth, the economic system of the regional cooperative community should reflect a collective economy and not an imperialist economic system. . . .

Fifth, its final but most important characteristic is that the theory of a regional cooperative community does not assume an autarkic or bloc system but a global system, and thus embodies the principles of the international political and economic system.

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Chapter Nineteen

Miyazaki Masayoshi: "On the East Asian League," 1938

Michael A. Schneider

Miyazaki Masayoshi (1893–1954) was a minor bureaucrat who came to wield considerable influence over draft plans for Japan's wartime mobilization (on Miyazaki's life, see Kobayashi 1995). Associated with prominent military figures, most notably Ishiwara Kanji (see II:22), Miyazaki reached a wide audience with his sharp critiques of laissez-faire capitalism blended with a vision of pan-Asian economic unity. As such, he offered a clear link between pan-Asian idealism and the formulation of concrete policies to implement a union of Asian nations. His career trajectory paralleled Ishiwara's, however, and he too became a marginal figure during the war years. Nevertheless, his ties to the Manchurian development project during the 1930s gave him influence in postwar discussions for reinvigorating Japan's economy.

Miyazaki was one of the few Japanese to witness the early stages of the Russian Revolution first hand. He was born in Kanazawa, Ishikawa Prefecture, to a former samurai family that had successfully made the transition into the rice trade business. Having earned a prefectural scholarship to study the Russian language in Harbin in 1914, he obtained another scholarship to continue his study in St. Petersburg (Petrograd at the time), where he earned a college-level degree. As a student, he witnessed the February Revolution (March 1917) and the ensuing chaos under the Provisional Government. He left Russia in July before the Bolshevik (October) Revolution, but the experience of the revolution shaped his views on political leadership and economic policy.

On his return, Miyazaki parlayed his expertise on Russia into a position with the Southern Manchurian Railway (SMR), eventually landing in its Research Section (on the history of the SMR's research section, see Kobayashi 2005). During the 1920s, he carried out a number of studies of the postrevolutionary Soviet economy. He was particularly interested in Soviet

central planning as pursued under the New Economic Policy and the Five-Year Plans. While certainly no Marxist, Miyazaki developed an appreciation for the role of state central planning for the economy.

In 1930, he met Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara Kanji, then serving on the general staff of the Kwantung army. Introduced to Ishiwara's vision of an impending global confrontation between regional economic blocs, Miyazaki perceived intellectual common ground over the importance of long-term economic development as essential to putting Japan and northeastern Asia on a firm wartime footing. For his part, Ishiwara subsequently credited Miyazaki with providing the intellectual rationale for his vision of regional development. After the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident in September 1931, Miyazaki sided decisively with the militarists. He moved from the Research Section to the newly organized Keizai Kenkyūkai (Economic Research Association [ERA]), taking the directorship of its First Division. This division held responsibility over general economic planning, thus appealing to Miyazaki's desire to establish the broad outlines of a new command economy. The move made him understandably unpopular within the SMR, as it led to a hollowing out of the existing Research Division while compelling the civilian bureaucrats to work with the military advocates of territorial expansion. In his new position, Miyazaki was the principal author of the ERA's 1932 proposal for state management of Manchurian industrial development. The proposal argued that the rise of regional economic blocs during the Great Depression was a direct response to the mismanagement of Japan's economy. In place of the bungled *laissez-faire*, export-oriented development of the 1920s, he insisted, Manchurian development must focus on long-term growth in heavy industry.

With the state of Manchukuo established in 1932 and the ERA's planning complete, future planning for continental development shifted to Tokyo. By 1935, both Ishiwara and Miyazaki found themselves there. Miyazaki joined the Japan-Manchukuo Finance and Economics Research Association, a think tank backed by the Army General Staff and populated with young economists mostly from Tokyo Imperial University. By 1937, the association under Miyazaki's leadership had crafted a detailed blueprint for the development of the Japanese economy in such a way as to give it the industrial might to confront the great powers in East Asia. As with Miyazaki's earlier proposals, this five-year plan included a sweeping vision of economic development to place the economy on a war footing, with centralized planning, production targets in heavy industries, controls on financial institutions and foreign exchange, and constraints on the activities of private entrepreneurs. It also called for dramatic changes to the domestic political structure in order to manage these policies.

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Miyazaki and Ishiwara viewed the slide into full-scale war with Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government in 1937 as premature. Predictably, the immediate needs of war prosecution derailed many of the broadly conceived, long-term prescriptions for centralizing economic planning. Their prescriptions for reform of existing government institutions had many powerful critics. Reflecting Ishiwara Kanji's gradual alienation from the official course of continental policy, Miyazaki reoriented his activities to support Ishiwara's vision for organizing a community of allied states liberated from Western imperialism: an East Asian League (on Ishiwara's role; see II:22). To this end Miyazaki played a leading role in forming the Tōa Renmei Kyōkai (East Asian League Association) in October 1939. The organization boasted fifty-two branches with some 6,600 members (Kobayashi 1995: 194). It had sister organizations in China, in Beijing the Zhonghua Dongya Lianmeng Xiehui (Japanese: Chūka Tōa Renmei Kyōkai, Chinese East Asian League Association, 1940), whose president was Miao Pin (1899–1946) and the Dongya Lianmeng Zhongguo Tongshihui (Japanese: Tōa Renmei Chūgoku Dōshikai, Association of Chinese Comrades of the East Asian League, 1941) in Nanjing headed by Wang Jingwei (Wang Ching-wei; see II:23), the premier of the collaborationist Nanjing (Nanking) regime (Kobayashi 1995: 194).

Miyazaki published his own views in 1938 in a book titled *Tōa Renmei Ron* (On the East Asian League). The appearance of the book coincided with the formation of the Wang Jingwei regime in Nanjing. It was a rare opportunity for Miyazaki to give a public voice to ideas he had been promoting within bureaucratic circles for years. As indicated in the translation here, the tract, with its sharp, clear prose and an unflinching critical tone, reads as an ideological call to arms on behalf of his command economy proposals. The work thus anticipates the reasons why the subsequent movement for an East Asian League, led by Ishiwara, would be a largely oppositional one. Although steeped in pan-Asianist themes and sustaining the image of Japanese moral leadership in Asia, Miyazaki and the movement for an East Asian League argued that East Asian unity must be formed by politically independent states, even if that requirement meant political independence for colonies like Korea. This quasi-internationalist stance was viewed as critical of the continental strategy of the Konoe Fumimaro cabinet. Ishiwara's nemesis Army Minister Tōjō Hideki ultimately suppressed the movement in 1941.

Miyazaki spent the remainder of the war years in occupied China working on local economic development projects. He was in Shanghai at the war's end and escaped close scrutiny by the American occupation authorities on his repatriation. He joined the Nihon Keizai Fukkō Kyōkai (Japanese Economic Recovery Association), a private think tank devoted to postwar reconstruction. Given his contacts with noted political figures, he might have achieved

greater status in the postwar era, but he died of liver cancer in 1954 before achieving a prominent position.

Source (translation from the Japanese original by Michael A. Schneider)
Miyazaki Masayoshi, *Tōa Renmei Ron* (On the East Asian League),
Kaizōsha, 1938, 44–53.

The policy of an East Asian League means turning away from our emulation of European imperialist and colonial policies and eventually repudiating them. . . .

I cannot emphasize enough that, in abandoning our imperialist policies, our nation must not vacillate. Today, the ambition to justify all of Japan's deeds has a strong grip over the nation. A posture of ruthlessly defending every one of our policies in the past, however, does not demonstrate the magnanimity of a great nation. Although our continental policy brought peace and prosperity to Korea and achieved a perfect merger of the Japanese and Korean peoples, we should not lose sight of the fact that we have lost supporters for our policies in East Asia. Japan must revert to its own course. It must reestablish a position of leadership in East Asia. For this reason, it is essential that we drive out any vestiges of imperialist thought remaining in our public discourse. As long as these attitudes persist in Japan, it will be difficult for East Asians to grasp the East Asian League framework, but moreover its policies will lose their moral force. In this sense, Japan, as the advocate for the League, must investigate the psyche of oppressed peoples thoroughly at every stage of the League's formulation. We must be ever mindful that the structure of the League not replace the system of Western exploitation with a system of Japanese oppression and must further be resolved not to give the impression that it will.

With the League taking as its goal the liberation of East Asian peoples, the right of political independence of liberated peoples must be guaranteed unconditionally. As Japan and its allies cooperate with the liberation movements of other East Asian peoples, it must be left to voluntary decision whether they join the League or whether they remain completely independent nations. Further, we must recognize a right of withdrawal after joining. The East Asian League is a union of autonomous East Asian nations, which should be bound closely by the sinews of mutual political and economic interdependence between Japan and its allies. It is not a system of coercion. The ultimate will to independent statehood cannot be suppressed. I believe that, with Japan and its allies assuming this stance, centrifugal forces will be very weak and the chances of a people distancing themselves from the League would be extremely small. From the perspective of the development

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of national economies generally or from the perspective of the benefits for ordinary individuals, the fact is that advantage is gained by being part of a big nation or a big bloc. During this recent period of quasi-warfare among competing blocs, this holds especially true for a small, weak country in the corner of East Asia. The historical significance of an East Asian League to East Asians could be most easily understood were Japan to adopt such a stance. . . .

[Miyazaki goes on ascribe the oppressive race relations under European empires to the liberal, free trade ideology of the West.]

The White man's system of rule over East Asia was, at root, shot through with liberal thought. Those who think my words are extreme need look no further than the cases of natives of India, the Annamites of French Indochina, the blacks of South Africa or the present state of the blacks and native Indians of the United States. . . .

It is emotionally stunning to think back to the days before the Manchurian Incident—when a segment of the Japanese intelligentsia longed for free trade, held out hope for the potential of a global economy, and even advocated abandoning Manchuria—that the day had arrived when the thought and systems of Western liberalism held such potency that Japanese would abandon their own East Asian-ness (*Tōyōsei*). . . .

The establishment of an East Asian League is a comprehensive renovationist policy, combining the renovation of our policy on the continent with the establishment of a new domestic order. Its renovationist character becomes increasingly clear, as evidenced by our comprehensive global policy through the Anti-Comintern Pact [concluded with Germany in 1936], and presents powerful testimony that Japan is entering a new epoch.

Chapter Twenty-Two

Ishiwara Kanji's "Argument for an East Asian League," 1940

Roger H. Brown

In May 1947, Ishiwara Kanji (1889–1949) testified before a special military court convened as part of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. While not under indictment himself, Ishiwara responded with indignation at what he viewed as American hypocrisy in trying Japanese for aggression and atrocities. Accusing prosecutors of being ignorant of their own country's history of expansionism in East Asia, he neatly shifted responsibility for Japanese aggression to the Americans and other Westerners who set the aggressive example, bluntly suggesting that, if they wished to try someone, they should subpoena the American Commodore Matthew Perry, who, with his flotilla of "black ships," forced the opening of Japan in 1853–1854. Disingenuous and evasive on the question of Japan's militarism and expansionism, Ishiwara's outburst illustrates aptly the manner in which Pan-Asianism served to both motivate and rationalize Japanese actions during the 1930s. Indeed, few individuals could match Ishiwara's degree of personal involvement in setting Japan's militarist quest for autarky in motion or close association with the pan-Asian ideology that accompanied that pursuit.

Ishiwara spent all but twenty-one years of his life in uniform (on Ishiwara's life, see Aoe 1997; Peattie 1975). He received his commission with the Twenty-First Class of the Military Academy in 1909 and served as an infantry field and staff officer before being retired at the rank of lieutenant general in 1941. Ishiwara was one of the key conspirators in the Manchurian Incident of 1931, which he viewed as a first step toward gaining the resources necessary for Japan to mobilize for a coming global war. While calling for formation of a New Order for East Asia based on Japanese, Manchurian, and Chinese cooperation, he sought an early end to the "China Incident" that began in July 1937 so as not to undermine preparations for total war against the West. This view brought him increasingly into conflict with other officers

on the Army General Staff, who saw the war as an opportunity to destroy Chinese resistance at one blow and, as their position gained ascendancy, Ishiwara's star began to fade. Leaving the General Staff for assignment with the Kwantung army in Manchukuo, Ishiwara made no secret of his unhappiness with the army's corrupt dominance over that puppet state. Criticizing those he held responsible for this state of affairs—including Major General Tōjō Hideki—he soon returned to Japan in 1938.

Although Ishiwara's army career was in eclipse, the years from 1939 to 1941 afforded him an opportunity to refine his thoughts regarding Japan's pan-Asian destiny and preparations for a "final war" against the West (cf. Ishiwara 1993), ideas that found institutional expression via the East Asian League Association (Tōa Renmei Kyōkai). A former lecturer at the Army War College, he perceived in his study of military history a tale of technological progress and strategic alternation between protracted wars and decisive wars. A follower of Nichiren Buddhism since 1919, he drew inspiration from this ethnocentric and apocalyptic form of Buddhism, which reserved for Japan the central role of combining government and religious truth in order to regenerate the world and bring about peace and harmony. Under the influence of the Nichiren revivalist Tanaka Chigaku's (1861–1939) blend of religious doctrine and emperor-centered ideology, Ishiwara conceived his theory of a "final war" (*saishū sensō*) between the champions of East and West, roles to be filled, respectively, by Japan and the United States.

Ishiwara envisioned a reorganization of domestic politics into "one country, one party" beneath "direct imperial rule," which would in turn facilitate increased industrial production and the creation of the national defense state that would provide Japan with military superiority in relation to prospective future foes, including the Soviet Union and, ultimately, the United States. Ishiwara sought to extend this renovation to the rest of East Asia, thereby securing the independence and modernization of the region while simultaneously fulfilling Japan's pan-Asian destiny. Japanese national mobilization would occur in tandem with the establishment of an alliance of East Asian nations to be led by Japan, harmonized through the creation of a new Asian morality rooted in the Kingly Way (*ōdō*) and animated by the spiritual qualities of the Japanese emperor. Facilitated through Japan's foundational spirit, the resulting material preparedness and ideological and political unity would enable Japan to successfully prosecute the final world war against the West. Japanese victory in this decisive conflict, which he believed would occur some thirty years hence, would result in the realization of world peace in the form of *hakkō ichiu* ("the eight corners of the world under one roof").

Although Ishiwara's personal interest in pan-Asian thought developed early in his life and the idea of an alliance of East Asian nations took shape shortly

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after the creation of Manchukuo in 1932, the East Asian League Association was not founded until 1939. At its peak, the organization boasted numerous branches at home and abroad and at least 100,000 members. Among the League's supporters were army officers in China, such as fellow Manchurian Incident conspirator and later Army Minister General Itagaki Seishirō (1885–1948), and members of the Japan-backed government in Nanjing, including President Wang Jingwei (Wang Ching-wei; see II:23). The New Order envisioned by the League resembled an East Asian commonwealth of nations under Japanese leadership and, in theory, held out the possibility of a regional system less coercive than the New Order being pursued by the Japanese government. Nevertheless, it was clearly to be a league not only led by Japan but also formed in the service of Japanese mobilization for war with the West.

Whatever ultimate form the East Asian League may have taken must remain speculative since the organization quickly ran afoul of General Tōjō, who, first as army minister in the second and third cabinets of Premier Kōnoe Fumimaro and then as prime minister in the successor administration, oversaw the League's suppression and ultimate disbanding. Tōjō's antipathy arose from both personal and political differences with the League and its leader. First, the League, reflecting Ishiwara's personal outlook, advocated a less hard-line approach to relations with China, something that Tōjō viewed as defeatist and antithetical to his own hard-line policy. Second, there was the obvious potential of the League to serve as a political base from which Ishiwara might challenge both Tōjō personally and government policy in general. Indeed, it was his perception of the League as a tool for getting at him personally that led Tōjō to initiate a crackdown in the fall of 1940. On the receiving end of this attention, Ishiwara fought back vigorously and publicly, his efforts culminating in a speech at Kyoto Imperial University in which he identified Tōjō and his allies rather than the Chinese as the true enemies of Japan and as men who should be arrested and executed. Nevertheless, it was a losing battle, and in March 1941, Ishiwara was placed on the retired list. A brief stint lecturing at Ritsumeikan University also ended under pressure from the authorities, and Ishiwara returned to his hometown for the remainder of the war.

It was there that occupation authorities later found him, outlawing his early postwar efforts to update and spread his ideas and deposing him for the war crimes tribunal. Meanwhile, the East Asian League Association was dissolved in 1942, then reorganized under the name East Asian League Comrades Association (Tōa Renmei Dōshikai), and finally purged by American occupation authorities in 1946.

The following translation is comprised of the East Asian League Association's manifesto and an explanation of the historical necessity for forming the

League and realizing a "New Order" for East Asia. These passages are taken from the association's *Tōa Renmei Kensetsu Yōkō* (Prospectus for Constructing the East Asian League), which goes on to enunciate the League's ideals and plans in greater detail before ending with an appended essay by Satomi Kishio (1897–1974)—the son of Tanaka Chigaku who was an Ishiwaras associate—arguing for the compatibility of the Confucian Kingly Way with Japan's Imperial Way.

Source (translation from the Japanese original by Roger H. Brown) "Sengen" (Manifesto) and "Tōa Renmei no Hitsuzensei" (The Inevitability of the East Asian League), *Tōa Renmei Kyōkai* (ed.) (1940), *Tōa Renmei Kensetsu Yōkō* (Prospectus for Constructing the East Asian League). Ritsumeikan Shuppanbu, 1–7.

MANIFESTO

The final world war that is the great pivot of human history will arrive in the coming few decades. The Shōwa Restoration is none other than the unified application of the total abilities of the East Asian peoples in expectation of certain victory in this decisive battle.

Specifically, the aims of the Shōwa Restoration are as follows:

1. Out of the various states of the region form an East Asian League capable of eliminating the oppression of Euro-American imperialism.
2. Through assertive and reformist construction within the League rapidly increase true strength and prepare the conditions for certain victory in the decisive war.
3. En route to constructing the above, establish the leadership principles of a new age rooted in the Kingly Way.

11 February 2600 [1940]
East Asian League Association

THE INEVITABILITY OF THE EAST ASIAN LEAGUE

Establishing absolute world peace has long been humanity's ideal. That so long as humanity exists there will be no end to war is contemporary common sense. According to theoretical and idealistic thinking, eradicating war is fundamentally impossible; however, progressive development in perfecting

the art of war will, the capacity for strife, ultimately end to war is the real world peace.

In the "New Thesis" case that the final world war that global unity ought to be.

Looking at the development of states grow ever larger, an inevitable trend of his state. Through the rise of culture, and industry, regional contiguous states, European war the world to the age of state and the second great European war, namely, Europe, the Sino-Japanese war. In this manner one can be divided into two groups of states: the Despotic Way, and the Kingly Way. The final world war of the unification of the world.

In this way, following the natural that the various states mate racially, and are

The idea of East Asian League Meiji predecessors met the countries of Japan, Korea, and Asianism. However, it is not yet allow for East Asian League community has existed. The realities of East Asia are no longer the case. The competition of the various peoples, so, then what are those

First, Japan has fought against the forces of Westernization, Japan first ended of the unequal treaties. Sino-Japanese War, which fought and won against

the art of war will, through a final world war giving full play to mankind's capacity for strife, ultimately bring about the end of war itself. Bringing an end to war is the realization of global unity, the first step toward absolute world peace.

In the "New Thesis on the Shōwa Restoration" we have already made the case that the final world war will arrive within about the next thirty years and that global unity ought to be realized within about fifty years.

Looking at the development of human society it is clear that the spheres of states grow ever larger even as their number grows ever fewer and that the inevitable trend of history is that there will soon be unification into a world state. Through the rapid development of communications, transportation, culture, and industry the world's space is being increasingly reduced and regional contiguous states are drawing together. Following the first great European war the world evolved from the era of states confronting states to the age of state alliances confronting state alliances; however, through the second great European war, the world is now dividing into four groups, namely, Europe, the Soviet Union, South and North America, and East Asia. In this manner one can imagine the world henceforth will ultimately divide into two groups of states representing the civilizations of the Kingly Way and of the Despotic Way, and that these two groups of states will then deploy for the final world war centered on the Pacific, the result of which will be the unification of the world.

In this way, following the inevitable tendency of world history, it is most natural that the various East Asian peoples who adjoin regionally, approximate racially, and are similar culturally must unite as one.

The idea of East Asian Unity is not necessarily new. There were among our Meiji predecessors more than a few who called for the unification of the three countries of Japan, Korea and China, and Sun Yat-sen also advocated Great Asianism. However, in their day, the objective conditions in East Asia did not yet allow for East Asian unification. As an idea, the case for an East Asian community has existed previously, but when it came to connecting this to the realities of East Asia, the time was not yet right. However, today that is no longer the case. The objective conditions are ripe for realizing the unification of the various peoples of East Asia and for forming the East Asian League. If so, then what are those objective conditions?

First, Japan has obtained the capability to strike back from East Asia against the forces of Euro-American imperialism. Following the Meiji Restoration, Japan first endeavored necessarily to free itself from the shackles of the unequal treaties imposed by the Euro-American countries. After the Sino-Japanese War, she at long last succeeded in treaty revision and then fought and won against Russia which was seeking to occupy Manchuria and

Asia. These passages are taken from *Tōa Renmei* (Prospectus for Constructing the League's ideals) an appended essay by Satomi Iwano who was an Ishiwara Kanji Confucian Kingly Way with

by Roger H. Brown) in *Tōa Renmei* (The Inevitability of the East Asian League). Rit-

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humanity's ideal. That so far is contemporary common thinking, eradicating war is the first step toward development in perfecting

annex Korea. At that time Japan was respected by the various races of Asia as a liberator and Japanese, too, thought of East Asian revival; however, regrettably Japan was then incapable of rivaling the forces of Euro-American imperialism and thus imitated the forms of imperialism, cooperating especially with the various Euro-American countries and, moreover, we must admit the truth here, oppressed the various races of East Asia who should have been our allies. However, having availed itself of the opportunity presented by the Manchurian Incident, Japan's capabilities increased rapidly. At the same time self-confidence in that power unconsciously stirred moral instinct that attained the conscious awareness to liberate the races of East Asia from the bonds of Euro-American imperialism. The unity of East Asia takes as its prerequisite the liberation of East Asia. Japan, availing itself of the opportunity presented by the recent [China] incident, has secured the capability to expel the forces of Euro-American imperialism and this, we must say, is the most important condition for the formation of the East Asian League.

Second, there is the decline of Euro-American imperialist power in East Asia. Led by Great Britain, the first country to complete the industrial revolution, the Euro-American countries advanced into East Asia during the nineteenth century by means of cannons and goods. In the age of imperialism, through banks and railways they invaded East Asia and, except for Japan, placed virtually all the races of East Asia under their control. However, rule over East Asia by Euro-American imperialism was shaken in the wake of the first great European war and is now collapsing because of the China Incident and the second great European war. In particular, Great Britain, the pioneer of aggression against East Asia, is now experiencing its downfall. Construction of the New Order for East Asia, i.e., formation of the East Asian League, will be accomplished only through the expulsion from East Asia of the political and military power of the Anglo-American countries that fail to cooperate with this venture. Today, the three countries of Japan, Germany, and Italy, who share the objective of constructing a New World Order, have concluded an alliance, and both Germany and Italy now recognize the leadership of Japan in East Asia. Thus, with the liberating of East Asia and its victimized peoples from the bonds of Anglo-American financial and military control, one can consider the objective conditions demanding the formation of the East Asian League to be ripening.

The third vital factor is the decline of liberal thought and the rise of a new East Asian world view originating in the Kingly Way. As we all know, liberalism has its origins in Great Britain and accompanied the establishment of Great Britain's global hegemony and, from the eighteenth century through the early twentieth century, constituted the *zeitgeist* that dominated the world. Thus, the world order of this age was established with this spirit as

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the foundation. Therefore, it is no exaggeration to call this order that existed in indivisible relation to the development of Great Britain, the British Order. Nevertheless, this liberal order must now conform to the general trend of the world. Since the first great European war, totalitarian systems have been set up in the Soviet Union, Italy, and Germany. In particular, the overwhelming victory of Germany and Italy in the second great European war is a triumph of the totalitarian world view. In East Asia, as well, liberalism is being increasingly liquidated and, furthermore, on the basis of traditional spiritual culture there is developing a new world view refining modern thought. Beneath this new East Asian world view originating in the Kingly Way is a general trend demanding the construction of a New Order for East Asia.

As stated above, following the progressive development of humanity, advancement from small regional states to large regional state alliances is an historical inevitability. The current shifting from the age of state confrontations to the age of state unions is the inevitable advance of world history. No power can avert this inevitable current of world history. At this moment the objective basis is being constructed for unification of the East Asian states, i.e., for the necessary formation of the East Asian League. However, the East Asian League will never be realized if things are allowed to naturally take their own course. Formation of the East Asian League will only come about through the endless cooperative efforts of the three peoples of Japan, Manchuria, and China who must be the core and each work tirelessly for that construction. In other words, as argued above, the East Asian League will be constructed atop the foundation of various objective relations in accord with world historical necessity, but only by directing our subjective will to work toward this can that construction be realized.

Chapter Twenty-Three

Nanjing's Greater Asianism: Wang Jingwei and Zhou Huaren, 1940

Torsten Weber

The concept of Asianism in China was a principal instrument in the justification of official Chinese collaboration with Japan during the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945). However, the Asianism proposed by the main Chinese collaborators—Wang Jingwei (Wang Ching-wei, also Wang Zhaoming, 1883–1944) and his followers—was neither an invention for propaganda purposes nor a mere adoption of Japanese wartime rhetoric. Instead, it was part of an integrated attempt at seeking political legitimacy by claiming the intellectual heritage of Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925; see II:5), the “Father of the Republic” (*guofu*). Wang’s Asianism, therefore, was a “restoration of Sun Yat-sen’s Asianism” (So 2007: 189), particularly as expressed in his famous Kobe speech of 1924. It was “primarily in this speech that Wang Ching-wei claimed to find the justification for his cooperation with Japan” (Jansen 1954: 213). By adopting Sun’s Asianism, Wang managed to combine his claim to Sun’s legacy with appeasing the Japanese on the one hand and offering a political alternative in the domestic arena to the united front of Mao Zedong’s Chinese Communist Party and Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Party (Guomindang [GMD], or Kuomintang) on the other. Eventually, Wang’s balancing act between pleasing the Japanese and appealing to the war-torn Chinese failed under the combined pressure of anti-Japanese resistance and the military success of the Allied forces. Before Wang died in 1944, he realized that his attempts to create an anticommunist and pro-Japanese China under his leadership had failed.

Wang Jingwei was born in Guangdong (Canton) and first visited Japan in 1904 as an exchange student at Hōsei University. In 1905, when Sun Yat-sen founded the Chinese Revolutionary League (Tongmenghui or T’ung-meng-hui; Japanese: Chūgoku Dōmeikai) in Tokyo, Wang became an editor of its party bulletin, the *Minbao* (People’s Paper). In 1910 Wang returned to China

to assassinate the regent and father of the child-emperor Puyi but was arrested and sentenced to death before he accomplished his mission. Following the Republican Revolution of 1911, he was freed and became one of Sun's closest followers. In the 1920s, he held several posts in Sun's Revolutionary Government in Guangdong.

When Sun Yat-sen died in 1925, he left behind not only a war-torn and disintegrated China but also a vacancy in the succession to the GMD leadership. At first, Wang appeared as the most likely candidate. However, lacking military support at a time when China was de facto ruled by regional warlords, Wang was quickly outstripped by Chiang Kai-shek, then head of the Whampoa Military Academy. The military expedition to unify northern China with the south from 1926 onward further strengthened Chiang's position. Subsequently, Wang—as the leader of the GMD's left wing—became Chiang's main inner-party rival, and the claim over the prerogative to Sun's legacy became an important instrument in his challenge to Chiang's leadership. Wang was eventually reconciled with Chiang after the Manchurian Incident (1931) and became premier of the GMD's Nationalist Government (1932–1935). His rivalry with Chiang, however, continued. When Chiang was again forced to cooperate with the communists after the Xi'an Incident of 1936, Wang's anticommunist and pro-Japanese stance estranged him further from the GMD leadership. Although Wang, together with Chiang and his GMD government, fled the Japanese invasion of China to Chongqing (Chungking) in 1938, he soon turned away from Chiang and began to look toward the Japanese.

Premier Konoe's announcement of a new China policy ("New Order in East Asia"; see II:17) in November was interpreted—both in Japan and in China—as an implicit invitation to Wang to become the head of a pro-Japanese administration in occupied China. Just one month later Wang and his followers left Chongqing. After a period of refuge in Hanoi and Hong Kong, Wang decided to move to Shanghai, where he would directly negotiate the conditions of his collaboration with Japan. It is important to note that almost a year and a half passed between Wang's defection and his assuming the leadership of a Japanese-sponsored government in Nanjing (Nanking) in March 1940. Studies that portray Wang as a traitor (*hanjian*)—still the predominant view in mainland China and Taiwan—overlook the fact that an appropriate political response to the situation was hotly debated within the Wang group. Once the decision to collaborate had been taken, Wang negotiated with the Japanese over the exact terms of his cooperation, which included the demand for a Japanese troop withdrawal. Seen in this light, Wang appears to have been much less of the passive toy in the hands of his Japanese masters than the frequent characterizations of his government as a "puppet regime" imply.

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In order to legitimize his government in Nanjing, to appear to the Chinese as an attractive alternative to Chiang, and simultaneously to please the Japanese, Wang employed a number of striking political symbols and slogans (Cheung 1995). He adopted the same name and structure as Chiang's Chongqing government and built his political program around the cornerstones of peace (*heping*), anticommunism (*fangong*), and national reconstruction (*jianguo*). These three slogans were usually displayed together with the national flag, the same one that had been adopted by the unified Nationalist government in 1928 ("blue sky-white sun-red earth"). Wang also insisted that his assumption of the leadership of the government in Nanjing would be publicized not as the creation of a new regime but as a "return to the capital" (*huan du*). Equally important, Wang linked the legitimacy of his government largely to the person of Sun Yat-sen. Together with Zhou Fohai (Chou Fuhai, 1897-1948), a close follower of Wang, he visited Sun's tomb in Nanjing prior to the official inauguration of his new government. Sun's birthday (12 November) was also used as a symbol of Wang's self-proclaimed succession of Sun's leadership. For example, the opening of Nanjing's Central Bank in 1940 was delayed to coincide with 12 November, and Wang's speech, translated here, explicitly noted Sun's birthday as the occasion on which it was written. While Wang openly embraced Japan's pan-Asian rhetoric, he explicitly linked his pro-Japanese and antiresistance positions not to Japanese but exclusively to Sun Yat-sen's Asianism. References to Sun soon became ubiquitous in Wang's speeches and articles. In the foreword to a collection of Sun's writings, which was published in 1941 and which included the text of Sun's Greater Asianism speech, Wang wrote,

Racially, geographically and historically, as well as in respect of environment, culture and material development, it is natural for China and Japan to be friends, unnatural for them to be enemies. Any dispute which arises between the two nations should be regarded as a transitory aberration, and should be settled in an appropriate manner so that the natural relationship may resume its permanent and natural course of peace and friendship. This point has been expounded most clearly and most thoroughly in the teachings bequeathed us by our late Leader, Dr. Sun Yat-sen. There are occasional passages to be found in those teachings in which he blames China for her errors; there are others in which he takes Japan to task for her mistakes; but at no time and in no place did he ever suggest that the two countries should be or remain enemies. Rather it was his constantly proclaimed hope that they would become friends, joining wholeheartedly in a united effort to promote the glorious cause of Greater Asianism. (Tang 1941: ix)

In order to solidify his claim to Sun's legacy and to justify his collaboration with Japan, a number of journals were published in Japanese-occupied China

that promoted Wang's adoption of Sun's Asianism, including the monthlies *Da Yazhouzhuyi* (Greater Asianism), *Da Yazhouzhuyi yu Dongya lianmeng* (Greater Asianism and an East Asian League), and *Da Dongya* (Greater East Asia). While these publications clearly functioned as instruments of propaganda, it should not be overlooked that Wang himself and many of his followers held sincere pro-Japanese sentiments. In addition, humanitarian and idealistic motives, such as putting an end to the ongoing slaughter on the battlefield and his well-known anticommunism, were among the reasons that led Wang to his betrayal of Chiang and to his cooperation with the Japanese. As Dongyoun Hwang points out, the nature of the differences between Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei was "not merely political factionalism, but ideological" (Hwang 1998: 15).

In addition to Sun's Greater Asianism, Wang and his supporters also adopted Sun's Three People's Principles (*Sanminzhuyi*; cf. Itō 1989) as theoretical underpinnings of the new Nanjing regime—and took considerable pains to convince the Japanese of the compatibility of these principles with Asianism. Reportedly, the nationalism (*minzuzhuyi*), democracy (*minquanzhuyi*), and livelihood (*minshengzhuyi*) that Sun had extensively lectured on in the summer of 1924 were viewed as "a menace" in Japan (Boyle 1972: 246). In this context, Zhou Huaren's text reproduced here can be read as an attempt to assuage Japanese concerns over the Three Principles, in particular nationalism. Although Zhou paid great attention to showing the conformity of the principles with the ideals of Greater Asianism, the text had to be edited to fit the Japanese rhetoric before it appeared in translation in Japan. For example, the Japanese version explicitly affirms Konoe's declaration of a New Order ("to share the responsibility for erecting a New Order in East Asia"), whereas Zhou's original text does not mention the "New Order" but speaks only of "the responsibility for building a stabilized East Asia." Wang's writings were similarly altered to remove any references to Chinese nationalist aspirations that ran counter to the official Japanese political rhetoric. The fact that such editing was necessary further demonstrates that condemnations of Wang as a Chinese quisling who "perverted Sun's Greater Asianism . . . in search of a theoretical basis for his own disgraceful behavior or treason" (Shi 2002: 217) are, at best, greatly exaggerated (see Hwang 1998: 2–6).

Zhou Huaren (1902–?) was vice minister of transportation in the Wang government. He represented Nanjing-China at the first of three Greater East Asian Writers' Conferences (see II:25), which was held in Tokyo in November 1942 to obtain the support of writers for the Greater East Asian War and "to create a Greater East Asian Literature." Zhou was also vice chairman of the Propaganda Committee of the All-Chinese Society for an East Asian

League and chairman of the East Asian League Association. He did not belong to the group that emerged as the regime's propagating the concept of Japanese collaboration. From 1940 onward, Wang's collaborationist theoretical heritage. In *Dai Ajiashugi* (Greater East Asian War), while some were collaborationist and *Nihon Hyōron*

Source 1 (translation of Wang Jingwei, "My Thoughts on Greater Asianism). *Da Yazhouzhuyi*

On the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Revolution, November, 29th year of the Republic

"For about forty years of the Revolution (*guominzhuyi*) for China," said Dr. Sun Yat-sen, "the consciousness derived from it has been national group consciousness. This has displayed the spirit of 4000 years. But it is not that a concentrated sophisticated content of the past—could be practically. In his last days, he trades and compares

This year marks the hundred years from the founding of the Republic, assisted by military force, the division of China's national consciousness caused considerable damage. The consciousness had to be lethal. On the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Revolution, and the mor-

League and chairman of the China branch of the Tōa Renmei Kyōkai (East Asian League Association; see II:22), founded in February 1941. Though he did not belong to the innermost circle of Wang's confidants, he quickly emerged as the regime's main propagandist, in particular with regard to propagating the concept of Greater Asianism as a means of justifying Sino-Japanese collaboration. Zhou contributed numerous articles to *Da Yazhouzhuyi* from 1940 onward and authored the 168-page *Da Yazhouzhuyi Gangyao* (Outline of Greater Asianism, 1940), which set out the guiding principles of Wang's collaborationist politics according to the template provided by Sun's theoretical heritage. Zhou's writings in Japanese translation appeared mostly in *Dai Ajiashugi* (Greater Asianism), published by the Greater Asia Association, while some were also reprinted in magazines such as *Kaizō* (Reconstruction) and *Nihon Hyōron* (Japan Review).

Source 1 (translation from the Chinese original by Torsten Weber)
Wang Jingwei, "Minzuzhuyi yu Da Yazhouzhuyi" (Nationalism and Greater Asianism). *Da Yazhouzhuyi* (Greater Asianism), 1:4 (November 1940), 1-5.

On the occasion of the anniversary of President Dr. Sun's birthday, 12 November, 29th year [of the Republic, 1940]

"For about forty years I have devoted myself to the cause of the People's Revolution (*guomin geming*), with the aim of gaining freedom and equality for China," said Dr. Sun Yat-sen. There can be no doubt that China's national consciousness derives from the great work of Dr. Sun. Ever since there have been national groups in China there has also been a national consciousness. This has displayed itself to some extent over a history spanning more than 4000 years. But it is really only as a result of the life-long efforts of Dr. Sun that a concentrated form of this national consciousness—a combination of a sophisticated contemporary national consciousness with the nationalism of the past—could be established theoretically and was also pushed forward practically. In his last moments he passed this task on to his surviving comrades and compatriots.

This year marks the centenary of the Opium War [1839-1842]. In the hundred years from 1840 to 1940 the imperialism of economic penetration, assisted by military invasion, has been the main factor in the ceaseless repression of China's national consciousness. We must say that this repression has caused considerable suffering to the Chinese nation. But, as China's national consciousness had already been formed, this kind of repression could never be lethal. On the contrary, the more attempts at disintegration, the greater the unity, and the more pressure, the greater the solidarity.

Apart from the fact of this repression [of national consciousness], its exploitation is also deplorable. This is the new method used by the Communist Party. While openly claiming that the worker has no fatherland, it exploits China's national consciousness when demanding national salvation. While openly advocating class struggle, it employs China's national consciousness by loudly insisting on a national united front. This tactic of using a sheep's head to sell dog meat brings suffering to the Chinese people, which is even greater when added to the reality of repression. But this tactic will not prove fatal either, because it can only be temporary and before long the people will wake up and then they will not be deceived again.

At the time of Dr. Sun's death, the true character of the Communist Party had not yet become apparent. . . . The target of Dr. Sun's national revolution was an end to the outrage of Imperialism. He was born in 1866, 22 [*sic*] years after the Opium War. He started his efforts to achieve a national revolution in 1885, 45 years after the Opium War, and when he died in 1925, 85 years after the Opium War, he said: "In *Yiyou*, the year of our defeat in the Sino-French War, I made up my mind to overthrow the Qing [Ch'ing] dynasty and create a republic." *Yiyou* is the year 1885, when Sun was 23 [*sic*] years old. He had witnessed this foreign threat and decided to turn against the Qing court and strive for the People's Revolution.

The foreign threat was mainly economic penetration backed up by military invasion. It was not easy for China to resist this kind of foreign threat. Without nationalism it could not achieve the self-awakening of the Chinese masses and unify their strength. And without the concept of Greater Asianism, it was impossible to bring about the self-awakening of the masses of East Asia and to unify the strength of its peoples. For this reason, after he had delivered his lecture on the Three People's Principles on 24 August of the 13th year [of the Republic, 1924], he lectured in Kobe on 28 November of the same year on Greater Asianism.

In his will, Sun Yat-sen stated: "Through the experiences of the past 40 years I have come to understand that in order to achieve this goal, we must raise the masses and ally with those peoples who treat us as equals and fight jointly with them." Many people have interpreted the phrase "those peoples who treat us as equals" as denoting the Soviet Union, but in his will no particular country is specified. If Japan is treating us as equals, then this is exactly what is envisaged by Greater Asianism. Why must we—apart from awakening the masses—also ally ourselves with those peoples who treat us as equals and fight alongside them? Because the power of imperialism, based on economic penetration backed up by military invasion, has already put down deep roots. The red race in America, the brown race in Australia, and

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the black race in Africa have all gradually been oppressed and conquered and have all either been subjugated or enslaved. For China to resist this kind of force, it is fundamental to achieve the self-awakening of the people and unify the power of the Chinese masses.

But merely to draw attention to this situation while disregarding the wider context is not only insufficient but also impractical. Formerly, a country did not undertake alliances lightly because alliances meant sharing another's fate, experiencing some good fortune together and then dying together in misery. To avoid such an outcome, it was considered better to remain isolated. But as regards the general international situation, seen both economically and militarily, there is a trend away from unilateral action to the formation of blocs. Already powerful countries can no longer avoid resorting to alliances, let alone countries that have only just started to rise or those planning their reconstruction after having fallen behind. This is exactly where Greater Asianism originates from. As I have said above, one after another, the three continents of America, Australia, and Africa have gone under and the threat has now come to the yellow races of Asia. After the Opium War, the imperialist invasion did not stop at China, but Japan was also threatened at the same time. However, Japan escaped this threat of invasion and thus achieved freedom and equality some decades before China. However, unless the aggressive forces of imperialism are extinguished, there is the danger that Japan will one day be subjected to invasion again. This is the very point that makes the destinies of the two countries of China and Japan identical. It is a great pity that we have neglected this fact of our identical destinies, but rather antagonized each other. After a process of reflection, we are now working hard to face our common destiny together. Fifteen years after the death of Dr. Sun, the ideals of Greater Asianism gleam with new splendor and illuminate the future path of two great peoples who are going forward together.

When, in the past, the destinies of China and Japan were in conflict, it appeared that nationalism and Greater Asianism were incompatible ideals. Now, in the age of a joint Sino-Japanese future, they are not only intertwined but one could say they have even melded into one. If China fails to acquire its independence and freedom it will not be qualified to share responsibility for East Asia, and if East Asia is not liberated China's independence and freedom cannot be achieved or guaranteed. This is what every Chinese must bear in mind. Since Japan expects China to shoulder its share of responsibility for East Asia, it will naturally treat us on the basis of equality. Ever since the Konoe Declaration [of a "New Order in East Asia," November 1938; see II:17], this has been Japan's unyielding national policy and the expression of a unified public opinion.

Source 2 (translation from the Chinese original by Torsten Weber)
 Zhou Huaren, "Da Yazhouzhuyi yu Sanminzhuyi" (Greater Asianism and
 the Three People's Principles). *Da Yazhouzhuyi* (Greater Asianism), 1:2
 (September 1940), 11–15.

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Greater Asianism and the Three People's Principles are essentially identical. President Sun said: "The Three People's Principles are the principles of national salvation." Mr. Wang [Jingwei] says: "If we can realize the Three People's Principles, we will naturally achieve the status of freedom and equality and at the same time we will increase our strength and share with Japan the responsibility for creating a stable East Asia. Thus, speaking from the perspective of China, the Three People's Principles relate to saving the nation and from the perspective of East Asia, the Three People's Principles are equivalent to Greater Asianism" (from Wang's "The Theory and Reality of the Three People's Principles") [Zhou's remark in the original text]. To be sure, Japan is the strongest country in Asia and China is the largest country in Asia. If we cannot direct the power of both countries to become the driving forces behind a revival movement, Asia cannot possibly be saved. Japan has already gathered up its strength. As China is currently in the process of building a modern nation state, China's present ambitions are twofold—to save China itself but also at the same time to save Asia. It is for precisely this reason that we can say that the Three People's Principles are equivalent to Greater Asianism.

. . . The Japanese [politician] Kōno Mitsu [1897–1981] reviewed the Three People's Principles and Greater Asianism as follows: "Sun Yat-sen's philosophy of the people's livelihood as an element of nationalism will strengthen the independence of the Chinese people and assist the revival of all Asian peoples. And it also informs the World Principle of Great Harmony (*Datong de Shijiezhuyi*), to be achieved through Greater Asianism. . . . We can confidently say that, at a profound level, Sun's ideals envisioned first creating a strong new China and then, building on policies of neighborliness and cordiality, planning the revival of Asia and the liberation of the Asian countries from oppression by the Whites through the realization of Greater Asianism."

What he observed was correct. We must realize the Three People's Principles to demand equality for ourselves and, at the same time, we must implement the ideals of Greater Asianism to demand equality for other nations. This way of thinking corresponds with the philosophical ideals of ancient China, in particular, with the concept of "taking responsibility for the welfare of the people" and "having a constant concern for the suffering of the people." Through promoting and expanding these ideals, we will find the

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spirit of Greater Asianism. Dr. Sun's principle of Greater Asianism is wholly derived from these ideals.

In addition, when we analyze the practical contents of Greater Asianism, we see that they correspond to the Three People's Principles. The key point of nationalism is the demand for the indiscriminate equality of all people within one country. It then involves raising the international status of the Chinese nation to a position of equality and, finally, pursuing equal status for Asian nations with those on other continents. It demands the independence and liberation of the Chinese nation and—taking matters one step further—aims at the independence and liberation of the peoples of East Asia. The final ideal of nationalism is a great union of the world (*shijie datong*). These ideals form the consistent expression of Dr. Sun's spirit and thought.

2

The methods to be used in realizing the ideals of Greater Asianism and of nationalism are identical. The President [Sun] has said that, in order to make Greater Asianism a reality, the traditional culture of the East must be revived. This culture embodies the Kingly Way (*wang dao*), or the ideals of benevolence and virtue (*renyi daode*). Only if we succeed in creating a union of the Asian peoples on this basis can Greater Asianism be realized. And the key point for the realization of nationalism is the unity of the Chinese people themselves and the revival of the traditional morality of the Chinese people, as well as the revival of benevolence and virtue and the promotion of the Kingly Way. . . .

In his lecture on nationalism he stated: "To take up the issue of culture again, the culture of China predates European culture by some one thousand years. The finest period of European culture was in the heyday of Greece and Rome, and with Rome it reached its zenith. However, the Roman Empire was contemporaneous with China's Han dynasty [206 BC–AD 220]. From this we can see that at the time of the Han dynasty China's ideals of peace were already well established, as China did not advocate war against foreigners" (4th Lecture on Nationalism). In subsequent passages, Sun gave examples of countries and regions such as the South Seas [Pacific Islands], Nepal, and Siam to illustrate the similarities with the Kingly Way in Greater Asianism.

The culture of the East (*dongfang*) has always been very strong. But in order to resist the material civilization of Western Europe, virtue and benevolence are not enough on their own. Thus the President encouraged the study of Western science, a point which he also stressed in his lectures on nationalism. In his lecture on Greater Asianism, he argued that one should study science on the basis of virtue and benevolence, and again in his lecture

on nationalism he stated that Asians must make an effort to catch up with developments in Western science. However, when China becomes strong again, the traditional duties of the Kingly Way "to relieve the weak and help the needy" must not be neglected (6th Lecture). In sum, we can say that the methods of realizing Greater Asianism and of achieving nationalism are identical and can be compared as follows:

Greater Asianism:

1. Revive Eastern culture, with an emphasis on benevolence and virtue
2. Create an alliance of the peoples of East Asia
3. Study Western science, but with benevolence and virtue as a foundation; promote industry as a means of self-defense

Nationalism:

1. Revive China's traditional virtues, including benevolence and virtue
2. The unification of the different peoples within China should result in the creation of a nation (*guozu*)
3. Make efforts to catch up with developments in European science, but with the ideals of the Kingly Way as the foundation

The individual elements of this three-point structure correspond to one another. The scope of the second point in the first list separates East Asia from China but, as it involves the union of the same race, it resembles the watery element of blood. The substance is the same.

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4

As the ideals underpinning Greater Asianism and the Three People's Principles are substantially identical, can we not simply promote Greater Asianism and set aside the Three People's Principles? As the principles explained above range from the intimate to the unfamiliar and from the close to the distant, we clearly cannot do this.

On the other hand, if we affirm the Three People's Principles, why must we also advocate Greater Asianism? The reasons for this are also very simple:

1. China is just one among the countries of Asia and its political, economic, and social structures are closely linked with those of its neighbors. Without forming alliances with other Asian nations, the independence and liberation of any one country cannot easily be achieved.

2. The twentieth century Europe and America has already a Alliance deserves particular the small nations to maintain their independence.

Economic alliances because the League of Nations failed. Following the League of Nations, nations may form an alliance in the form of an economic union as a means of resistance. This may form a grouping between nations.

In conclusion, the Three People's Principles, but in substance, both must first of all stand to the best of our ability and thus China and the objective situation and liberation of a nation.

The Three People's Principles only mutually include our own people we realize we advocate Greater Asianism on the two sides of the coin should not be interrelated and overlooked when

2. The twentieth century is the age of national alliances. The continents of Europe and America have formed various blocs and the Pan-American alliance has already achieved some notable results. (Although the Pan-American Alliance deserves some criticism, without it many countries in America, in particular the small countries of Central America, would be unable to maintain their independence.)

Economic alliances are even more important than political alliances. It was because the League of Nations paid no attention to economic problems that it failed. Following the current European War, the European nations will certainly form an alliance. In the future, Europe will present itself to the world in the form of an alliance, and the Americas have already formed an alliance as a means of resistance. Therefore, the Asian peoples must also inevitably form a grouping based on their common beliefs and practices.

In conclusion, insofar as we are Chinese we advocate the Three People's Principles, but insofar as we are East Asians, we support Greater Asianism. In substance, both are identical and have the same goals. For this reason we must first of all strive for the independence, equality and freedom of China, to the best of our ability. At the same time, because China is a part of Asia and thus China and Asia possess an inseparable character, and also because the objective situation requires it, we must also work for the independence and liberation of all of Asia.

The Three People's Principles and the ideals of Greater Asianism are not only mutually inclusive, but in fact are reciprocal and complementary. To our own people we recommend the Three People's Principles and to the Asians we advocate Greater Asianism. Both go back to one common root; they are the two sides of the same coin. These are the teachings of President Sun and should not be interpreted as two separate concepts. This point should not be overlooked when researching Greater Asianism.

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Chapter Twenty-Four

Matsuoka Yōsuke and the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, 1941

Sven Saaler

Matsuoka Yōsuke (1880–1946) was born in Yamaguchi Prefecture in western Japan, a region that many influential politicians of modern Japan have called home. Matsuoka went to the United States at the age of twenty. After graduating from Oregon University's Law School (Ano 1997), he returned to Japan and after 1904 pursued a diplomatic career at the Foreign Ministry. In 1921 he became a director of the state-owned South Manchurian Railway Company (Mantetsu). In 1930 he was elected to the House of Representatives on the Seiyūkai ticket. As a politician, he continued to advocate Japanese expansion in Manchuria and the creation of a Japanese puppet state there.

Matsuoka gained international notoriety in 1933 when he announced, as Japan's representative to the League of Nations in Geneva, that his country would resign from the League after the League condemned the establishment of Manchukuo as an act of aggression. Between 1935 and 1939, Matsuoka was back in Manchuria as president of the South Manchurian Railway Company, but he quit this important position when, in July 1940, he was appointed foreign minister in the second Konoe Fumimaro cabinet. During his tenure, he signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy (27 September 1940) and the Neutrality Pact with the Soviet Union (13 April 1941) but was forced out of the government in July 1941 after the German attack on the Soviet Union. After Japan's defeat in 1945, he was arrested as a class A war criminal but died in prison of tuberculosis before receiving his sentence.

As a vocal advocate of Japanese expansion in Manchuria, Matsuoka had from early on envisaged a scheme of regional integration in East Asia under the leadership of the Japanese Empire (Eizawa 1995: 88–94). In January 1933 he claimed, in an interview reported in a two-page feature in the *New York Times* (8 January 1933), "a world spiritual mission" for Japan as well as a leadership role in East Asia. In 1941, in a speech to the Japanese Imperial

Diet (reproduced here), Matsuoka called for the establishment of “a sphere of co-prosperity throughout greater East Asia with Japan, Manchukuo and China as its pivotal point.” This idea of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (*Daitōa kyōeiken*), which he also advocated in his popular book *Kōa no Taigyō* (Matsuoka 1941b), would become one of the major wartime slogans, aiming at legitimizing Japanese leadership in East Asia, shutting out Western interests in Asia, and mobilizing manpower and raw materials to support Japan’s war effort (see also the following chapters).

The concept was rooted in older forms of Pan-Asianism and was directly linked to Konoe’s proclamation of a “New Order in East Asia” in 1938 (see II:17), Konoe’s attempts to form a pan-Asian core by installing a Japan-friendly government in China under Wang Jingwei (Wang Ching-wei; see II:23), and the reaffirmation of these policies by the Hiranuma cabinet (see II:21). Matsuoka had been an early advocate of the concept of Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity and used the term as early as 1938 when he was president of the Mantetsu. The concept continued to be prevalent after the end of Matsuoka’s tenure as foreign minister and was, once again, reaffirmed as official policy by the third Konoe cabinet in July 1941 (*New York Times*, 20 July 1941). It became of pressing importance when the government utilized Co-Prosperity rhetoric in order to justify Japan’s occupation of French Indochina. As the Japanese government declared,

French Indo-China and Japan have from olden times been closely bound in cultural, historical and economic relations. Prior to the closing of Japan to foreign intercourse [in the 1630s] . . . , there were two Japanese towns each in Annam and Cambodia and very prosperous trade was carried on with Japan. . . . In recent times Indo-China has re-established her old relations with Japan in a new sense as a source of materials for the industries of Japan. Relations of late steadily have become closer and more cordial, with Indo-China constituting an important link in the sphere of common prosperity in Great East Asia which Japan is endeavoring to establish. (quoted in the *New York Times*, 27 July 1941)

The idea of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere eventually reached its zenith with the creation of a Ministry for Greater East Asia (*Daitōashō*) in November 1942 and the calling of an “Assembly of the Greater East Asiatic Nations” in Tokyo in November 1943 (see II:27). However, it was not an idea of Asian solidarity only. At least in Matsuoka’s case, it implied universal validity—and the long-term political aim to extend the benevolent rule of the Tennō to the whole world. In this sense, the idea of East Asian Co-Prosperity overlapped with the concept of “The Eight Corners of the World Under One Roof,” or *hakkō ichiu* (Eizawa 1995: 94f).

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Certainly, these concepts found some support among the Japanese and also among some of the peoples of the region. Many Japanese soldiers who fought in Southeast Asia testify in their diaries and recollections that they believed that they were fighting for a pan-Asian cause, that is, for the liberation of Asian peoples (Yoshimi 1987: 189). The previously mentioned Tokyo Conference of November 1943 was accompanied by a "People's Mass Meeting for Solidarity with Greater East Asia" in Hibiya Park, which was reportedly attended by over 120,000 people (Go 1944). However, the idea of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere lost its attraction after Japan's defeat in World War II. Ever since, it has been associated with Japanese expansionism, and thus even today the idea remains an important and problematic historical legacy for Japan—a legacy that is considered by many as a major obstacle to regional integration in contemporary East Asia.

Source (English in the original)

Address by the Foreign Minister of Japan, Yosuke Matsuoka, delivered before the 76th session of the Imperial Diet, 21 January 1941. *Contemporary Japan*, February 1941.

It gives me great pleasure to have this opportunity of explaining at the reopening of the 76th session of the Diet the recent course of our country's foreign affairs.

Needless to say, the aim of Japan's foreign policy is that of enabling all nations of the world each to take its own proper place, in accordance with the spirit of the Hakko Ichiu ["The Eight Corners of the World under One Roof," a wartime slogan used to justify Japanese territorial expansion], the very ideal which inspired the foundation of our Empire. The object of the Three Power Pact, concluded between Japan, Germany and Italy on September 27 [1940] last, is none other than the realization of the same great ideal. . . .

The Three Power Pact stipulates that Germany and Italy recognize and respect the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia. It is our avowed purpose to bring all the peoples in greater East Asia to revert to their innate and proper aspect, promoting conciliation and co-operation among them, and thereby setting the example of universal concord. . . .

Of the nations in greater East Asia, Manchukuo has special and inseparable relations with this country [Japan]. As you are aware, during the ten years which have already elapsed since her emergence as an independent nation, her national foundations have become strong and secure while her international position has been greatly enhanced, her teeming millions ever

enjoying an increasing measure of prosperity. In June last year, the Emperor of Manchukuo paid a visit to Japan to offer his felicitations personally to our Imperial House on the auspicious occasion of the 2,600th anniversary of the foundation of our Empire. This is a source of genuine congratulation for the peoples of Japan and Manchukuo as it is a conspicuous manifestation of the unique relations subsisting between the two nations, sharing, as they do, common aims and aspirations. By the Sino-Japanese Basic Treaty concluded with the National Government at Nanking, and through the Joint Declaration made by Japan, Manchukuo and China, the Republic of China recognized Manchukuo, with the result that an exchange of ambassadors has been arranged between them.

Inasmuch as an early settlement of the China Affair [Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1945] is desirable in the interests of the creation of this sphere of common prosperity throughout greater East Asia, the present Government ever since its formation, has urged the Chiang Kai-shek regime to reconsider and reverse its attitude, with a view of bringing about its amalgamation with the Nanking Government, but it remains still struggling against Japan. . . .

In the light of such an international situation, the Japanese Government, in pursuance of their fixed policy, recognized the National Government at Nanking and on November 30 of last year concluded with the latter the Sino-Japanese Basic Treaty. This treaty embodies the three basic principles of good neighbourliness, economic co-operation and joint defence against communist activities. It stipulates that both Japan and China respect each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and undertake close economic co-operation on the basis of equality and reciprocity, and that Japanese forces be stationed in certain specified areas in Mengchiang [also transliterated Mengjiang, an autonomous region in Inner Mongolia, 1936-1945, under the control of the Mongol United Autonomous Government, informally under the control of the Japanese army] and North China. Not only does Japan demand no territorial cession and no indemnities, but she has willingly pledged to China a policy of abolishing extraterritoriality and also of restoring the "concessions" to China. This is an eloquent testimony of her sincere desire for the attainment of a moral union of the Asiatic peoples. . . .

We have thus maintained an attitude to surmount all obstacles for the purpose of establishing a sphere of co-prosperity throughout greater East Asia with Japan, Manchukuo and China as its pivotal point.

Let me now make a brief survey of our relations with the Netherlands East Indies, French Indo-China, and Thailand, which lie within the above-mentioned sphere of common prosperity.

The Netherlands East Indies and French Indo-China, if only for geographical reasons, should be in intimate and inseparable relationship with our coun-

try. Therefore, the this natural relation neighbourliness se

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try. Therefore, the situation which has hitherto thwarted the development of this natural relationship must be thoroughly remedied, and relations of good neighbourliness secured for the promotion of mutual prosperity. . . .

As regards French Indo-China, it formed the most important route of supply for Chungking since the beginning of the China Affair. Consequent, however, upon the sudden change in the European situation last June, a change has occurred in the relations between Japan and French Indo-China, resulting in the closure of the border between French Indo-China and China itself, and the entry by agreement, of Japanese armed forces into French Indo-China. . . .

In June, last year, a Treaty of Amity and Neutrality was concluded by Japan with Thailand. With the exchange of ratifications, completed on December 23 at Bangkok, the bonds of friendship between the two countries have been drawn still closer. . . .

The relations between Japan and Near Eastern countries have recently increased in cordiality. Our ratification of the Treaty of Amity with Iran is only one of many proofs that illustrate this happy state of affairs. . . .

In establishing a sphere of common prosperity in greater East Asia, and ensuring the peace of the Orient, it is not desirable that the present diplomatic relations between Japan and the Soviet Union should be left as they are. The utmost efforts are being made, therefore, to remove mutual misunderstandings and, if possible, to bring about a fundamental and far-reaching adjustment of diplomatic relations. . . .

The prevailing confusion of the international situation shows no sign of subsiding, but, on the contrary, it tends to increase. Should the United States unfortunately become involved in the European war, and should Japan, too, be compelled to participate in the war, another great World War both in name and reality would ensue, precipitating a situation which would defy all attempts at saving it. Should the war take its furious course, unleashing formidable new weapons which have not hitherto been used, no one could guarantee that it would not develop into a war spelling the downfall of modern civilization. The Three Power Pact has been concluded for the purpose not only of making sustained efforts for the establishment of a sphere of common prosperity throughout greater East Asia, but of preventing, in its course, any further extension of the present disturbances.