

Related Titles in
THE BEDFORD SERIES IN HISTORY AND CULTURE

Advisory Editors: Natalie Zemon Davis, Princeton University
Ernest R. May, Harvard University
Lynn Hunt, University of California
at Los Angeles
David W. Blight, Amherst College

The Japanese Discovery of America: A Brief History with Documents
Peter Duus, *Stanford University*

Schools and Students in Industrial Society: Japan and the West, 1870–1940
Peter N. Stearns, *Carnegie Mellon University*

The Era of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1932–1945: A Brief History with Documents
Richard Polenberg, *Cornell University*

America Views the Holocaust, 1933–1945: A Brief Documentary History
Robert H. Abzug, *University of Texas at Austin*

Nuremberg War Crimes Trial, 1945–1946: A Documentary History
Michael R. Marrus, *Toronto University*

American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68
Edited with an Introduction by Ernest R. May, *Harvard University*

THE BEDFORD SERIES IN HISTORY AND CULTURE

**Pearl Harbor
and the Coming of
the Pacific War**
**A Brief History with
Documents and Essays**

Akira Iriye
Harvard University

BEDFORD/ST. MARTIN'S

Boston • New York

The Documents

Reproduced in this section are documents focusing on the U.S.-Japanese negotiations in November 1941. Read them as if you were a U.S. or Japanese official. Assume that you are interested in a negotiated settlement of the differences between the two countries. What concessions might you make to avert war? What issues are so critical that you would advocate going to war rather than compromise?

Now assume that you are Japanese. Would you consider the U.S. memorandum (the so-called Hull note) of November 26 an ultimatum and thus decide on war? In that case, would you support a surprise attack on U.S. territory? As an American official, would you agree with the timing and the contents of the Hull memorandum? If you were President Roosevelt and aware of the contents of the final Japanese message on December 7, is there anything you could do to avert the Pearl Harbor tragedy? Keep these questions in mind as you read the following documents.

Apart from the immediate circumstances of Pearl Harbor, what were the broad causes of the Pacific war? Were these causes open to negotiated solutions? Do the documents indicate that there was a fatal lack of communication between Washington and Tokyo? Were the two countries' differences as much historical and cultural as they were geopolitical?

Imperial Conference

November 5, 1941

Japan's negotiating position (Proposals A and B) was formally adopted by the imperial conference of November 5, 1941. The document that follows is a record of the Japanese leaders' deliberations on these proposals. Participating in the conference, besides the emperor, were Japan's top civilian and military leaders: the prime minister, the foreign minister, the finance minister, the president of the Planning Board (an agency for war mobilization), the president of the Privy Council (an organization of senior statesmen whose constitutional function was to advise the government), the war minister, the navy minister, the army chief of staff, and the navy chief of staff.

Because Japanese cabinets changed frequently—Hideki Tōjō was the fourteenth prime minister since 1931—and military appointments usually coincided with the formation of new cabinets, the individual biographies of the men who took part in the meeting are less important than the positions they held. As you will note, they expressed their views more often as spokesmen for the offices they held than as individuals. In this connection, it is important to keep in mind that Tōjō was at that time both prime minister and war minister. He had served as war minister in the cabinet of Prince Fumimaro Konoe (1940–41) and had adamantly refused to agree on concessions to the United States on the issue of Japanese troops in China. When the emperor turned to him to form a new cabinet in mid-October 1941, however, Tōjō considered that his mandate had changed: He was now speaking for the entire government, not just for the army. Even his decision to appoint himself war minister can be understood as a means of controlling the army in the event that the cabinet and the emperor adopted a policy on China that was contrary to the army's past positions.

The extreme difficulties that Tōjō and his colleagues foresaw in arriving at a compromise settlement on China can be gleaned from the minutes of this imperial conference. They indicate that the Japanese leaders persisted in the view that U.S. assistance to China had been the major reason for the prolongation of the war on the continent and that once the United States ceased such assistance, Japan could "settle" the war and withdraw its forces from most areas of China. Such an arrangement would still allow Japan to

retain control over the northeast (Manchuria) and other parts of China, so the Japanese must have recognized that there was little chance the United States would agree to the scheme. That is why Japan's leaders were interested in ascertaining whether the United States might agree to a temporary arrangement (*modus vivendi*) that would shelve the thorny issue of China for the time being and focus on the question of Southeast Asia. In a nutshell, Japan pledges to desist from further "southern advances" and the United States resumes trade with Japan, especially shipments of oil.

The record of the imperial conference indicates the extreme seriousness of the shortage of oil and other resources that Japan faced. If the United States agreed to resume trade with Japan, the situation would obviously be alleviated, and there would be no urgent need to undertake a "southern advance." On the other hand, if the U.S.-Japanese crisis persisted, it would become imperative to obtain those vital resources in Southeast Asia—by use of force if necessary. Such action would almost certainly result in war. This dilemma was evident in the deliberations of the Japanese leaders.

Given their preoccupation with the question of natural resources, were Japan's leaders being realistic in pinning their hopes on a deal with the United States that they believed could avoid war? What important concessions did the Japanese think they were making? Why was China so important to them? What was their view of Germany, their official ally? What seems to be the main reason for Japan's risking war with the United States?

Agenda: "Essentials for Carrying Out the Empire's Policies"

- I. Our Empire, in order to resolve the present critical situation, assure its self-preservation and self-defense, and establish a New Order in Greater East Asia, decides on this occasion to go to war against the United States and Great Britain and takes the following measures:
 1. The time for resorting to force is set at the beginning of December, and the Army and Navy will complete preparations for operations.
 - * 2. Negotiations with the United States will be carried out in accordance with the attached document.
 3. Cooperation with Germany and Italy will be strengthened.
 4. Close military relations with Thailand will be established just prior to the use of force.
- ! II. If negotiations with the United States are successful by midnight of December 1, the use of force will be suspended.

Nobutaka Ike, *Japan's Decision for War: Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1967), 209–20, 222–39.

Summary of Negotiations with the United States of America

We will negotiate with the United States and seek to reach an agreement on the basis of attached Proposal A or attached Proposal B, both of which express, in a more moderate and amended form, important matters that have been pending between the two countries.

PROPOSAL A

We will moderate our position on the most important matters pending in the negotiations between Japan and the United States: (1) stationing and withdrawal of troops in China and French Indochina; (2) nondiscriminatory trade in China; (3) interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Pact; (4) the Four Principles.* This will be done as follows:

1. Stationing and withdrawal of troops in China:

We will moderate our position on this point as follows (in view of the fact that the United States — disregarding for the time being the reason for the stationing of troops — attaches importance to the stationing of troops for an indefinite period, disagrees with the inclusion of this item in the terms for peace, and urges us to make a clearer statement of our intentions regarding withdrawal):

Of the Japanese troops sent to China during the China Incident, those in designated sections of North China and Inner Mongolia, and those on Hainan Island, will remain for a necessary period of time after the establishment of peace between Japan and China. The remainder of the troops will begin withdrawal simultaneously with the establishment of peace in accordance with arrangements to be made between Japan and China, and the withdrawal will be completed within two years.

Note: In case the United States asks what the “necessary period of time” will be, we will respond that we have in mind 25 years.

Stationing and withdrawal of troops in French Indochina:

We will moderate our position on this point as follows, since we recognize that the United States is apprehensive that Japan has territorial ambitions in French Indochina and is building a base for military advance into neighboring territories:

Japan respects the sovereignty of French Indochina over her territory. Japanese troops currently stationed in French Indochina will be immediately withdrawn after the settlement of the China Incident or the establishment of a just peace in the Far East.

*The basic policies that Secretary of State always insisted should guide the conduct of nations: respect for the territorial integrity of states, noninterference in their internal affairs, equal commercial opportunity, and the use of peaceful means for changing the status quo.

2. Nondiscriminatory trade in China:

. . . The Japanese Government will recognize the application of the principle of nondiscrimination in the entire Pacific region, including China, if this principle is applied throughout the world.

3. The interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Pact:

On this point we will respond as follows: We do not intend to broaden unreasonably the interpretation of the right of self-defense. Regarding the interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Pact, the Japanese Government, as it has stated on previous occasions, will act independently. Our position will be that we assume that the United States is fully aware of this.

4. Regarding the so-called Four Principles put forward by the United States, we will make every effort to avoid their inclusion in official agreements between Japan and the United States (this includes understandings and other communiqués).

PROPOSAL B

1. Both Japan and the United States will pledge not to make an armed advance into Southeast Asia and the South Pacific area, except French Indochina.

2. The Japanese and American Governments will cooperate with each other so that the procurement of necessary materials from the Netherlands East Indies will be assured.

3. The Japanese and American Governments will restore trade relations to what they were prior to the freezing of assets. The United States will promise to supply Japan with the petroleum Japan needs.

4. The Government of the United States will not take such actions as may hinder efforts for peace by both Japan and China.

Notes

1. As occasion demands, it is permissible to promise that with the conclusion of the present agreement Japanese troops stationed in southern Indochina are prepared to move to northern Indochina with the consent of the French Government; and that the Japanese troops will withdraw from Indochina with the settlement of the China Incident or upon the establishment of a just peace in the Pacific area.

2. As occasion demands, we may make insertions in the provisions on nondiscriminatory trade and on the interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Pact in the above-mentioned proposal (Proposal B).

Statement by Prime Minister Tōjō

The Conference is now opened. With His Majesty's permission I will take charge of the proceedings.

At the Imperial Conference of September 6 "Essentials for Carrying Out the Empire's Policies" was discussed, and the following was decided by His Majesty: our Empire, determined not to avoid war with the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands in the course of assuring her self-preservation and self-defense, was to complete preparations for war by late October. At the same time it was decided that we would endeavor to attain our demands by using all possible diplomatic measures vis-à-vis the United States and Great Britain; and that in case there was no prospect of our demands being attained through diplomacy by early October, we would decide immediately on war with the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands.

Since then, while maintaining close coordination between political and military considerations, we have made a special effort to achieve success in our diplomatic negotiations with the United States. In this interval we have endured what must be endured in our efforts to reach an agreement, but we have not been able to get the United States to reconsider. During the negotiations, there has been a change in the Cabinet.

The Government and the Army and Navy sections of Imperial Headquarters have held eight Liaison Conferences in order to study matters more extensively and deeply on the basis of the "Essentials for Carrying Out the Empire's Policies" adopted on September 6. As a result of this, we have come to the conclusion that we must now decide to go to war, set the time for military action at the beginning of December, concentrate all of our efforts on completing preparations for war, and at the same time try to break the impasse by means of diplomacy. Accordingly, I ask you to deliberate on the document "Essentials for Carrying Out the Empire's Policies."

There will be statements by participants on matters for which they are responsible.

Statement by Foreign Minister Tōgō

I respectfully submit that the essence of our Empire's foreign policy is to establish a system of international relations based on justice and fairness, and thereby contribute to the maintenance and promotion of world peace.

The successful conclusion of the China Incident and the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere would assure the ex-

istence of our Empire and lay the foundations for stability in East Asia. To achieve these objectives, our Empire must be prepared to sweep away any and all obstacles.

With the conclusion of the basic treaty between Japan and China on November 30 of last year, our Empire recognized the Nanking Government, marking a great step in the China Incident. Since then we have cooperated with that government to foster its growth and add to its strength. On the other hand, we have continued to put military pressure on the Chiang Kai-shek regime, in an effort to get it to reconsider. Its continued resistance after four and a half years of our holy war depends a great deal, it is clear, on aid from the United States and Great Britain.

Since the outbreak of the China Incident, both the British and American Governments have obstructed our advance on the continent. On the one hand, they have aided Chiang; on the other hand, they have checked our activities in China or have stepped up their economic measures against us. Needless to say, Great Britain, which has acquired more interests than anyone else in East Asia, took all kinds of measures to obstruct us from the beginning. The United States, cooperating with her, abrogated the Japanese-American Trade Agreement,* limited or banned imports and exports, and took other measures to increase her pressure on Japan. Particularly since our Empire concluded the Tripartite Pact, the United States has taken steps to encircle Japan by persuading Great Britain and the Netherlands to join her and by cooperating with the Chiang regime. Since the start of the German-Soviet war, she has taken unfriendly action against us by supplying oil and other war materials to the Soviet Union through the Far East, despite warnings from our Government. As soon as our Empire sent troops into French Indochina after concluding a treaty on the basis of friendly negotiations with the French Government for the purpose of defending ourselves and bringing the China Incident to a conclusion, America's actions became increasingly undisguised. Not only did she cut off economic relations between Japan and the United States, with Central and South America going along with her, under the guise of freezing our assets; but also, in cooperation with Great Britain, China, and the Netherlands, she threatened the existence of our Empire and tried harder to prevent us from carrying out our national policies. Accordingly, our Empire, which is the stabilizing force in East Asia, was compelled to try to overcome the impasse by showing firmness and determination.

*The agreement was signed in 1911 and provided the legal framework for the bilateral trade. In July 1939 Washington notified Tokyo of its intention to terminate the agreement within six months, and in January 1940 it was abrogated.

President Roosevelt has stressed, as his national policy, the rejection of "Hitlerism" — that is, policies based on force — and he has continued to aid Great Britain, which is almost tantamount to entering the war, by utilizing the economically superior position of the United States. At the same time, as I have stated before, he has adopted a policy of firm pressure on Japan. In the middle of April of this year unofficial talks were begun, seeking a general improvement in relations between Japan and the United States. Our Imperial Government, desirous of promoting stability in East Asia and peace in the world, has since then continued the negotiations with a most sincere and fair approach. For a period of more than six months we have tried to reach an amicable settlement by showing patience and a spirit of compromise. In particular, the previous Cabinet tried hard to break the deadlock by suggesting a conference of the two heads of state, and in this way it displayed its sincerity. Late in September it presented a compromise proposal for the improvement of relations between the two countries. The American Government, however, maintained an extremely firm attitude, stuck to the proposal of June 21, which might be considered its original position, and refused to make any concessions. Recently, in discussions since the formation of the previous Cabinet, there have been some optimistic reports that the United States has shown a willingness to compromise substantially; but in fact, she has not made any concessions. Moreover, she has taken many measures to tighten the encirclement of Japan — strengthening of military facilities in the South; encouragement to Chiang through economic assistance, supplying arms, and sending military missions; meetings with military leaders in Singapore and Manila; and holding frequent military and economic conferences in Batavia, Hong Kong, etc. There has been nothing to demonstrate her sincerity. Hence we cannot help but regretfully conclude that there is no prospect of the negotiations coming to a successful conclusion quickly if things continue as they have in the past.

A close study of the June 21 proposal shows that it contains some points that we could accept. But in general it is a reaffirmation of the Nine-Power Pact;* and it was feared that it might destroy the policy we have pursued at great sacrifice since the Manchurian Incident; this in turn might block the creation of a New Order in East Asia and endanger our position as the leader in that area.

*Signed at the Washington Conference of 1921–22. It proclaimed such principles as China's territorial and administrative integrity and the open door (equal commercial opportunity).

... In Europe, although Germany and Italy will be able to achieve their first goal, the conquest of the Continent, we cannot anticipate an overall conclusion soon, and the war there is likely to be prolonged. In reality we could not expect Germany and Italy to give us much cooperation.

As I see it, the situation is becoming more and more critical every day, and negotiations with the United States are very much restricted by the time element; consequently, to our regret, there is little room left for diplomatic maneuvering. Moreover, the conclusion of a Japanese-American understanding would necessitate great speed in negotiations, partly because of the time required for domestic procedures on the American side. For this reason we have been required to carry on negotiations under extremely difficult circumstances. The prospects of achieving an amicable settlement in the negotiations are, to our deepest regret, dim. However, the Imperial Government will endeavor on this occasion to make every effort to arrive at a quick settlement in our negotiations. We would like to negotiate on the basis of the two proposals in the attached document, which assure the honor and self-defense of our Empire. . . .

In case the present negotiations should unfortunately fail to lead to an agreement, we intend to strengthen our cooperative arrangements with German and Italy, and to take a variety of measures so as to be prepared for any situation.

Statement by President of the Planning Board Suzuki

I am going to give a summary of the outlook with regard to our national strength, particularly in vital materials, in case we go to war against Great Britain, the United States, and the Netherlands.

First, if we can constantly maintain a minimum of 3 million tons of shipping for civilian use, it will be possible to secure supplies in the amount called for by the Materials Mobilization Plan for the fiscal year of 1941, except for certain materials. . . .

Second, if the yearly loss in shipping is estimated to be between 800,000 and 1 million tons, the maintenance of the 3 million tons of shipping mentioned above should be possible if we can obtain an average of about 600,000 gross tons of new construction each year. . . . Building the foregoing 600,000 tons of shipping is considered possible if we rationally utilize the present civilian shipbuilding capacity of 700,000 gross tons and the engineering and forging capacity of about 600,000 gross tons and if we take such measures as standardizing and lowering the quality of the ships to be built, giving overall control of shipbuilding operations to

the Navy, and securing a labor force, as well as allocating 300,000 tons of steel, copper, and other necessary materials.

Third, in order to build 600,000 gross tons of new ships, more than 300,000 tons of ordinary steel will be needed. This can be secured if steel available for civilian use can be maintained at 2.61 million tons and this is allocated on a priority basis, with the allotment being kept to a minimum. . . .

Fourth, in order to maintain the shipping needed for production, it will be necessary to follow the plan agreed upon between the Army, Navy, and the Planning Board when it comes to determining the amount of shipping and the length of time such shipping will be needed for the Southern Operation. . . .

. . . Since it is estimated that for a certain period of time during the 1942 operation in the South ships for civilian use would be reduced to a minimum of 1.6 million gross tons, and civilian shipping capacity to around 2.6 million tons [for this period], it is expected that steel production during this period would decline to 3.8 million tons in terms of yearly production, and that other important materials would decline by around 15 per cent. . . .

In the second half of 1941, particularly in the fourth quarter, transportation capacity will decline because of operations in the South; so we plan to hold the decrease in production to 150,000 tons by mobilizing sailing ships with auxiliary engines, utilizing iron foundries that can use coal shipped by rail, increasing the use of stored iron ore, collecting more scrap iron, and so on. Thus we estimate that actual production will be about 4.5 million tons, as against the 4.76 million tons called for in the Plan.

Fifth, concerning rice, I think it will be necessary to consider substitute food, such as soybeans, minor cereals, and sweet potatoes, and to exercise some control over food in case the expected imports of rice from Thailand and French Indochina called for in the Food Supply Plan for the 1942 rice year (from October 1941 to September 1942) are reduced owing to operations in the South. That is, if the expected imports from Thailand and Indochina are reduced by 50 per cent, the food supply will be down to 93 per cent of the amount called for in the Plan; and if the imports decrease by 75 per cent, the supply will go down to 91 per cent. However, if imports from Thailand and French Indochina can be increased by using more ships after the completion of the first phase of military operations, it may be possible to prevent the reduction from becoming too large. . . .

Sixth, if we can occupy important points in the Netherlands East Indies in a short period of time, we can expect to obtain the following major items . . . :

Nickel ore
Tin (for anti-friction alloy and gilding)
Bauxite (raw ore for aluminum)
Crude rubber
Cassava root, theriac (for industrial alcohol)
Copra, palm oil (glycerin, substitute machine oil)
Sisal (substitute for Manila hemp)
Corn (animal feed and foodstuff)
Industrial salt
Sugar

Among the above items, crude rubber, tin, and bauxite would most seriously affect the United States if their supply is cut off.

Seventh, the total supply of petroleum, in case of operations in the South, will be 850,000 kiloliters in the first year, 2.6 million kiloliters in the second year, and 5.3 million kiloliters in the third year. If an estimate is made of the future supply and demand of petroleum, including 8.4 million kiloliters in our domestic stockpile, I believe we will just be able to remain self-supporting, with a surplus of 2.55 million kiloliters in the first year, 150,000 kiloliters in the second year, and 700,000 kiloliters in the third year. Concerning aviation fuel: it is expected that, depending on consumption, we might reach a critical stage in the second or third year.

That is, according to a study of the supply and demand of petroleum resulting from the occupation of the Netherlands East Indies, which was made jointly by the Army and the Navy at Liaison Conferences, the quantity expected to be obtained from the Netherlands East Indies is 300,000 kiloliters in the first year, 2 million kiloliters in the second year, and 4.5 million kiloliters in the third year. . . .

The oil surplus or shortage each year:

The surplus or shortage, calculated with a presumed loss of 100,000 kiloliters in the first year, 50,000 kiloliters in the second year, and 20,000 kiloliters in the third year, is given below. Estimate One [assumes a demand of] 800,000 kiloliters in the first year, 750,000 kiloliters in the second year, and 620,000 kiloliters in the third year. . . . If a reserve of 200,000 kiloliters, equivalent to approximately two months' need, is taken into account, the supply-and-demand relationship is as follows: in Estimate

One, 180,000 kiloliters surplus the first year, 440,000 kiloliters shortage the second year, and 28,000 kiloliters shortage the third year. . . .

Overall supply and demand of liquid fuel:

If civilian demand is assumed to be 1.4 million kiloliters each year, and military demand is added to it, the overall demand is 5.2 million kiloliters in the first year, 5 million kiloliters in the second year, and 4.75 million kiloliters in the third year.

On the other hand, the potential supply, including stockpiles, production, and expected procurement from the Netherlands East Indies, less a minimum of 150,000 tons for reserve, is: 7.75 million kiloliters in the first year, with a remainder of 2.55 million kiloliters; 5.15 million kiloliters in the second year, with a remainder of 150,000 kiloliters; and 5.45 million kiloliters in the third year, with a remainder of 700,000 kiloliters. In this estimate, domestic production is calculated at 250,000 kiloliters in the first year, 200,000 kiloliters in the second year, and 300,000 kiloliters in the third year, while synthetic petroleum is estimated at 300,000 kiloliters, 400,000 kiloliters, and 500,000 kiloliters respectively.

In brief, it is by no means an easy task to carry on a war against Great Britain, the United States, and the Netherlands — a war that will be a protracted one — while still fighting in China, and at the same time maintain and augment the national strength needed to prosecute a war over a long period of time. It is apparent that the difficulty would be all the greater if such unexpected happenings as natural disasters should occur. However, since the probability of victory in the initial stages of the war is sufficiently high, I am convinced we should take advantage of this assured victory and turn the heightened morale of the people, who are determined to overcome the national crisis even at the cost of their lives, toward production as well as toward [reduced] consumption and other aspects of national life. In terms of maintaining and augmenting our national strength, this would be better than just sitting tight and waiting for the enemy to put pressure on us. . . .

Statement by Finance Minister Kaya

Although the budget of our country has constantly increased since the beginning of the China Incident and has reached more than ¥7.99 billion in the general account and ¥5.88 billion in extraordinary military expenditures (agreed upon by the 76th Diet Session), or a total of over ¥13.2 billion, we have been able to secure large amounts in taxes and assure large savings, thanks to the efforts of various institutions and of the people. On the whole, we have been able to carry on operations smoothly. However,

it is clear that when we begin military operations in the South, additional large expenditures of Government funds will be needed to cover them. Can our national economy bear the burden of such large military expenditures? Especially, are they feasible when the probability is high that the war will be protracted? Will there not be unfavorable effects on finance? Isn't there danger of a vicious inflation as a result of these expenditures? . . .

The . . . absorption of funds by taxation or national savings will be possible if the Government's economic policies are adequate, and if the people are fully aware that the destiny of their country is at stake and are willing to exert every effort and make extreme sacrifices. Moreover, we anticipate that the Government's policies will not be in error because the Government itself will carry them out. We believe the people will make every effort and endure sacrifices because they are the subjects of our Empire. Hence we must judge that it is possible. . . .

- The areas in the South that are to become the object of military operations have been importing materials of all kinds in large quantities. If these areas are occupied by our forces, their imports will cease. Accordingly, to make their economies run smoothly, we will have to supply them with materials. However, since our country does not have sufficient surpluses for that purpose, it will not be possible for some time for us to give much consideration to the living conditions of the people in these areas, and for a while we will have to pursue a so-called policy of exploitation. . . .
- We must adopt a policy of self-sufficiency in the South, keep the shipment of materials from Japan to that area to the minimum amount necessary to maintain order and to utilize labor forces there, ignore for the time being the decline in the value of currency and the economic dislocations that will ensue from this, and in this way push forward. Of course it is to be recognized that the maintenance of the people's livelihood there is easy compared to the same task in China because the culture of the inhabitants is low, and because the area is rich in natural products.

Statement by Navy Chief of Staff Nagano

. . . Hereafter we will go forward steadily with our war preparations, expecting the opening of hostilities in the early part of December. As soon as the time for commencing hostilities is decided, we are prepared for war.

We are planning and getting ready with great care because success or failure in the initial phases of our operations will greatly affect success or failure in the entire war. It is very important that we carry out our initial

operations ahead of the enemy and with courageous decisiveness. Consequently, the concealment of our war plans has an important bearing on the outcome of the war; and so, in putting our whole nation on a war footing in the future, we would like to maintain even closer relations with the Government and attain our desired goal.

Statement by Army Chief of Staff Sugiyama

→ ... Army strength in the several countries in the South is gradually being increased. Roughly speaking, Malaya has an army of about 60,000 to 70,000 and about 320 airplanes, the Philippines have about 42,000 men and about 170 airplanes, the Netherlands East Indies have about 85,000 men and about 300 airplanes, and Burma has about 35,000 men and about 60 airplanes. Compared to strength before the outbreak of the war in Europe, enemy strength has been increased about eight times in Malaya, four times in the Philippines, two and one-half times in the Netherlands East Indies, and five times in Burma; it totals well over 200,000 in these countries. It is anticipated that the rate of increase will rise as the situation changes.

The ground forces in these regions, although varying from one region to another, are composed for the most part of native soldiers, with a nucleus of about 30 per cent white, "homeland" soldiers. They do not have sufficient education and training, and their fighting ability is generally inferior. It should be remembered, however, that they are thoroughly acclimatized, and used to tropical conditions. As to the fighting ability of the enemy air force, I assume that it cannot be taken lightly when compared to the ground force, since the quality of the aircraft is excellent and their pilots are comparatively skilled . . .

1. On the timing of the commencement of war:

From the standpoint of operations, if the time for commencing war is delayed, the ratio of armament between Japan and the United States will become more and more unfavorable to us as time passes; and particularly, the gap in air armament will enlarge rapidly. Moreover, defensive preparations in the Philippines, and other American war preparations, will make rapid progress. Also, the common defense arrangements between the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and China will become all the more close, and their joint defensive capability will be rapidly increased. Finally, if we delay until after next spring, the weather will permit operational activities in the North, and also there will be a higher probability that our Empire will have to face simultaneous war in the

South and in the North. Thus it would be very disadvantageous for us to delay; and it is to be feared that it might become impossible for us to undertake offensive operations.

In addition, weather conditions in the area where important operations are going to take place are such that no delay is possible. Accordingly, in order to resort to force as soon as preparations for the operations we contemplate are completed, we would like to set the target date in the early part of December.

2. On the prospects of the operations:

Since the principal Army operations in the initial stages in the South will be landing operations against fortified enemy bases, conducted after a long ocean voyage in the intense heat of the sun while repelling attacks from enemy submarines and aircraft, we expect to face considerable difficulties. However, if we take a broad view of the situation, the enemy forces are scattered over a wide area and moreover separated by stretches of water, making coordinated action difficult. We, on the other hand, can concentrate our forces, undertake sudden raids, and destroy the enemy piecemeal. Therefore, we are fully confident of success, given close cooperation between the Army and the Navy. As for operations after we land, we have complete confidence in our victory when we consider the organization, equipment, quality, and strength of the enemy forces.

After the initial stage in our operations has been completed, we will endeavor to shorten greatly the duration of the war, using both political and military strategies, particularly the favorable results from our naval operations. Nevertheless, we must be prepared for the probability that the war will be a protracted one. But since we will seize and hold enemy military and air bases and be able to establish a strategically impregnable position, we think we can frustrate the enemy's plans by one means or another.

We will firmly maintain in general our present posture with respect to defense against the Soviet Union and operations in China while we engage in operations in the South. In this way we will be able to strengthen our invincible position vis-à-vis the North, and there will be no problem in carrying on in China as we have been doing. With regard to China, the favorable results of the operations in the South should particularly contribute to the settlement of the China Incident.

3. On the situation in the North resulting from operations in the South:

The Red Army has suffered massive losses at the hands of the German Army; and there has been a marked decline in the productivity of

the Soviet armament industry. In addition, the Red Army in the Far East has sent westward to European Russia forces equal to 13 infantry divisions, about 1,300 tanks, and at least 1,300 airplanes since last spring. Its war potential, both materially and spiritually, is declining. Consequently, the probability of the Soviet Union taking the offensive, so long as the Kwantung Army is firmly entrenched, is very low.

However, it is possible that the United States may put pressure on the Soviet Union to permit America to utilize a part of the Soviet territory in the Far East for air and submarine bases for use in attacking us; and the Soviet Union would not be in a position to reject these American demands. Hence we must anticipate the possibility that we might see some submarines and aircraft in action against us from the North. Consequently, it cannot be assumed that there is no danger of a war breaking out between Japan and the Soviet Union as a result of such causes and changes in the situation. Thus our Empire must conclude its operations in the South as quickly as possible, and be prepared to cope with this situation.

4. On the relationship between operations and diplomacy:

Up to now, in accordance with the decision of the Imperial Conference of September 6, we have limited our preparations for operations so that they would not impede diplomatic negotiations. But from now on, given the decision for war, we will take all possible measures to be ready to use force at the beginning of December. This will have the effect of goading the United States and Great Britain; but we believe that diplomacy, taking advantage of progress in war preparations, should be stepped up. Needless to say, if diplomatic negotiations succeed by midnight of November 30, we will call off the use of force. If they do not succeed by that time, however, we would like to receive the Imperial Assent to start a war in order not to miss our opportunity, and thereby to fully achieve the objectives of our operations.

[A summary of the question-and-answer session between President of the Privy Council Hara and others follows.]

Hara: The topic of today's Imperial Conference is the extension and execution of the decision of the Imperial Conference of September 6. The decision of September 6 was primarily on the development of Japanese-American negotiations; but, to my regret, the negotiations have not led to agreement. . . . I should like to skip over the technical points of diplomacy and ask what is the present status of the negotiations. What are the important points? What has been definitely agreed upon, and what has not?

Tōgō: . . . Concerning attitudes of both countries toward the European war: The two parties have virtually agreed upon the matter of preventing the expansion of the war. On this matter, what the United States wants is to exert military power against Germany as a right of self-defense, while Japan promises not to exert military force in the Pacific region.

Concerning the question of peace between Japan and China: The two parties have not agreed upon the question of stationing and withdrawing troops. Japan shall station troops in necessary places for the necessary period of time, and shall withdraw other troops under certain conditions in a certain period of time. Nevertheless, the United States demands that we proclaim the withdrawal of all troops; but we cannot accept the demand.

Concerning activities of both countries in the Pacific region: The United States demands that there be no discrimination in trade in the entire Pacific region, including China; whereas Japan cannot agree to the demand unconditionally because of the problem of obtaining resources in China, and so on. On the other hand, since the United States contends that this principle [of nondiscriminatory trade] should be maintained throughout the world, we have said in the negotiations that we would agree to their demand if it is possible to maintain the principle throughout the world.

Both parties have agreed not to solve political problems in the Pacific region by military force. Concerning this, the withdrawal of troops from French Indochina is a problem we have not agreed on. . . .

Tōjō: Since the Foreign Minister might be unfamiliar with some matters pertaining to the previous Cabinet, I will make some supplementary remarks.

The American reply received on October 2 does endeavor to force upon Japan the Four Principles: (1) respect of territorial integrity and sovereignty; (2) noninterference in internal affairs; (3) non-discriminatory trade; and (4) disapproval of changing the status quo by force. The Four Principles are a condensation of the Nine-Power Treaty. If we agree to (1), the agreement will involve even Manchukuo, which the Americans have not recognized, to say nothing of the China Incident. If we agree to (2), there is a danger that this might lead to the abolition of agreements with the Nanking regime: i.e., the Japanese-Chinese treaty for trade and communications. Although (3) might be regarded as proper from a common-sense viewpoint, we cannot concede it where it concerns the self-preservation and self-defense of our Empire. This would also be the attitude of the United States and of

Great Britain. Nondiscrimination would also change our rights in nearby areas, which are prescribed by Article 6 of the Japanese-Chinese treaty. Concerning (4), we think that we could probably accept it in the Southwest Pacific, but not in the areas vital to our national defense and vital for procuring resources, such as China. The United States demands that we accept these principles. We cannot do so, because we carried out the Manchurian Incident and the China Incident in order to get rid of the yoke that is based on these principles. The new Foreign Minister and the new Finance Minister say that it is dangerous to agree to these principles. The previous Cabinet conceded what should not have been conceded for the sake of reaching an agreement in the Japanese-American negotiations. Although the American proposal of October 2 uses flowery words, the spirit and attitude expressed in the proposal remain unchanged. The United States has not conceded a single point; it simply makes strong demands on Japan.

The important points are as the Foreign Minister has stated. In concrete terms:

With reference to our attitudes toward the European war, they "appreciate Japan's attitudes" and add, "If Japan would reconsider the matter, it would be most beneficial." That is to say, they are demanding that we clarify our attitude toward the Tripartite Pact. Approval of the Four Principles and their local application are serious questions. More serious is the question of the stationing and withdrawal of troops. What they insist upon is Japan's acceptance of the principle of withdrawal of troops. They urge us to proclaim the withdrawal both at home and abroad, while suggesting that we could probably make some arrangements for stationing troops secretly. As I understand it, withdrawal of our troops is retreat. We sent a large force of one million men [to China], and it has cost us well over 100,000 dead and wounded, [the grief of] their bereaved families, hardship for four years, and a national expenditure of several tens of billions of yen. We must by all means get satisfactory results from this. If we should withdraw troops stationed in China under the Japanese-Chinese treaty, China would become worse than she was before the Incident. She would even attempt to rule Manchuria, Korea, and Formosa. We can expect an expansion of our country only by stationing troops. This the United States does not welcome. However, the stationing of troops that Japan insists upon is not at all unreasonable.

Concerning the Japanese-American conference of heads of state, we do not agree with each other. The United States insists that the

meeting be held after the major questions have been agreed upon; whereas Japan proposes to settle the major questions at the talks.

Hara: I have acquired a preliminary understanding of the contents of Proposals A and B as a result of the explanation just given. I shall now ask questions in detail.

Under (1), "Stationing of troops," does "disagrees with the inclusion of this item in the terms for peace" mean that it is not acceptable to include the stationing of troops in the Japanese-Chinese peace treaty?

Tōjō: Yes. That is, the United States makes it a principle that troops must be withdrawn, and objects to including stationing of troops in the terms.

Hara: Do they mean that we should write the withdrawal of troops into the treaty, but still negotiate with China on stationing troops?

Tōjō: The United States seems to be suggesting that we negotiate with China on stationing troops, which she maintains should be dealt with as an unofficial matter. . . .

Hara: Item 3 of Proposal B reads "to restore [trade relations] to what they were prior to the freezing of assets." What about sanctions imposed prior to the freezing of assets?

Tōgō: Our sending of troops into French Indochina directly caused the issuance of the order freezing our assets. The situation should be restored to what it was before the Indochina incident. Japan would prefer that we returned to the state of affairs prior to the abrogation of the trade treaty, but I think it would be better to seek first of all a relaxation of tension. Since the United States will not be completely satisfied because this item is conditional, as stated in Note 1, we think we should first proceed to return to the situation prior to the freezing order, and after this has been achieved carry on negotiations with the United States on various matters. However, in the case of oil, its export was prohibited even before the freezing order; so I would like to make an agreement whereby Japan would be able to buy the amount she needs, and not be limited to the amount prior to the freezing order.

Hara: It was because of the China Incident that the United States put restrictions on trade with us. The freezing order resulted from our advance into French Indochina. Nonetheless, we want to settle the China Incident; therefore, I think we should negotiate and settle all these questions, including the China Incident, with the United States at one and the same time. Aren't our demands in Proposal B too weak? We plan to proceed with negotiations first on the basis of Proposals A

and B, and then go on to other questions. How is the United States likely to react to these proposals?

Tōgō: I shall explain what led us to put in Point 3 in Proposal B. Although we desire to return to the situation prior to the abrogation of the trade treaty in one stroke, as you have said, a most serious situation — namely, war — would result if the United States did not agree with us. Therefore, if we offer as many concessions as we can afford, and still the United States does not agree with us, then we will know that she intends to go to war, and at the same time our moral position will be made clear both at home and abroad. Answering your question on the overall situation, we cannot expect to settle matters quickly by means of Proposal A. I am afraid we cannot settle matters even with Proposal B. Take, for example, the withdrawal of troops from French Indochina. The United States, I think, will not agree to the China Question in (4) of Proposal B either, for she has never agreed to it. I suppose it will also be very difficult for her to agree to Item 2 of the Notes, since she has been requiring us to observe it. I, however, do not think that Japan's demands are unreasonable. If the United States wants peace in the Pacific, or if she reflects on the fact that Japan is determined, I think that the United States must give some consideration to our demands. But since this means that Japan will coerce the United States with force [in the background], it is not impossible that she may resist us. Moreover, we have only a short time left. Since we will send instructions to begin negotiations after His Majesty has made the decision, and because we must conclude them by the end of November, we have only two weeks for negotiations. This cannot be helped because of other needs. Consequently, I think the prospect of success in the negotiations is small. As Foreign Minister, I hope to do my best. To my regret, there is little hope for success in the negotiations.

Hara: I should like both the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff to explain what will happen if the negotiations break down. Please state it in such a way that it can be understood with the use of common sense. Regarding operations in the South, the field of battle in the map we have here covers the entire region. What is the scope of operations, and how successful are our military operations likely to be?

Sugiyama: Targets of this operation are military and air bases in Guam, Hong Kong, British Malaya, Burma, British Borneo, Dutch Borneo, Sumatra, Celebes, the Bismarck Islands, and small islands southwest of the Bismarck Islands. The numerical strength of the enemy in these places is more than 200,000, while the number of enemy air-

craft is 800. There are other forces in India, Australia, and New Zealand, which I assume would participate sooner or later. The Army will carry out operations under these conditions in cooperation with the Navy, and its major efforts will be made in the Philippines and Malaya. The operation is planned to start in Malaya and the Philippines simultaneously, and then to move toward the Netherlands East Indies. In this way, it is estimated that it will take 50 days to complete the operation in the Philippines, 100 days in Malaya, and 50 days in the Netherlands East Indies; and that the entire operation will be completed within five months after the opening of the war. However, in case the American fleet comes to attack us, and our Navy goes out to meet it, or in case the United States and the Soviet Union attack us in the North — although the probability of this is low — the periods mentioned above would probably be extended for some time. I believe, however, that we would be able to carry on a protracted war if we could bring under our control such important military bases as Hong Kong, Manila, and Singapore, and important areas in the Netherlands East Indies.

Hara: . . . Although it is said that there is a force of well over 200,000 men and some aircraft in these areas, there are also warships. Can we destroy their fleet in a short period of time?

Nagano: The ratio of our fleet to that of the United States is 7.5 to 10; but 40 per cent of the American fleet is in the Atlantic Ocean, and 60 per cent is in the Pacific. I do not believe that Great Britain will be able to send a large fleet against us; probably her fleet would consist of a battleship, ten or more cruisers, and some aircraft. As to the method of fighting battles, the United States would need considerable time if she should withdraw ships from the Atlantic Ocean and come to attack us. However, a part of their naval force might be able to obstruct our operations in the South, although the strength of that naval force would probably be insufficient to engage in a decisive battle. Consequently, they would have to bring the Atlantic Fleet into the Pacific. Great Britain might send a part of her fleet because she would not want to lose Singapore. In this case it is possible that Great Britain and the United States might combine their fleets. Our Navy has plans for this contingency, although the method of fighting battles would be different from the other case. The combined force of Great Britain and the United States has weak points. We are, therefore, confident of victory. We can destroy their fleet if they want a decisive battle. Even if we destroy it, however, the war will continue long after the Southern Operation.

Hara: Although the Army Chief of Staff has stated that the operation would last 50 to 100 days, I would imagine that landings could not be carried out unless we could deal with the enemy fleets now in the South Pacific. What is your opinion on this?

Nagano: I assume that, among enemy fleets, the surface fleets operating in the vicinity of our fleets would temporarily retreat. We would destroy them if possible; even if we could not, they would not be able to do much. But it is submarines that we would attempt to overwhelm. It would not be difficult to dominate the enemy fleets now in the Pacific Ocean.

Hara: I shall ask about the Soviet Union. While it is stated that our plans are to occupy the greater part of the South Pacific in about 100 days, it is usual for predictions to turn out wrong. . . . Although I believe that our Supreme Command's plan is most realistic, would you transfer some troops in the South to the North in case the war is prolonged, and the Soviet Union starts a war against us? What would happen in the Chinese theater? I should like to hear your views on this, just to be certain.

Sugiyama: It is difficult for the Soviet Union to conduct a major operation in winter. In light of the present situation, the probability of the Soviet Union entering the war is low. Even if the Soviet Union and the United States should combine forces, they would be unable to carry out a major operation. Even if there were combined operations, they would be only nominal ones for the Soviet Union. We are prepared to deal with their winter operations.

What we are most concerned with is a possible United States-Soviet alliance concurrent with a delay in our plans to occupy Malaya in 100 days and to complete occupation of the Netherlands East Indies in five months. This is dangerous. I think we should be able to meet this situation adequately by using Army corps now in the home islands and forces to be transferred from China.

Hara: I think it is clear that the Soviet Union would not attack us immediately. I also assume that the alliance between the United States and the Soviet Union would be as you have described it. I should like to ask further if we can ignore the possibility that our trade and maritime commerce might be hindered by the activities of the Soviet Navy, and by the enemy fleet stationed in the South Seas. Can we assume that the transportation of materials and other goods would not be affected by interference from the Soviet Union and enemy ships in the South Seas?

Nagano: If the Soviet Union starts a war, and if her submarines become active, we would not be able to send sufficient forces against her, since our Navy would be carrying out operations in the South Seas. We would put up a defense against her activities; and then, as our operations in the South Seas progressed, we would fight actively against them. In the South Seas there are enemy warships, submarines, and aircraft. We are, therefore, prepared to suffer considerable damage once we have begun operations. . . .

Hara: Am I to understand that materials can be secured even if the Soviet fleet and the navies of Great Britain, the United States, and the Netherlands interfere?

Suzuki: The Army and the Navy have already made studies concerning the loss of ships.

Hara: Although (4) under I in "Essentials for Carrying Out the Empire's Policies" discusses relations with Thailand just prior to resorting to arms, it would seem that we will not be able to confer with her if this must be done just before we use force. What do you think about this point? If we allow time for negotiations, Great Britain will learn about them. In that event, the intentions of the Supreme Command will become known to the enemy. What is meant by "just prior"? If you are going to use coercion, it will be coercion, and not negotiation for a close military relationship. This approach would affect our relations with Thailand in the future.

Tōjō: Since diplomatic and military affairs are closely interrelated here, I will answer. With the idea of winning Thailand over to our side we have been working on [Prime Minister] Pibun Songgram to set up close military relations ever since the time of our advance into southern French Indochina. As you have pointed out, there are delicate points. It is necessary from an operational point of view for us to make landings in Thailand. It will not do to let this be known too early. Therefore, we cannot do other than push the matter by force if they do not agree with us at the talks just before we act.

Hara: . . . It would not be desirable to fail to get an agreement on Japanese-American negotiations. We have endured hardships for four years because we are a unified nation under an Imperial family with a history of 2,600 years. It seems that Britain already has war weariness. I wonder about Germany. It also seems that there is an antiwar movement in Italy. I believe that the favorable situation in our country results from our national polity with the Imperial family as its head. Nonetheless, our people want to settle the China Incident quickly.

Statesmen must give serious consideration to the wisdom of waging war against a great power like the United States without the prospect of the China Incident being settled quickly. At the last Imperial Conference it was decided that we would go to war if the negotiations failed to lead to an agreement. According to the briefings given today, the present American attitude is not just the same as the previous one, but is even more unreasonable. Therefore, I regret very much that the negotiations have little prospect of success.

It is impossible, from the standpoint of our domestic political situation and of our self-preservation, to accept all of the American demands. We must hold fast to our position. As I understand it, the Japanese-Chinese problem is the important point in the negotiations, and there is suspicion that the United States is acting as spokesman for the Chungking regime. If Chiang, relying on American power, should negotiate with us, I doubt that the negotiations could be completed in two or three months. It would be nice if he would capitulate in the face of Japan's firm determination; but I think there is absolutely no hope for this.

On the other hand, we cannot let the present situation continue. If we miss the present opportunity to go to war, we will have to submit to American dictation. Therefore, I recognize that it is inevitable that we must decide to start a war against the United States. I will put my trust in what I have been told: namely, that things will go well in the early part of the war; and that although we will experience increasing difficulties as the war progresses, there is some prospect of success.

On this occasion I would like to make one comment to the leaders of the Government. Although the China Incident is one cause for war between Japan and the United States and Great Britain, another is the German-British war. I do not believe that the present situation would have developed out of just the China Incident. We have come to where we are because of the war between Germany and Great Britain. What we should always keep in mind here is what would happen to relations between Germany and Great Britain and Germany and the United States, all of them being countries whose population belongs to the white race, if Japan should enter the war. Hitler has said that the Japanese are a second-class race, and Germany has not declared war against the United States. Japan will take positive action against the United States. In that event, will the American people adopt the same attitude toward us psychologically that they do toward the Germans? Their indignation against the Japanese will be stronger than their ha-

ted of Hitler. The Germans in the United States are considering ways of bringing about peace between the United States and Germany. I fear, therefore, that if Japan begins a war against the United States, Germany and Great Britain and Germany and the United States will come to terms, leaving Japan by herself. That is, we must be prepared for the possibility that hatred of the yellow race might shift the hatred now being directed against Germany to Japan, thus resulting in the German-British war's being turned against Japan.

Negotiations with the United States have failed to lead to an agreement. A war against the United States and Great Britain is inevitable if Japan is to survive. However, we must give serious consideration to race relations, exercise constant care to avoid being surrounded by the entire Aryan race — which would leave Japan isolated — and take steps now to strengthen relations with Germany and Italy. Paper agreements will not do. I would like to call the attention of the officials in the Government to the following point: don't let hatred of Japan become stronger than hatred of Hitler, so that everybody will in name and in fact gang up on Japan. I hope that our officials will deal adequately with international affairs in the future.

Tōjō: The points of the President of the Privy Council are well taken. Ever since the previous Imperial Conference, the Government has not given up its earnest desire to somehow break the impasse in our negotiations with the United States. It is natural for the Supreme Command to devote itself exclusively to military operations, since it sees little hope for the negotiations' success. However, in the hope that there might be some way to break the impasse, the Government sought a settlement, even though it meant some sacrifice of freedom in military operations. That is, we pursued diplomacy and military planning at the same time. There is still some hope for success. The reason the United States agreed to negotiate with us is that they have some weaknesses: (1) they are not prepared for operations in two oceans; (2) they have not completed strengthening their domestic structure; (3) they are short of materials for national defense (they have only enough for one year); and so on.

They will learn how determined Japan is from the deployment of our troops, which we will carry out on the basis of the present proposal. The United States has from the beginning believed that Japan would give up because of economic pressure; but if they recognize that Japan is determined, then that is the time we should resort to diplomatic measures. I believe this is the only way that is left for us. This is the present proposal. This is the last measure we can take that

is in line with what President Hara has called "going by diplomacy." I cannot think of any other way in the present situation.

If we enter into a protracted war, there will be difficulties, as mentioned before. The first stage of the war will not be difficult. We have some uneasiness about a protracted war. But how can we let the United States continue to do as she pleases, even though there is some uneasiness? Two years from now we will have no petroleum for military use. Ships will stop moving. When I think about the strengthening of American defenses in the Southwest Pacific, the expansion of the American fleet, the unfinished China Incident, and so on, I see no end to difficulties. We can talk about austerity and suffering, but can our people endure such a life for a long time? The situation is not the same as it was during the Sino-Japanese War [1894-95]. I fear that we would become a third-class nation after two or three years if we just sat tight. We agreed upon the present proposal as a result of a careful study in the light of the possibility just mentioned. The President should share our views on this point.

I intend to take measures to prevent a racial war once war is started. I should like to prevent Germany and Italy from making peace with Great Britain or with the United States by taking advantage of the results of campaigns in the South. I think the sentiments of the American people are as the President of the Privy Council has indicated, and so I intend to take precautions.

As to what our moral basis for going to war should be, there is some merit in making it clear that Great Britain and the United States represent a strong threat to Japan's self-preservation. Also, if we are fair in governing the occupied areas, attitudes toward us would probably relax. America may be enraged for a while, but later she will come to understand [why we did what we did]. In any case I will be careful to avoid the war's becoming a racial war.

Do you have any other comments? If not, I will rule that the proposals have been approved in their original form.

Plan A and Plan B

November 7 and November 20, 1941

The last act of the Pearl Harbor drama began in November 1941, when the Japanese government, in a last-ditch attempt to avoid war with the United States, dispatched a special envoy to Washington. The envoy, Saburō

Kurusu was a career diplomat, and his superiors in the Foreign Ministry believed that he would be more adept at negotiating with the Americans than Admiral Kichisaburō Nomura, who had been Japan's ambassador in Washington since early 1941. Nomura was not a professional negotiator, his English left much to be desired, and he insisted on talking with the American leaders without an interpreter. Partly as a result of Nomura's inexperience and ineptness, the earlier "Washington conversations" (informal talks with President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, and others) had gone nowhere, although it would be unfair to blame him for the breakdown in U.S.-Japanese communication, which was fundamentally caused by the two governments' contradictory policies in Asia.

Nomura and Kurusu were empowered to negotiate with the U.S. government for a possible deal. Japan's terms for compromise consisted of two parts, Plan A and Plan B, which had been approved in outline at the Imperial Conference of November 5. As you will see, Plan A focused on China, and Plan B on Southeast Asia. Because conflicting policies in China were the principal cause of the U.S.-Japanese difficulties, it would be difficult to arrive at a mutually acceptable settlement on the issue of China. Therefore, Tokyo judged, it might be more practical to negotiate a deal with Washington on the Southeast Asian question, which had arisen from the Japanese occupation of French Indochina and the subsequent U.S. freezing of Japanese assets. If Plan A was unacceptable to the U.S., Plan B might hold some promise. Do you think either Plan A or Plan B offered a reasonable basis for a negotiated settlement?

Plan A

(A) *Stationing of Japanese forces in China and the withdrawal thereof:*

With regard to the Japanese forces that have been dispatched to China in connection with the China Affair, those forces in specified areas in North China and Mengchiang (Inner Mongolia) as well as in Hainantao (Hainan Island) will remain to be stationed for a certain required duration after the restoration of peaceful relations between Japan and China. All the rest of such forces will commence withdrawal as soon as general peace is restored between Japan and China, and the withdrawal will proceed according to separate arrangements between Japan and China and will be completed within two years with the firm establishment of peace and order.

Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943), 776, 801-2.

(B) *Stationing of Japanese forces in French Indo-China and the withdrawal thereof.*

The Japanese Government undertakes to guarantee the territorial sovereignty of French Indo-China. The Japanese forces at present stationed there will be withdrawn as soon as the China Affair is settled or an equitable peace is established in East Asia.

PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION

The Japanese Government recognizes the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations to be applied to all the Pacific areas, inclusive of China, on the understanding that the principle in question is to be applied uniformly to the rest of the entire world as well.

Plan B

1. Both the Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to make any armed advancement into any of the regions in the South-eastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area excepting the part of French Indo-China where the Japanese troops are stationed at present.

2. The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw its troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area.

In the meantime the Government of Japan declares that it is prepared to remove its troops now stationed in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part of the said territory upon the conclusion of the present arrangement which shall later be embodied in the final agreement.

3. The Governments of Japan and the United States shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition of those goods and commodities which the two countries need in Netherlands East Indies.

4. The Governments of Japan and the United States mutually undertake to restore their commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of the assets.

The Government of the United States shall supply Japan a required quantity of oil.

5. The Government of the United States undertakes to refrain from such measures and actions as will be prejudicial to the endeavors for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.

WASHINGTON DISCUSSIONS ON CHINA AND THE TRIPARTITE (AXIS) PACT

As soon as Kurusu arrived in Washington, he and Ambassador Nomura paid courtesy calls to the White House and the State Department. On November 17, the Japanese diplomats met with President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull; on the following day, they met again with Hull. The records of their conversations are reproduced here.

Even before these meetings took place, the American leaders knew of the contents of Plans A and B, at least in outline, from deciphered Japanese cables. As you will see later in this collection (see page 158), since 1939 the U.S. Army's code breakers had been reading top secret Japanese cable messages. These were encoded in a system called PURPLE, but the Army cryptographers had developed a decoding machine called "Magic" that was capable of deciphering all PURPLE messages. They were then translated into English and made available to top U.S. officials. The translating skills of those involved in the operation were far from perfect, and they often made careless mistakes, but on the whole the decoded and translated documents accurately conveyed the gist of evolving Japanese policies and strategies. By the time Kurusu arrived in Washington, then, Roosevelt, Hull, and a few other leaders were aware of Plans A and B as they had been cabled from the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo to the Japanese embassy in Washington. Moreover, the Americans knew through intercepted messages that the Japanese considered late November to be the point at which negotiation would cease and steps toward war would be taken.

Given such foreknowledge, ask yourself whether Roosevelt, Hull, Nomura, and Kurusu acted with an appropriate sense of urgency in seeking a negotiated settlement, or whether they were wasting precious time by talking in general terms about the state of U.S.-Japanese relations. In this context, why do you think they spent so much time discussing the Tripartite Pact, the Japanese alliance with Germany? What issue was the most important in preventing a settlement: the Tripartite Pact, the status of China, or the fate of Southeast Asia? Do these documents suggest that Secretary Hull was open to, or against, some sort of negotiated settlement with Japan?

CORDELL HULL

*Memorandum**November 17, 1941*

I accompanied Ambassador Nomura and Ambassador Saburō Kuru to the White House in order that the latter might be received by the President.

Following several minutes of an exchange of courtesies and formalities, the President brought up the more serious side by referring to the misunderstandings and matters of difference between our countries and made clear the desire of this country, and he accepted the statement of the Japanese Ambassador that it was the desire of Japan equally, to avoid war between our two countries and to bring about a settlement on a fair and peaceful basis so far as the Pacific area was concerned.

Ambassador Kuru proceeded with one line of remarks that he kept up during the conversation and that was that we must find ways to work out an agreement to avoid trouble between our two countries. He said that all the way across the Pacific it was like a powder keg, and again he repeated that some way must be found to adjust the situation.

Ambassador Kuru made some specious attempt to explain away the Tripartite Pact. I replied in language similar to that which I used in discussing this matter with Ambassador Nomura on November fifteenth, which need not be repeated here. I made it clear that any kind of a peaceful settlement for the Pacific area, with Japan still clinging to her Tripartite Pact with Germany, would cause the President and myself to be denounced in immeasurable terms and the peace arrangement would not for a moment be taken seriously while all the countries interested in the Pacific would redouble their efforts to arm against Japanese aggression. I emphasized the point about the Tripartite Pact and self-defense by saying that when Hitler starts on a march of invasion across the earth with ten million soldiers and thirty thousand airplanes with an official announcement that he is out for unlimited invasion objectives, this country from that time was in danger and that danger has grown each week until this minute. The result was that this country with no other motive except self-defense has recognized that

The following selections are from *Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943), 789-99.

danger, and has proceeded thus far to defend itself before it is too late; and that the Government of Japan says that it does not know whether this country is thus acting in self-defense or not. This country feels so profoundly the danger that it has committed itself to ten, twenty-five or fifty billions of dollars in self-defense; but when Japan is asked about whether this is self-defense, she indicates that she has no opinion on the subject — I said that I cannot get this view over to the American people; that they believe Japan must know that we are acting in self-defense and, therefore, they do not understand her present attitude. I said that he was speaking of their political difficulties and that I was thus illustrating some of our difficulties in connection with this country's relations with Japan.

The President remarked that some time ago he proclaimed a zone around this hemisphere, 300 miles out in the sea in some places and 1,100 miles in others. The President added that this was self-defense.

I then said that Ambassador Nomura and I have been proceeding on the view that the people of the United States and Japan alike are a proud and great people and there is no occasion for either to attempt to bluff the other and we would not consider that bluffing enters into our conversations, which are of genuine friendliness.

The President brought out a number of illustrations of our situation and the Japanese situation as it relates to Germany and our self-defense which serve to emphasize our position and to expose the sophistry of the Japanese position.

Ambassador Kuru said that Germany had not up to this time requested Japan to fight; that she was serving a desirable purpose without doing so, — this must have meant that she was keeping the American and British Navies, aircraft, et cetera, diverted.

The further question of whether the United States is on the defensive in the present Pacific situation came up by some general discussion in reference to that situation by Ambassador Kuru, and the President and I made it clear that we were not the aggressors in the Pacific but that Japan was the aggressor.

At another point I said that the belief in this country is that the Japanese formula of a new order in greater East Asia is but another name for a program to dominate entirely, politically, economically, socially and otherwise by military force all of the Pacific area; that this would include the high seas, the islands and the continents and would place every other country at the mercy of very arbitrary military rule just as the Hitler program does in Europe and the Japanese in China. The Ambassador made no particular comment.

There was some effort by Ambassador Kuru to defend their plan of not bringing the troops out of China. Placing the Japanese on the defensive, the President said that the question ought to be worked out in a fair way considering all of the circumstances and relative merits of the matters involved; and that at a suitable stage, while we know that Japan does not wish us to mediate in any way, this Government might, so to speak, introduce Japan and China to each other and tell them to proceed with the remaining or detailed adjustments, the Pacific questions having already been determined.

Ambassador Kuru strongly stated that it would be most difficult to bring all the troops out of China at once.

Ambassador Kuru said that we, of course, desired to bring up both sides of matters existing between our two countries and he said that we would recall that when the Japanese went into Shantung during the World War, this Government insisted that she get out. I replied that my own country opposed a policy of this seizure of new territory by any country to the fullest extent of its ability to do so; that it declined to take a dollar of compensation or a foot of territory for itself; that it insisted that the world must turn over a new leaf in this respect or nations would be fighting always for territory and under modern methods of war would soon destroy and utterly impoverish each other; that in any event his country fared well in this respect.

The question of our recent proposal on commercial policy was brought up by us and Ambassador Kuru said he had not examined it and that he had forgotten much of the technical side of commercial policy since he was in the Foreign Office. The President made very pertinent and timely reference to the destructive nature of armaments and the still more destructive effects of a permanent policy of armaments which always means war, devastation and destruction. He emphasized the point that there is from the long-term point of view no difference of interest between our two countries and no occasion, therefore, for serious differences.

* All in all, there was nothing new brought out by the Japanese Ambassador and Ambassador Kuru. Ambassador Kuru constantly made the plea that there was no reason why there should be serious differences between the two countries and that ways must be found to solve the present situation. He referred to Prime Minister Tōjō as being very desirous of bringing about a peaceful adjustment notwithstanding he is an Army man. The President expressed his interest and satisfaction to hear this. The President frequently parried the remarks of Ambassador Nomura and also of Ambassador Kuru, especially in regard to the

three main points of difference between our two countries. There was no effort to solve these questions at the conference. The meeting broke up with the understanding that I would meet the Japanese representatives tomorrow morning.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

JOSEPH W. BALLANTINE*

Memorandum

November 18, 1941

The Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kuru called on the Secretary, by appointment made at their request, at the Department.

After some preliminary remarks the Secretary took up the question of Japan's relations with the Axis. He pointed out that the public would place their own interpretation upon the implications of a situation wherein on the one hand Japan had an agreement with us and on the other was in an alliance with the Axis powers. He said that our people do not trust Hitler and furthermore we feel that it would be inevitable that Hitler would eventually, if he was successful, get around to the Far East and double-cross Japan. The Secretary cited the instance when Germany, after having concluded an anti-Comintern pact** with Japan had surprised Japan later on by entering into a non-aggression pact with Russia and finally went back on the non-aggression pact by attacking Russia. The Secretary said that he presumed Japan did not know in advance what Germany's intentions were any more than we did. The Secretary expressed great doubt that any agreement into which we entered with Japan while Japan at the same time had an alliance with Hitler would carry the confidence of our people and he emphasized that we would have to have a clear-cut agreement making self-evident our peaceful pur-

* A foreign service officer specializing in Japanese affairs. He worked in the Far Eastern Division of the State Department and was the principal aide to Secretary of State Hull during the November 1941 negotiations with the Japanese.

** Signed by Germany and Japan in November 1936. Ostensibly an agreement to cooperate in checking activities by the Communist International operating out of Moscow, the pact contained a secret understanding that neither Germany nor Japan would come to the aid of the Soviet Union if the latter should attack one of them.

*Hull doubts he can sell a deal with Japan to the American public while Japan is in alliance with Hitler Germany
Hull raises a big problem of the axis alliance, but refuses to say specifically what Japan should do*

pose, for otherwise there would be a redoubled effort by all nations to strengthen their armaments. He pointed out that we are coming out of the Philippines in 1946 and that we are now bringing our marines out of China and in this way we are trying to make a contribution to the establishment of a peaceful world based on law and order. He said that this is what we want to work out with Japan; that we had nothing to offer in the way of bargaining except our friendship. Our commercial program was one, he said, calling for a maximum production and distribution of goods. The Secretary pointed out also that we are even now engaged in efforts to induce the British Empire to reduce its Empire preferences. He said that what we desire is to put our people back to work in a way that can never be accomplished through permitting armies to overrun countries. The Secretary observed that many Japanese spokesmen had spoken of Japan's desire to have a controlling influence in Eastern Asia, but the only kind of controlling influence which was worth anything was one that could not be achieved or maintained by the sword. He dwelt briefly upon what we have accomplished in South America through our peaceful policies and through renouncing the employment of gunboats and armed forces. The Secretary made it clear that we recognized that under present emergency conditions we cannot carry out to perfection our commercial policy which must be modified to meet war conditions, but we can at least establish the principles. The Secretary said, going back to the situation with regard to Japan's relations with the Axis, that a difficult situation was created thereby as far as our public was concerned — as, for example, when telegrams of congratulations were sent to Hitler by Japanese leaders when he commits some atrocity.

The Japanese Ambassador observed that the United States and Russia were not pursuing parallel courses and yet we are aligned with Russia at the present time. He also said he appreciated very well the relations we had developed with South America but that, although Japan would like to imitate us, Japan was not in a position to be so magnanimous — as, for example, in the matter of extending substantial lend-lease aid to other countries. . . . The Secretary then added that he frankly did not know whether anything could be done in the matter of reaching a satisfactory agreement with Japan; that we can go so far but rather than go beyond a certain point it would be better for us to stand and take the consequences. The Ambassador then said that Japan is now hard-pressed and that the Secretary was well aware of how desirous Japan was to reach some agreement with the United States.

Mr. Kurusu said that he had served five years as Director of the Commercial Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Office and that he was familiar

with the developments in Japan's commercial policy. He said that the situation with respect to the Empire preferences was one of the factors which had influenced Japan to go into the Axis camp. He said that the United States was an economically powerful country and that the United States was, therefore, in a much better position than was Japan to enter into commercial bargaining. Furthermore, Japan was much more dependent than was the United States upon foreign trade. He felt that what the two Governments should now do would be to achieve something to tide over the present abnormal situation. He referred, for example, to the exchange control situation which had been developed in Japanese-occupied China and expressed the view that that situation could not be done away with in a short time. He said that perhaps after the war was over it might be possible to adopt a more liberal policy but that he was unable to promise anything on the part of his Government. The Secretary asked whether Japan could not now agree in principle on commercial policy. Mr. Kurusu made no direct reply but went on to say that in the early years of American intercourse in the Far East our main interest was in commerce and not religious and cultural activities; that we had pursued a course of idealism, but with American occupation of the Philippines the situation changed somewhat and the United States tied itself in with the European concert of nations.

Turning to the question of the Tripartite Pact, Mr. Kurusu said that he could not say that Japan would abrogate the Tripartite Pact but that Japan might do something which would "outshine" the Tripartite Pact. ✓

The Secretary pointed out that unless peacefully minded nations now start their program of reconstruction it will be impossible to get such a program started later on because the selfish elements would get control of the situation and prevent the materialization of a liberal policy. Therefore, he said it was necessary to get the fundamental principles established so that we might begin to enable the peaceful forces, which were now demoralized, to assert a leadership. Unless we pursue such a course, the Secretary noted, we shall not be able to obtain the confidence of peacefully minded people when the time for putting into effect a reconstruction program arrives. Mr. Kurusu asked whether the Secretary had a concrete formula for dealing with Japan's relations with the Axis alliance. The Secretary made it clear that this was a matter for Japan to work out. He said that if we could get a peaceful program firmly established, Hitler ought to be asked not to embarrass us too much. He asked whether Japan could not work it out in some way which would be convincing to the American people. He said that if it goes the wrong way every peaceful nation will redouble its defensive efforts. The Secretary

→ Monroe Doctrine

emphasized again that the public would be confused in regard to a survival of a relationship between Japan and the Axis while Japan had an agreement with the United States.

The Ambassador asked whether it was not important now to make some understanding to save the situation. The Secretary said he agreed but that he felt that the Tripartite Pact was inconsistent with the establishment of an understanding.

Mr. Kurusu asked what could the Secretary suggest. The Secretary said that if we mix the Tripartite Pact with an agreement with the United States it will not be possible to get many people to follow us. The Secretary said that the question arises whether Japanese statesmen desire to follow entirely peaceful courses with China or whether they desire to face two ways. The Secretary went on to say that if the Japanese should back away from adopting a clear-cut position with regard to commercial policy, with regard to a course in China consistent with peaceful principles and with regard to Japanese relations to the European war this would leave us in an indefensible position in regard to the proposed agreement. We would have to say that the Japanese Government is unable to get its politicians into line.

The Ambassador repeated that the situation in Japan was very pressing and that it was important to arrest a further deterioration of the relations between the two countries. He suggested that if this situation could now be checked an atmosphere would develop when it would be possible to move in the direction of the courses which this Government advocated. He pointed out that big ships cannot turn around too quickly, that they have to be eased around slowly and gradually.

The Secretary replied that if we should sit down and write an agreement permeated with the doctrine of force it would be found that each country would be entirely distrustful and would be piling up armaments, as countries cannot promote peace so long as they are tied in in any way with Hitler.

Mr. Kurusu pointed out that a comprehensive solution cannot be worked out immediately, that he could make no promises. He said that our freezing regulations had caused impatience in Japan and a feeling that Japan had to fight while it still could. If we could come to some settlement now, he said, it would promote an atmosphere which would be conducive to discussing fundamentals. The Secretary asked if he did not think that something could be worked out on the Tripartite Pact. The Ambassador said that he desired to emphasize that Japan would not be a cat's-paw for Germany, that Japan's purpose in entering into the Tri-

partite alliance was to use it for Japan's own purposes, that Japan entered the Tripartite Pact because Japan felt isolated. The Secretary observed that it would be difficult to get public opinion in this country to understand the situation as Mr. Kurusu had described it.

He then asked what the Ambassador had in mind in regard to the Chinese situation and whether the Japanese stood for no annexations, no indemnities, respect for China's sovereignty, territorial integrity and the principle of equality. The Ambassador replied in the affirmative.

The Secretary then said that while he had made this point already clear to the Ambassador he wished to make it clear also to Mr. Kurusu, that whereas the Japanese Government desired to consider our talks negotiations rather than exploratory conversations, the Secretary felt that without having first reached a real basis for negotiations, he was not in a position to go to the British or the Chinese or the other governments involved, as these governments had a rightful interest in these problems. Mr. Kurusu tried to get the Secretary to specify in just which problems each of the respective governments were interested but the Secretary said that he had not yet, for manifest reasons, discussed these problems with these other governments and anything that he might say would be just an assumption on his part. Mr. Kurusu then said that under such circumstances United States and Japanese relations would be at the mercy of Great Britain and China. The Secretary replied that he believed and must repeat that we must have something substantial in the way of a basis for an agreement to take to these governments for otherwise there would be no point in talking to them. Mr. Kurusu said that the situation was so pressing that it might get beyond our control. The Secretary agreed that that was true but he pointed out that the fact that Japan's leaders keep announcing programs based upon force adds to our difficulties. He said he would like to leave the Hitler situation to the Japanese Government for consideration. → *but he is also making it into a problem!?*

Turning to the China situation the Secretary asked how many soldiers the Japanese wanted to retain in China. The Ambassador replied that possibly 90 per cent would be withdrawn. The Secretary asked how long the Japanese intended to keep that remaining 10 per cent in China. The Ambassador did not reply directly to this but he invited attention to the fact that under the existing Boxer Protocol Japan was permitted to retain troops in the Peiping and Tientsin area. The Secretary pointed out that the question of the Japanese troops in China was one in which there were many elements of trouble. American interests even had suffered severely from the actions of the Japanese forces and we had a long list of

such instances. The Secretary made mention of the great patience this Government had exercised in the presence of this situation. He said the situation was one in which the extremists seemed to be looking for trouble and he said that it was up to the Japanese Government to make an extra effort to take the situation by the collar. He said also that the United States and Japan had trusted each other in the past, that the present situation was one of Japan's own making and it was up to the Japanese Government to find some way of getting itself out of the difficulty in which it had placed itself. The Secretary went on to say that the situation was now exceptionally advantageous for Japan to put her factories to work in producing goods which are needed by peaceful countries if only the Japanese people could get war and invasion out of mind. The Ambassador said that our conversations had been protracted and if the American Government could only give the Japanese some hope with regard to the situation it might be helpful. He added that our country was great and strong. The Secretary replied that our Government has not made any threats and he has exercised his influence throughout to deprecate bellicose utterances in this country. He added that the Japanese armed forces in China do not appear to realize whose territory they are in and that the people in this country say that Hitler proposes to take charge of one-half of the world and Japan proposes to take charge of the other half and if they should succeed what would there be left for the United States? Mr. Kurusu suggested that Japan would have to move gradually in China, that one step might lead to another and that what was important now was to do something to enable Japan to change its course. The Secretary asked what was in Mr. Kurusu's mind. In reply to a suggestion that it was felt in Japanese circles that we have been responsible for delay the Secretary pointed out that we could more rightly accuse the Japanese of delays, that he had met with the Japanese Ambassador promptly every time the latter had asked for a meeting and had discussed matters fully with him. The Secretary added that when Japan's movement into Indochina in July took place this had caused an interruption of our conversations and it was then that the Secretary could no longer defend the continued shipments of petroleum products to Japan, especially as for the past year he had been under severe criticism in this country for not having cut off those shipments. Mr. Kurusu asked whether we wanted the *status quo ante* to be restored or what we expected Japan to do. The Secretary replied that if the Japanese could not do anything now on those three points — getting troops out of China, commercial policy and the Tripartite agreement — he could only leave to

Japan what Japan could do. The Secretary said that it is our desire to see Japan help furnish a world leadership for a peaceful program and that he felt that Japan's long-swing interests were the same as our interests. The Ambassador said that he realized that our Government was suspicious of the Japanese Government but he wished to assure us that Japan wanted to settle the China affair notwithstanding the fact that Japan desired to keep a few troops in China for the time being. The Secretary then asked again what the Japanese had in mind. Mr. Kurusu said that it was Japan's intention to withdraw Japanese troops from French Indochina as soon as a just Pacific settlement should be reached and he pointed out that the Japanese Government took the Burma Road* situation very seriously. The Secretary asked, if there should be a relaxation of freezing, to what extent would that enable Japan to adopt peaceful policies. He explained that what he had in mind was to enable the peaceful leaders in Japan to get control of the situation in Japan and to assert their influence. The Ambassador said that our position was unyielding and that it was Japan's [sic] unyielding attitude toward Chiang Kai-shek which had stiffened Chinese resistance against Japan. He asked whether there was any hope of a solution — some small beginning toward the realization of our high ideals. The Secretary replied that if we do not work out an agreement that the public trusts the arming of nations will go on; that the Japanese Government has a responsibility in the matter as it has created the conditions we are trying to deal with. The Ambassador then suggested the possibility of going back to the status which existed before the date in July when, following the Japanese move into southern French Indochina, our freezing measures were put into effect. The Secretary said that if we should make some modifications in our embargo on the strength of a step by Japan such as the Ambassador had mentioned we do not know whether the troops which have been withdrawn from French Indochina will be diverted to some equally objectionable movement elsewhere. The Ambassador said that what he had in mind was simply some move toward arresting the dangerous trend in our relations. The Secretary said that it would be difficult for him to get this Government to go a long way in removing the embargo unless this Government believed that Japan was definitely started on a peaceful

* Built in 1938, connecting, through mostly mountains and jungles, southern China with Burma, a British colony. In July 1940 Japan demanded the closing of the road, which the Japanese viewed as the last remaining channel for bringing supplies from the outside world to the Chongqing regime. Britain acquiesced to the closing for three months, and in October the Burma Road was reopened.

course and had renounced purposes of conquest. The Ambassador said that the Japanese were tired of fighting China and that Japan would go as far as it could along a first step. The Secretary said that he would consult with the British and the Dutch to see what their attitude would be toward the suggestion offered by the Japanese Ambassador. In reply to a question by the Secretary the Ambassador replied that the Japanese Government was still studying the questions of commercial policy involved in our proposal of November 15. He said he assumed that what we had in mind was a program for dealing with the situation after the war. The Secretary replied in the affirmative, so far as the full operation of a sound program is concerned, but added that it should now be agreed upon as to principles.

When asked by the Secretary as to when the Ambassador would like to confer with us again the Ambassador said that he would get in touch with his Government and would communicate to the Secretary through Mr. Ballantine.

DISCUSSING PLAN B

The White House and State Department meetings of November 17 and 18 indicated the hopelessness of arriving at a satisfactory solution to the China problem, and the stage was set for last-minute negotiations on the basis of Plan B. It was presented by the Japanese emissaries to Secretary of State Hull on November 20, and between that day and November 26, the U.S. and Japanese negotiators met on two additional occasions to discuss the plan. In the meantime, there was intensive activity among U.S. officials to counter Japan's Plan B with their own proposals.

Because the future of U.S.-Japanese relations, indeed the fate of the world, hinged on the discussion of Plan B, it is very important to study carefully the record of the conversations as well as the various drafts prepared by U.S. officials. Most U.S. military leaders wanted to delay the coming of a Pacific war in order to focus their efforts on the defense of Britain and the Soviet Union. General George Marshall, chief of the General Staff, hoped that putting more aircraft (B-17s) in the Philippines would make it possible to stop a Japanese southward advance by March 1942. Even if a showdown with Japan over China, Southeast Asia, and the Asian-Pacific region was ultimately inevitable, the situation in Europe might improve by the spring of 1942 and then the United States would be better prepared to fight a two-front war.

Could such a war, then, be postponed through a last-minute deal with Japan? The documents here suggest that many U.S. leaders thought it was worth trying. Plan B proposed, in essence, Japan's pledge not to invade Southeast Asian countries in exchange for a resumption of U.S. oil shipments to Japan. If such a deal could be struck, it would keep Japanese forces out of the British and Dutch colonies in Asia and the Pacific. There were rough estimates in Washington — confirmed after the war in Japanese documents — that without additional supplies of petroleum Japanese naval vessels would not be able to operate beyond two years at most. To resume shipments of oil would obviously change the picture. However, Japanese vulnerability itself would remain, for the United States could always threaten to resume embargoing of petroleum. Therefore, it might make sense for the United States to consider accepting part, if not the entirety, of Plan B as a strictly temporary expedient.

Would you agree with such reasoning? All of these drafts were written for discussion within the U.S. government, and none was actually presented to the Japanese, but if one of the draft proposals had been presented to Japan in response to Plan B, would the Japanese have accepted it? Would war have been avoided? You will note that within just a few days the proposed U.S. response to Japan's Plan B became more and more complex. Does this suggest a mounting sense of urgency to reach an agreement with Japan or rather a growing reluctance to compromise? Q

JOSEPH W. BALLANTINE

Memorandum

November 20, 1941

The Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu called at their request at the Department. Mr. Kurusu said that they had referred to their Government the suggestion which the Ambassador had made at a previous

The following selections are from *Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943), 799-807; *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. 4 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1956), 633-37, 642-43, 661-64.

meeting in regard to a return to the status which prevailed prior to the Japanese move into south Indochina last July, and said that they had anticipated that the Japanese Government might perceive difficulty in moving troops out of Indochina in short order, but that nevertheless the Japanese Government was now prepared to offer a proposal on that basis. He said, however, that the proposal represented an amplification of the Ambassador's suggestion. He then read the proposal to the Secretary which was as follows:

[Here follows the text of the proposal.]

The Secretary said that he would later examine the proposal, and that he would give sympathetic study to the proposal speaking generally, but that the comments which he was about to make were not directed specifically to the proposal but to the general situation. The Secretary said that Japan had it in its power at any moment to put an end to the present situation by deciding upon an all-out peaceful course; that at any moment Japan could bring to an end what Japan chose to call encirclement. He said that we want to have Japan develop public opinion in favor of a peaceful course. Mr. Kurusu said that if we could alleviate the situation by adopting a proposal such as the Japanese Government had just made it would help develop public opinion. The Ambassador said that the Japanese Government was clearly desirous of peace and that it was trying to show this peaceful purpose by relieving the pressure on Thailand which adoption of the proposal would accomplish.

The Secretary asked what the Ambassador thought would be the public reaction in this country if we were to announce tomorrow that we had decided to discontinue aid to Great Britain. He said that in the minds of the American people the purposes underlying our aid to China were the same as the purposes underlying aid to Great Britain; that the American people believed that there was a partnership between Hitler and Japan aimed at enabling Hitler to take charge of one-half of the world and Japan of the other half; and that the fact of the Tripartite Alliance and the continual harping by Japanese leaders upon slogans of the Nazi type such as "new order in East Asia" and "co-prosperity sphere" served to strengthen the public in their belief. What was therefore needed, the Secretary pointed out, was the manifestation by Japan of a clear purpose to pursue peaceful courses.

The Ambassador replied that there was no doubt of Japan's desire for peace, as this was clear from the eagerness of the Japanese Government to reach a settlement of the China affair — and indeed adoption of the Japanese Government's proposal that he had just presented was de-

signed to bring about speedy settlement of the China affair. He said that the Japanese people after four years of fighting were jaded and that the slogans to which the Secretary had made reference were intended to encourage the Japanese people to push on to victory.

The Secretary said that we of course are anxious to help work this matter out for if we should get into trouble everybody was likely to get hurt.

Mr. Kurusu said that if we could go ahead with the present proposal the Japanese idea would be that we could go on working at fundamentals. He said that Japan has never pledged itself to a policy of expansion. The Secretary observed that the Chinese might have an answer to that point. The Secretary said that our people desired to avoid a repetition in east Asia of what Hitler was doing in Europe; that our people oppose the idea of a "new order" under military control. He said also that the public in this country thinks that Japan is chained to Hitler. Mr. Kurusu asked how Japan could eradicate such a belief as Japan could not abrogate the Tripartite Pact. The Secretary said that he did not want to be disagreeable, but he felt he must observe that Japan did not talk that way about the Nine Power Treaty. Mr. Kurusu said something about the Nine Power Treaty being twenty years old and being outmoded. The Secretary said that of course he did not wish to argue the matter. He said that when the Japanese complained about our helping China the public in this country wonders what is underneath the [anti-]Comintern Pact. He emphasized that Japan is doing this country tremendous injury in the Pacific; that Japanese statesmen ought to understand that we are helping China for the same reason that we are helping Britain; that we are afraid of the military elements led by Hitler. He added that the methods adopted by the Japanese military leaders in China were not unlike Hitler's methods. The Ambassador asked how we could save the situation at this juncture. The Secretary replied that he agreed upon the urgent importance of saving it, but he asked whether the Ambassador thought that the Japanese statesmen could tone down the situation in Japan. Mr. Kurusu said, with reference to the fifth point in the Japanese proposal, that he did not know whether his Government would agree but he thought that that point might be interpreted to mean that American aid to China would be discontinued as from the time that negotiations were started. The Secretary made no comment on that point but noted that in the last few days there had been marked subsidence in warlike utterances emanating from Tokyo, and he felt that it was indeed a great tribute to the Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu that so much had been accomplished in this direction within a short space of two days as he felt

*
we brought it up?

sure that it was their efforts which had brought this about. He said that if so much had been accomplished within the course of two days, much more could be accomplished in the course of a longer period.

No time was set for the next meeting.

JOSEPH W. BALLANTINE

Memorandum

November 22, 1941

The Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu called at the Secretary's apartment by appointment made at the request of the Ambassador. The Secretary said that he had called in the representatives of certain other governments concerned in the Pacific area and that there had been a discussion of the question of whether things (meaning Japanese peaceful pledges, et. cetera) could be developed in such a way that there could be a relaxation to some extent of freezing. The Secretary said that these representatives were interested in the suggestion and there was a general feeling that the matter could all be settled if the Japanese could give us some satisfactory evidences that their intentions were peaceful.

The Secretary said that in discussing the situation with the representatives of these other countries he found that there had arisen in their minds the same kind of misgivings that had troubled him in the course of the conversations with the Japanese Ambassador. He referred to the position in which the Japanese Government had left the Ambassador and the Secretary as they were talking of peace when it made its move last July into Indochina. He referred also to the mounting oil purchases by Japan last Spring when the conversations were in progress, to the fact that he had endured public criticism for permitting those shipments because he did not wish to prejudice a successful outcome to the conversations and to the fact that that oil was not used for normal civilian consumption.

The Secretary went on to say that the Japanese press which is adopting a threatening tone gives him no encouragement and that no Japanese statesmen are talking about a peaceful course, whereas in the American press advocacy of a peaceful course can always get a hearing. He asked why was there not some Japanese statesman backing

the two Ambassadors by preaching peace. The Secretary pointed out that if the United States and other countries should see Japan coming along a peaceful course there would be no question about Japan's obtaining all the materials she desired; that the Japanese Government knows that.

The Secretary said that while no decisions were reached today in regard to the Japanese proposals he felt that we would consider helping Japan out on oil for civilian requirements only as soon as the Japanese Government could assert control of the situation in Japan as it relates to the policy of force and conquest. He said that if the Ambassador could give him any further assurances in regard to Japan's peaceful intentions it would help the Secretary in talking with senators and other persons in this country.

Mr. Kurusu said it was unfortunate that there had been a special session of the Diet at this time, as the efforts of the Government to obtain public support had brought out in sharp relief the abnormal state of the present temper of the Japanese people who had been affected by four years of war and by our freezing measures. ✓

The Secretary asked to what extent in the Ambassador's opinion did the firebrand attitude prevail in the Japanese army. Mr. Kurusu said that it took a great deal of persuasion to induce the army to abandon a position once taken, but that both he and the Ambassador had been pleasantly surprised when the Japanese army acceded to their suggestion in regard to offering to withdraw the Japanese troops from southern Indochina. He said he thought this was an encouraging sign, but that nevertheless the situation was approaching an explosive point.

The Secretary asked whether it was not possible for a Japanese statesman now to come out and say that Japan wanted peace; that while there was much confusion in the world because of the war situation Japan would like to have a peace which she did not have to fight for to obtain and maintain; that the United States says it stands for such ideas; and that Japan might well ask the United States for a show-down on this question.

The Ambassador said he did not have the slightest doubt that Japan desired peace. He then cited the popular agitation in Japan following the conclusion of the peace settlement with Russia in 1905, as pointing to a difficulty in the way of publicly backing a conciliatory course.

The Secretary asked whether there was any way to get Japanese statesmen to approach the question before us with real appreciation of the situation with which we are dealing including the question of finding a way to encourage the governments of other powers concerned in the

Pacific area to reach some trade arrangement with Japan. He pointed out that Japan's Indochina move, if repeated, would further give a spurt to arming and thus undo all the work that he and the Ambassador had done. He suggested that if the United States and the other countries should supply Japan with goods in moderate amounts at the beginning those countries would be inclined to satisfy Japan more fully later on if and as Japan found ways in actual practice of demonstrating its peaceful intentions. He said that one move on Japan's part might kill dead our peace effort, whereas it would be easy to persuade the other countries to relax their export restrictions if Japan would be satisfied with gradual relaxation.

Mr. Kurusu said that at best it would take some time to get trade moving. The Secretary replied that he understood this but that it would be difficult to get other countries to understand until Japan could convince those countries that it was committed to peaceful ways. Mr. Kurusu said that some immediate relief was necessary and that if the patient needed a thousand dollars to effect a cure an offer of three hundred dollars would not accomplish the purpose. The Secretary commented that if the Japanese Government was as weak as to need all that had been asked for, nothing was likely to save it.

Mr. Kurusu said that Japan's offer to withdraw its forces from southern Indochina would set a reverse movement in motion.

The Secretary said that the Japanese were not helping as they should help in the present situation in which they had got themselves but were expecting us to do the whole thing.

Mr. Kurusu asked what was the idea of the American Government.

The Secretary replied that although the Japanese proposal was addressed to the American Government he had thought it advisable to see whether the other countries would contribute and he found that they would like to move gradually. The effect of an arrangement between these countries and Japan would be electrifying by showing that Japan had committed herself to go along a peaceful course.

Mr. Kurusu asked what Japan could do. The Secretary replied that if, for example, he should say that he agreed to enter into a peaceful settlement provided that there should be occasional exceptions and qualifications he could not expect to find peaceful-minded nations interested.

The Secretary then asked whether his understanding was correct that the Japanese proposal was intended as a temporary step to help organize public opinion in Japan and that it was intended to continue the conversations looking to the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement. Mr. Kurusu said yes.

Mr. Kurusu asked whether the Secretary had any further suggestions. The Secretary replied that he did not have in mind any suggestions and that he did not know what amounts of exports the various countries would be disposed to release to Japan. He said that Japan made the situation very difficult, for if Japan left her forces in Indochina, whether in the north, east, south or west, she would be able to move them over night, and that therefore this would not relieve the apprehensions of neighboring countries. The British, for example, would not be able to move one warship away from Singapore. ✓

The Ambassador argued that it would take many days to move troops from northern Indochina to southern Indochina, and he stated that the Japanese desired the troops in northern Indochina in order to bring about a settlement with China. He said that after the settlement of the China affair Japan promised to bring the troops out of Indochina altogether. (1) ✓

The Secretary emphasized again that he could not consider this, that also uneasiness would prevail as long as the troops remained in Indochina, and commented that Japan wanted the United States to do all the pushing toward bringing about a peaceful settlement; that they should get out of Indochina.

Mr. Kurusu observed that the Japanese Foreign Minister had told Ambassador Grew that we seemed to expect that all the concessions should be made by the Japanese side.

The Secretary rejoined that Mr. Kurusu had overlooked the fact that in July the Japanese had gone into Indochina. He added that the United States had remained from the first in the middle of the road, that it was the Japanese who had strayed away from the course of law and order, and that they should not have to be paid to come back to a lawful course.

Mr. Kurusu said that this country's denunciation of the commercial treaty had caused Japan to be placed in a tight corner.

The Secretary observed that Japan had cornered herself; that we had been preaching for the last nine years that militarism was sapping everybody and that if the world were to be plunged into another war there would not be much left of the people anywhere. He said that in 1934 he had told Ambassador Saitō that Japan was planning an overlordship in East Asia. The Secretary added that he had tried to persuade Hitler that participation by him in a peaceful course would assure him of what he needed. The Secretary said it was a pity that Japan could not do just a few small peaceful things to help tide over the situation.

Mr. Kurusu asked what the Secretary meant. The Secretary replied that the major portion of our fleet was being kept in the Pacific and yet

(1) Japan wants troops in Indochina in order to beat China (to so attach SEAs in of necessary); → US wants Japanese out of Indochina now - in effect asking them to lose the Sino-Japanese war!

Japan asked us not to help China. He said we must continue to aid China. He said it was little enough that we were actually doing to help China. The Ambassador commented that our moral influence was enabling Chiang to hold out.

The Secretary said that a peaceful movement could be started in thirty or forty days by moving gradually, and yet Japan pushed everything it wanted all at once into its proposal. The Ambassador explained that Japan needed a quick settlement and that its psychological value would be great.

The Secretary said that he was discouraged, that he felt that he had rendered a real contribution when he had called in the representatives of the other countries, but that he could only go a certain distance. He said he thought nevertheless that if this matter should move in the right way peace would become infectious. He pointed also to the danger arising from blocking progress by injecting the China matter in the proposal, as the carrying out of such a point in the Japanese proposal would effectually prevent the United States from ever successfully extending its good offices in a peace settlement between Japan and China. He said this could not be considered now.

There then ensued some further but inconclusive discussion of the troop situation in Indochina, the Secretary still standing for withdrawal, after which the Ambassador reverted to the desire of the Japanese Government to reach a quick settlement and asked whether we could not say what points in the Japanese proposal we would accept and what points we desired to have modified.

The Secretary emphasized that there was no way in which he could carry the whole burden and suggested that it would be helpful if the Japanese Government could spend a little time preaching peace. He said that if the Japanese could not wait until Monday [November 24, 1941] before having his answer there was nothing he could do about it as he was obliged to confer again with the representatives of the other governments concerned after they had had an opportunity to consult with their governments. He repeated that we were doing our best, but emphasized that unless the Japanese were able to do a little there was no use in talking.

The Ambassador disclaimed any desire to press the Secretary too hard for an answer, agreed that the Secretary had always been most considerate in meeting with the Ambassador whenever an appointment had been requested, and said that the Japanese would be quite ready to wait until Monday.

The Secretary said he had in mind taking up with the Ambassador sometime a general and comprehensive program which we had been engaged in developing and which involved collaboration of other countries.

The Ambassador said that the Japanese had in mind negotiating a bilateral agreement with us to which other powers could subsequently give their adherence.

JOSEPH W. BALLANTINE

Memorandum

November 22, 1941

MR. SECRETARY: With reference to the Japanese proposal of November 20 for a *modus vivendi* and our memorandum containing suggestions for possible comment that might be made orally to the Japanese in regard to their proposal (copy of which is attached), there are given below additional suggestions for possible comment:

With reference to item three in regard to cooperation in obtaining from the Netherlands East Indies materials which our two countries need, it is not clear why the Japanese Government desires to limit this proposal to Netherlands East Indies. It would appear to us that, if the Japanese Government could see its way clear to adopting our proposal in regard to commercial policy, the field for cooperation by the two countries would not be limited to any one area but would extend to the entire world. It would seem to us that the Japanese proposal takes no account of our broad offer which was renewed in very specific terms in the paper which was given to the Japanese Ambassador on November 15. It would seem to us that such a proposal would be open to possible criticism. That is to say that, whereas Japan was insisting on preferential treatment for itself in certain areas, in other areas it was asking for cooperation of the United States in obtaining for Japan the very kind of economic opportunities which Japan was trying to deny to third countries elsewhere. This Government has consistently advocated broadening the basis of world trade not from any selfish point of view but from the point of view of providing stable peace and elimination of chronic political instability and recurrent economic collapse. Such a program would provide means

of raising living standards all over the world, thus promoting the well-being of all peoples.

With reference to the provision that the Government of the United States should supply Japan a required quantity of oil, it may be observed that until very recently the United States was supplying Japan with an ever-increasing amount of petroleum products, even to the extent where there was widespread public criticism in the United States of permitting this to continue. The period since 1937 was marked, on the one hand, by a tremendous increase in imports into Japan from the United States of petroleum products and, on the other hand, according to reports reaching us, by a progressive curtailment in the amounts of oil released in that country for normal peacetime consumption. There is no desire in this country to deny to Japan petroleum products needed for its normal economy, but the increased consumption of American petroleum products in Japan for a military purpose brings to the fore a question which we have called to the attention of the Japanese Ambassador, namely, that the Japanese association with the Axis powers is doing the United States tremendous injury.

With regard to the fifth point in the Japanese proposal, you might wish to emphasize again what you said to the Japanese Ambassador on November 20, namely, that, when the Japanese complain about our helping China, the public in this country wonders what is underneath the Anti-Comintern Pact; that Japanese statesmen ought to understand we are helping China for the same reason that we are helping Britain; that we are afraid of the military elements throughout the world led by Hitler; and that the methods adopted by the Japanese military leaders in China are not unlike Hitler's methods. You might then ask what the Ambassador thinks would be the public reaction in this country if we were to announce that we had decided to discontinue aid to Great Britain. You might say that in the minds of American people the purposes underlying our aid to China are the same as the purposes underlying our aid to Great Britain and that the American people believe that there is a partnership between Hitler and Japan aimed at dividing the world between them.

J[OSEPH] W. B[ALLANTINE]

Draft of Proposed Modus Vivendi with Japan

November 22, 1941

Strictly Confidential,
Tentative and without
Commitment

Oral

The representatives of the Government of the United States and of the Government of Japan have been carrying on during the past several months informal and exploratory conversations for the purpose of arriving at a settlement if possible of the questions relating to the entire Pacific area based upon the principles of law and order and fair dealing among nations. These principles include the principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations; the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment; and the principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador indicated that the Government of Japan is desirous of going ahead with such a program; that the domestic political situation within Japan is urgent; and that, in order to give the Japanese Government opportunity to develop and promote public sentiment in Japan in support of a comprehensive and liberal program of peace such as has been under discussion between our two Governments, it would be helpful if there could be taken some initial steps toward resumption of trade and normal intercourse between Japan and the United States. At that time the Japanese Ambassador communicated to the Secretary of State proposals in regard to measures to be taken respectively by the Government of Japan and by the Government of the United States, which measures are understood to have been designed to create an atmosphere favorable to pursuing the conversations which have been taking place. These proposals contain features which from the point of view of the Government of the United States present difficulties in reference to the broad-gauge principles the practical application of which represents the desires of both Governments as manifested in

current conversations. In as much as the Government of the United States desires to contribute to the peace of the Pacific area and to afford every opportunity to continue discussions with the Japanese Government directed toward working out a broad-gauge program of peace throughout the Pacific area, the Government of the United States offers for the consideration of the Japanese Government suggestions as follows:

Modus Vivendi

1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan, both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific, affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area and that they have no territorial designs therein. They undertake reciprocally not to make by force or threat of force, unless they are attacked, any advancement, from points at which they have military establishments, across any international border in the Pacific area.

2. The Japanese Government undertakes forthwith to withdraw its armed forces now stationed in southern French Indochina, not to engage in any further military activities there, including the construction of military facilities, and to limit Japanese military forces in northern French Indochina to the number there on July 26, 1941, which number in any case would not exceed 25,000 and which number would not be subject to replacement.

3. The Government of the United States undertakes forthwith to remove the freezing restrictions which were placed on Japanese assets in the United States on July 26 and the Japanese Government agrees simultaneously to remove the freezing measures which it imposed in regard to American assets in Japan. Exports from each country would thereafter remain subject to the respective export control measures which each country may have in effect for reasons of national defense.

4. The Government of the United States undertakes forthwith to approach the British and the Dutch Governments with a view to their Governments' taking, on a basis of reciprocity with Japan, measures similar to those provided for in paragraph three above.

5. The Government of the United States would not look with disfavor upon the inauguration of conversations between the Government of China and the Government of Japan directed toward a peaceful settlement of their differences nor would the Government of the United States look with disfavor upon an armistice during the period of any such discussions. The fundamental interest of the Government of the United States in reference to any such discussions is simply that they be based

upon and exemplify the fundamental principles of peace which constitute the central spirit of the current conversations between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States.

In case any such discussions are entered into between the Government of Japan and the Government of China, the Government of the United States is agreeable to such discussions taking place in the Philippine Islands, if so desired by both China and Japan.

6. It is understood that this *modus vivendi* is of a temporary nature and shall not remain in effect for a period longer than three months unless renewed by common agreement.

Revised Draft of Proposed Modus Vivendi with Japan

November 24, 1941

- ... 1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan, both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific, affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area and that they have no territorial designs therein.
2. They undertake reciprocally not to make from regions in which they have military establishments any advance by force or threat of force into any areas in Southeastern or Northwestern Asia or in the southern or the northern Pacific area.
3. The Japanese Government undertakes forthwith to withdraw its armed forces now stationed in southern French Indochina and not to replace those forces; to reduce the total of its forces in French Indochina to the number there on July 26, 1941, which number in any case shall not exceed 25,000; and not to send additional forces to Indochina for replacements or otherwise.
4. The Government of the United States undertakes forthwith to modify the application of its existing freezing and export restrictions to the extent necessary to permit the following resumption of trade between the United States and Japan in articles for the use and needs of their peoples:
- (a) Imports from Japan to be freely permitted and the proceeds of the sale thereof to be paid into a clearing account to be used for the purchase of the exports from the United States listed

from "armistice"
to "modus vivendi"

below, and at Japan's option for the payment of interest and principal of Japanese obligations within the United States, provided that at least two-thirds in value of such imports per month consist of raw silk. It is understood that all American-owned goods now in Japan, the movement of which in transit to the United States has been interrupted following the adoption of freezing measures, shall be forwarded forthwith to the United States.

- (b) Exports from the United States to Japan to be permitted as follows:
- (i) Bunkers and supplies for vessels engaged in the trade here provided for and for such other vessels engaged in other trades as the two Governments may agree.
 - (ii) Food and food products from the United States subject to such limitations as the appropriate authorities may prescribe in respect of commodities in short supply in the United States.
 - (iii) Raw cotton from the United States to the extent of \$600,000 in value per month.
 - (iv) Medical and pharmaceutical supplies subject to such limitations as the appropriate authorities may prescribe in respect of commodities in short supply in the United States.
 - (v) Petroleum. The United States will permit the export to Japan of petroleum upon a monthly basis for civilian needs, the proportionate amount of petroleum to be exported from the United States for such needs to be determined after consultation with the British and the Dutch Governments. It is understood that by civilian needs in Japan is meant such purposes as the operation of the fishing industry, the transport system, lighting, heating, industrial and agricultural uses, and other civilian uses.
 - (vi) The above stated amounts of exports may be increased and additional commodities added by agreement between the two governments as it may appear to them that the operation of this agreement is furthering the peaceful and equitable solution of outstanding problems in the Pacific area.
5. The Government of Japan undertakes forthwith to modify the application of its existing freezing and export restrictions to the extent necessary to permit the resumption of trade between Japan and the United States as provided for in paragraph four above.

6. The Government of the United States undertakes forthwith to approach the Australian, British and Dutch Governments with a view to those Governments' taking measures similar to those provided for in paragraph four above.
7. With reference to the current hostilities between Japan and China, the fundamental interest of the Government of the United States in reference to any discussions which may be entered into between the Japanese and the Chinese Governments is simply that these discussions and any settlement reached as a result thereof be based upon and exemplify the fundamental principles of peace, law, order and justice, which constitute the central spirit of the current conversations between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States and which are applicable uniformly throughout the Pacific area.
8. This *modus vivendi* shall remain in force for a period of three months with the understanding that the two parties shall confer at the instance of either to ascertain whether the prospects of reaching a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area justify an extension of the *modus vivendi* for a further period.

*Final Draft of Proposed
Modus Vivendi with Japan*

November 25, 1941

-
- ... 1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan, both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific, affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area and that they have no territorial designs therein.
 2. They undertake reciprocally not to make from regions in which they have military establishments any advance by force or threat of force into any areas in Southeastern or Northeastern Asia or in the southern or the northern Pacific area.
 3. The Japanese Government undertakes forthwith to withdraw its armed forces now stationed in southern French Indochina and not to replace those forces; to reduce the total of its forces in French Indochina to the number there on July 26, 1941; and not

to send additional naval, land or air forces to Indochina for replacements or otherwise.

The provisions of the foregoing paragraph are without prejudice to the position of the Government of the United States with regard to the presence of foreign troops in that area.

4. The Government of the United States undertakes forthwith to modify the application of its existing freezing and export restrictions to the extent necessary to permit the following resumption of trade between the United States and Japan in articles for the use and needs of their peoples:

(a) Imports from Japan to be freely permitted and the proceeds of the sale thereof to be paid into a clearing account to be used for the purchase of the exports from the United States listed below, and at Japan's option for the payment of interest and principal of Japanese obligations within the United States, provided that at least two-thirds in value of such imports per month consist of raw silk. It is understood that all American-owned goods now in Japan the movement of which in transit to the United States has been interrupted following the adoption of freezing measures shall be forwarded forthwith to the United States.

(b) Exports from the United States to Japan to be permitted as follows:

- (i) Bunkers and supplies for vessels engaged in the trade here provided for and for such other vessels engaged in other trades as the two Governments may agree.
- (ii) Food and food products from the United States subject to such limitations as the appropriate authorities may prescribe in respect of commodities in short supply in the United States.
- (iii) Raw cotton from the United States to the extent of \$600,000 in value per month.
- (iv) Medical and pharmaceutical supplies subject to such limitations as the appropriate authorities may prescribe in respect of commodities in short supply in the United States.
- (v) Petroleum. The United States will permit the export to Japan of petroleum, within the categories permitted general export, upon a monthly basis for civilian needs. The proportionate amount of petroleum to be exported from the United States for such needs will be determined after consultation with the British and the Dutch Governments.

It is understood that by civilian needs in Japan is meant such purposes as the operation of the fishing industry, the transport system, lighting, heating, industrial and agricultural uses, and other civilian uses.

- (vi) The above stated amounts of exports may be increased and additional commodities added by agreement between the two governments as it may appear to them that the operation of this agreement is furthering the peaceful and equitable solution of outstanding problems in the Pacific area.
5. The Government of Japan undertakes forthwith to modify the application of its existing freezing and export restrictions to the extent necessary to permit the resumption of trade between Japan and the United States as provided for in paragraph four above.
 6. The Government of the United States undertakes forthwith to approach the Australian, British and Dutch Governments with a view to those Governments' taking measures similar to those provided for in paragraph four above.
 7. With reference to the current hostilities between Japan and China, the fundamental interest of the Government of the United States in reference to any discussions which may be entered into between the Japanese and the Chinese Governments is simply that these discussions and any settlement reached as a result thereof be based upon and exemplify the fundamental principles of peace, law, order and justice, which constitute the central spirit of the current conversations between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States and which are applicable uniformly throughout the Pacific area.
 8. This *modus vivendi* shall remain in force for a period of three months with the understanding that the two parties shall confer at the instance of either to ascertain whether the prospects of reaching a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area justify an extension of the *modus vivendi* for a further period.

DISCARDING THE *MODUS VIVENDI*

On November 24, President Roosevelt cabled Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill (referred to as the "Former Naval Person" in their exchanges), giving him an outline of a proposed *modus vivendi* with Japan. This counterproposal to Japan's Plan B in effect offered partial resumption of

trade with Japan in return for the latter's agreement to withdraw its forces from southern Indochina. The *modus vivendi* thus called for a return to the status quo of July 1941, before the Japanese occupation of southern Indochina. The fact that Roosevelt solicited Churchill's response indicates that the president agreed with his top advisers that a temporary deal with Japan was worth pursuing.

Churchill's response, however, was lukewarm, as revealed in his cable to Roosevelt. The British leader was particularly concerned that the Chinese appeared to be ignored in the pending U.S.-Japanese deal. Sure enough, as the material printed below reveals, China and other nations expressed strong opposition to the *modus vivendi* idea. They were concerned that such an agreement would convey the impression that the U.S. was willing to purchase a temporary truce with Japan at the expense of China, with serious implications for other parts of the world. The upshot was that the proposal was never formally presented to the Japanese negotiators.

Should the U.S. government have gone ahead with the counterproposal? Why or why not? Were Churchill, Chiang Kai-shek, and other foreign leaders justified in squelching the initiative? Did they play a large role in thwarting the official presentation of the *modus vivendi*? If they did, would it follow that the United States went to war for the sake of China or of the British empire?

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Cable to Winston S. Churchill

November 24, 1941

Secret from the President to the Former Naval Person.

On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador communicated to us proposals for a *modus vivendi*. He has represented that the conclusion of such a *modus vivendi* might give the Japanese Government opportunity to develop public sentiment in Japan in support of a liberal and comprehensive program of peace covering the Pacific area and that the domestic political situation in Japan was so acute as to render urgent some re-

The following selections are from *Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence*, vol. 1, ed. Warren F. Kimball (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 275-78.

lief such as was envisaged in the proposal. The proposal calls for a commitment on the part of Japan to transfer to northern Indochina all the Japanese forces now stationed in southern Indochina pending restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of general peace in the Pacific area when Japan would withdraw all its troops from Indochina, commitments on the part of the United States to supply Japan a required quantity of petroleum products and to refrain from measures prejudicial to Japan's efforts to restore peace with China and mutual commitments to make no armed advancement in the southeastern Asiatic and southern Pacific areas (the formula offered would apparently not exclude advancement into China from Indochina), to cooperate toward obtaining goods required by either in the Netherlands East Indies and to restore commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the adoption of freezing measures.

This Government proposes to inform the Japanese Government that in the opinion of this Government the Japanese proposals contain features not in harmony with the fundamental principles which underlie the proposed general settlement and to which each Government has declared that it is committed. It is also proposed to offer to the Japanese Government an alternative proposal for a *modus vivendi* which will contain mutual pledges of peaceful intent, a reciprocal undertaking not to make armed advancement into areas which would include northeastern Asia and the northern Pacific area, southeast Asia and the southern Pacific area, an undertaking by Japan to withdraw its forces from southern French Indochina, not to replace those forces, to limit those in northern Indochina to the number there on July 26, 1941, which number shall not be subject to replacement and shall not in any case exceed 25,000 and not to send additional forces to Indochina. This Government would undertake to modify its freezing orders to the extent to permit exports from the United States to Japan of bunkers and ship supplies, food products and pharmaceuticals with certain qualifications, raw cotton up to \$600,000 monthly, petroleum on a monthly basis for civilian needs, the proportionate amount to be exported from this country to be determined after consultation with the British and Dutch Governments. The United States would permit imports in general provided that raw silk constitute at least two-thirds in value of such imports. The proceeds of such imports would be available for the purchase of the designed exports from the United States and for the payment of interest and principal of Japanese obligations within the United States. This Government would undertake to approach the British, Dutch, and Australian Governments on the question of their taking similar economic measures. Provision is

made that the *modus vivendi* shall remain in force for three months with the understanding that at the instance of either party the two parties shall confer to determine whether the prospects of reaching a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area warrant extension of the *modus vivendi*.

This seems to me a fair proposition for the Japanese but its acceptance or rejection is really a matter of internal Japanese politics. I am not very hopeful and we must all be prepared for real trouble, possibly soon.

ROOSEVELT

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL

Cable to Franklin D. Roosevelt

November 26, 1941

Most Secret for the President from the Former Naval Person.

Your message about Japan received tonight. Also full accounts from Lord Halifax of discussions and your counter project to Japan on which Foreign Secretary has sent some comments. Of course, it is for you to handle this business and we certainly do not want an additional war. There is only one point that disquiets us. What about Chiang Kai-shek? Is he not having a very thin diet? Our anxiety is about China. If they collapse, our joint dangers would enormously increase. We are sure that the regard of the United States for the Chinese cause will govern your action. We feel that the Japanese are most unsure of themselves.

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL

Cable to Franklin D. Roosevelt

November 30, 1941

Personal and Secret for the President from the Former Naval Person.

It seems to me that one important method remains unused in averting war between Japan and our two countries, namely a plain declaration, secret or public as may be thought best, that any further act of ag-

gression by Japan will lead immediately to the gravest consequences. I realize your constitutional difficulties but it would be tragic if Japan drifted into war by encroachment without having before her fairly and squarely the dire character of a further aggressive step. I beg you to consider whether, at the moment which you judge right which may be very near, you should not say that "any further Japanese aggression would compel you to place the gravest issues before Congress" or words to that effect. We would, of course, make a similar declaration or share in a joint declaration, and in any case arrangements are being made to synchronize our action with yours. Forgive me, my dear friend, for presuming to press such a course upon you, but I am convinced that it might make all the difference and prevent a melancholy extension of the war.

THE HULL NOTE

At a meeting with Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu on November 26, Secretary of State Hull presented two memorandums, one reiterating the traditional policies of the United States, such as territorial integrity and equal commercial opportunity, and the other offering to resume trade between the two countries if Japan carried out certain terms, the most important of which was the withdrawal of its forces from China and Indochina. Together, these memorandums are known as the "Hull note."

Clearly, the presentation of the Hull note, rather than a *modus vivendi* proposal, meant that the U.S. government had decided against seeking a temporary compromise with Japan. Instead, it would call for a fundamental solution of the Asian-Pacific crisis through a Japanese agreement to go back to the status quo of 1931 before its forces conquered Manchuria. The document, then, reflected the official U.S. view that the crisis between the two countries — "the road to Pearl Harbor," as it would come to be called — began in 1931 and that if the two nations were to live in peace again, it would be necessary to return to the conditions of the 1920s.

The Japanese negotiators, as well as their superiors in Tokyo, were shocked by the Hull note. They had expected a counterproposal to Plan B, not something that read like an ultimatum. (In diplomacy, an *ultimatum* is a notification that unless its recipient accepts certain terms, its sender will resort to some punitive action.) As you will see in the next set of documents, it was after receipt of the Hull note of November 26 that Tokyo decided there was no hope of arriving at a deal with Washington. U.S. officials, including Hull, vehemently denied, both then and after the

war, that the two memorandums amounted to an ultimatum. Instead, they insisted, they left room for further talks, if only Japan had been willing to respond. This gap in Japanese and American perceptions of just what was in the Hull note, and what was implied by it, not only exacerbated their relationship but heightened the sense of betrayal the Americans felt when the Japanese struck less than two weeks later.

What is your reading of these documents? If you had been an adviser to Roosevelt and Hull, would you have endorsed handing over these documents to the Japanese? Why or why not? If you had been a Japanese leader, would you have considered the Hull note to be a rejection of all attempts to avoid war — an ultimatum? Did it contain any major concessions by the United States?

CORDELL HULL

Outline of Proposed Basis for Agreement between the United States and Japan

November 26, 1941

Section I

DRAFT MUTUAL DECLARATION OF POLICY

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area, that they have no territorial designs in that area, that they have no intention of threatening other countries or of using military force aggressively against any neighboring nation, and that, accordingly, in their national policies they will actively support and give practical application to the following fundamental principles upon which their relations with each other and with all other governments are based:

- (1) The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations.

The following selections are from *Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943), 807-13.

- (2) The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
- (3) The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.
- (4) The principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States have agreed that toward eliminating chronic political instability, preventing recurrent economic collapse, and providing a basis for peace, they will actively support and practically apply the following principles in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples:

- (1) The principles of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.
- (2) The principle of international economic cooperation and abolition of extreme nationalism as expressed in excessive trade restrictions.
- (3) The principle of non-discriminatory access by all nations to raw material supplies.
- (4) The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming countries and populations as regards the operation of international commodity agreements.
- (5) The principle of establishment of such institutions and arrangements of international finance as may lend aid to the essential enterprises and the continuous development of all countries and may permit payments through processes of trade consonant with the welfare of all countries.

Section II

STEPS TO BE TAKEN BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND BY THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan propose to take steps as follows:

1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact ○

among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand and the United States.

2. Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among the American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherland and Thai Governments an agreement whereunder each of the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indochina and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of Indochina, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the threat in question. Such agreement would provide also that each of the Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indochina and would use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and commerce with French Indochina.

③ The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and from Indochina.

④ The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support — militarily, politically, economically — any government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking.

⑤ Both Governments will give up all extraterritorial rights in China, including rights and interests in and with regard to international settlements and concessions, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

Both Governments will endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British and other governments to give up extraterritorial rights in China, including rights in international settlements and in concessions and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

6. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list.

⑦ The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will, respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the United States and on American funds in Japan.

8. Both Governments will agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose, half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States.

9. Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has concluded with any third power or powers shall be interpreted by it in

such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.

10. Both Governments will use their influence to cause other governments to adhere to and to give practical application to the basic political and economic principles set forth in this agreement.

JOSEPH W. BALLANTINE

Memorandum

November 26, 1941

The Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu called by appointment at the Department. The Secretary handed each of the Japanese copies of an outline of a proposed basis of an agreement between the United States and Japan and an explanatory oral statement.

After the Japanese had read the documents, Mr. Kurusu asked whether this was our reply to their proposal for a *modus vivendi*. The Secretary replied that we had to treat the proposal as we did, as there was so much turmoil and confusion among the public both in the United States and in Japan. He reminded the Japanese that in the United States we have a political situation to deal with just as does the Japanese Government, and he referred to the fire-eating statements which have been recently coming out of Tokyo, which he said had been causing a natural reaction among the public in this country. He said that our proposed agreement would render possible practical measures of financial cooperation, which, however, were not referred to in the outline for fear that this might give rise to misunderstanding. He also referred to the fact that he had earlier in the conversations acquainted the Ambassador of the ambition that had been his of settling the immigration question but that the situation had so far prevented him from realizing that ambition.

Mr. Kurusu offered various depreciatory comments in regard to the proposed agreement. He noted that in our statement of principles there was a reiteration of the Stimson doctrine. He objected to the proposal for multilateral non-aggression pacts and referred to Japan's bitter experience of international organizations, citing the case of the award against Japan by the Hague tribunal in the Perpetual Leases matter. He went on

to say that the Washington Conference Treaties had given a wrong idea to China, that China had taken advantage of them to flaunt Japan's rights. He said he did not see how his Government could consider paragraphs (3) and (4) of the proposed agreement and that if the United States should expect that Japan was to take off its hat to Chiang Kai-shek and propose to recognize him Japan could not agree. He said that if this was the idea of the American Government he did not see how any agreement was possible.

The Secretary asked whether this matter could not be worked out.

Mr. Kurusu said that when they reported our answer to their Government it would be likely to throw up its hands. He noted that this was a tentative proposal without commitment, and suggested that it might be better if they did not refer it to their Government before discussing its contents further informally here.

*talked
confusion?*
The Secretary suggested that they might wish to study the documents carefully before discussing them further. He repeated that we were trying to do our best to keep the public from becoming uneasy as a result of their being harangued. He explained that in the light of all that has been said in the press, our proposal was as far as we would go at this time in reference to the Japanese proposal; that there was so much confusion among the public that it was necessary to bring about some clarification; that we have reached a stage when the public has lost its perspective and that it was therefore necessary to draw up a document which would present a complete picture of our position by making provision for each essential point involved.

The Secretary then referred to the oil question. He said that public feeling was so acute on that question that he might almost be lynched if he permitted oil to go freely to Japan. He pointed out that if Japan should fill Indochina with troops our people would not know what lies ahead in the way of a menace to the countries to the south and west. He reminded the Japanese that they did not know what tremendous injury they were doing to us by keeping immobilized so many forces in countries neighboring Indochina. He explained that we are primarily out for our permanent futures, and the question of Japanese troops in Indochina affects our direct interests.

Mr. Kurusu reverted to the difficulty of Japan's renouncing its support of Wang Ching-wei. The Secretary pointed out that Chiang Kai-shek had made an outstanding contribution in bringing out national spirit in China and expressed the view that the Nanking regime had not asserted itself in a way that would impress the world. Mr. Kurusu agreed with what the Secretary had said about Chiang, but observed that the question of the standing of the Nanking regime was a matter of opinion. His

arguments on this as well as on various other points were specious, and unconvincing.

The Ambassador took the occasion to observe that sometimes statesmen of firm conviction fail to get sympathizers among the public; that only wise men could see far ahead and sometimes suffered martyrdom; but that life's span was short and one could only do his duty. The Ambassador then asked whether there was no other possibility and whether they could not see the President.

The Secretary replied that he had no doubt that the President would be glad to see them at any time.

Mr. Kurusu said that he felt that our response to their proposal could be interpreted as tantamount to meaning the end, and asked whether we were not interested in a *modus vivendi*.

The Secretary replied that we had explored that. Mr. Kurusu asked whether it was because the other powers would not agree; but the Secretary replied simply that he had done his best in the way of exploration.

The Ambassador when rising to go raised the question of publicity. The Secretary replied that he had it in mind to give the press something of the situation tomorrow, and asked what the Ambassador thought. The Ambassador said that they did not wish to question the Secretary's right to give out what he desired in regard to the American proposal.

JAPAN'S VIEW OF THE HULL NOTE

The receipt of the Hull note drove the Japanese government into a flurry of activity. Considering the note a virtual ultimatum, the leaders in Tokyo began taking steps toward a break in diplomatic relations with Washington— and toward war. Although no final decision for war was made until December 1 (see pages 86–95), the secret cables exchanged between the Foreign Ministry and the embassy in Washington indicate a sense of urgency.

Exactly how urgent was the situation? Some of the decoded messages suggest that the Japanese diplomats in Washington persisted in the hope that further talks could be held with the Americans in an effort to avoid war. The gap between the thinking of the Japanese in Tokyo and in Washington constitutes an important part of the drama, for the embassy diplomats did not really believe—nor were they informed—that Tokyo was about to go to war against the United States.

Did the U.S. leaders share this sense of urgency? Recall that they were reading the same cables you will read below: the intercepted and decrypted PURPLE messages. U.S. policymakers have been aware that

the Japanese considered the Hull note a point of no return. Nevertheless, as some of the cables reveal, U.S. officials did not believe that all negotiation would cease just because of the Hull note. How would you have read the messages between Tokyo and Washington if you had been a policymaker in Washington at that time? Some of the cables indicate that the Japanese embassies were being instructed to destroy their code machines. What would that have meant to the United States, whose officials were reading such instructions?

FROM: TOKYO — ready to go to a war
 TO: BERLIN [JAPANESE EMBASSY IN GERMANY]
 NOVEMBER 30, 1941
 (PURPLE)
 #986

The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this attitude of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting clause which says that no matter what treaty either party enters into with a third power it will not be interpreted as having any bearing upon the basic object of this treaty, namely the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This means specifically the Three-Power Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the European war at any time, the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Germany and Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others, makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations. What is more, before the United States brought forth this plan, they conferred with England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China — they do so repeatedly. Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those nations and has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy.

FROM: WASHINGTON — still a desire for negotiations
 TO: TOKYO
 DECEMBER 1, 1941
 (PURPLE)
 #1227

Indications are that the United States desires to continue the negotiations even if it is necessary to go beyond their stands on the so-called ba-

The following selections are from Henry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee, *Pearl Harbor: Final Judgment* (New York: Crown, 1992), 334-41.

sic principles. However, if we keep quibbling on the critical points and continue to get stuck in the middle as we have been in the past, it is impossible to expect any further developments. If it is impossible from the broad political viewpoint, to conduct a leaders' meeting at this time, would it not be possible to arrange a conference between persons in whom the leaders have complete confidence (for example, Vice President Wallace or Hopkins from the United States and the former Premier Konoye, who is on friendly terms with the President, or Adviser to the Imperial Privy Council Ishii). The meeting could be arranged for some midway point, such as Honolulu. High army and navy officers should accompany these representatives. Have them make one final effort to reach some agreement, using as the basis of their discussions the latest proposals submitted by each.

We feel that this last effort may facilitate the final decision as to war or peace.

We realize of course that an attempt to have President Roosevelt and former Premier Konoye meet, failed. Bearing in mind the reaction to that in our nation, it may be to our interest to first ascertain the U.S. attitude regarding this possibility. Moreover, since we have no guarantee either of success or failure of the objectives even if the meeting is held, careful consideration should first be given this matter.

We feel, however, that to surmount the crisis with which we are face to face, it is not wasting our efforts to pursue every path open to us. It is our opinion that it would be most effective to feel out and ascertain the U.S. attitude regarding this matter, in the name of the Japanese Government. However, if this procedure does not seem practical to you in view of some internal conditions, then how would it be if I were to bring up the subject as purely of my own origin and in that manner feel out their attitude. Then, if they seem receptive to it the government could make the official proposal.

Please advise me of your opinions on this matter.

FROM: TOKYO
 TO: WASHINGTON
 DECEMBER 1, 1941
 (PURPLE)
 CIRCULAR #2436

When you are faced with the necessity of destroying codes, get in touch with the Naval Attache's office there and make use of chemicals they have on hand for this purpose. The Attache should have been advised by the Navy Ministry regarding this.

destroying of the codes + machines.

FROM: TOKYO
 TO: LONDON
 DECEMBER 1, 1941
 (PURPLE)
 CIRCULAR #2443

Please discontinue the use of your code machine and dispose of it immediately.

In regard to the disposition of the machine please be very careful to carry out the instructions you have received regarding this. Pay particular attention to taking apart and breaking up the important parts of the machine.

As soon as you have received this telegram wire the one word SETUJU in plain language and as soon as you have carried out the instructions wire the one word HASSO in plain language.

Also at this time you will of course burn the machine codes and YU GO No. 26 of my telegram. (The rules for the use of the machine between the head office and the Ambassador resident in England.)

(NOTE: THIS MESSAGE CARRIED A NOTATION ON THE BOTTOM AS A RESULT OF MY AFFIDAVIT OF CAPTAIN LAYTON SAYING:

Message not seen but—British reported that Japs had destroyed their purple machine in London, 26 April 1945. [signed] E.J. Layton.)

FROM: TOKYO
 TO: WASHINGTON
 DECEMBER 1, 1941
 (PURPLE-CA)
 #865

1. The date set in my message #812 has come and gone, and the situation continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is only for your information.)

2. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to the U.S. Ambassador to Tokyo as suggested by you at the end of your message #1124. Please make the necessary representations at your end only.

3. There are reports here that the President's sudden return to the capital is an effect of Premier Tōjō's statement. We have an idea that the

President did so because of his concern over the critical Far Eastern situation. Please make investigations into this matter.

FROM: WASHINGTON
 TO: TOKYO
 DECEMBER 2, 1941
 (PURPLE)
 #1232 (PART 1 OF 2)

Today, the 2nd Ambassador KURUSU and I had an interview with Under-Secretary of State WELLES. At that time, prefacing his statement by saying that it was at the direct instruction of the President of the United States, he turned over to us the substance of my separate wire #1233. Thereupon we said: "Since we haven't been informed even to the slightest degree concerning the troops in French Indo-China, we will transmit the gist of your representations directly to our Home Government. In all probability they never considered that such a thing as this could possibly be an upshot of their proposals of November 20th." The Under-Secretary then said: "I want you to know that the stand the United States takes is that she opposes aggression in any and all parts of the world." Thereupon we replied: "The United States and other countries have pyramided economic pressure upon economic pressure upon us Japanese. (I made the statement that economic warfare was even worse than forceful aggression.) We haven't the time to argue the pros and cons of this question or the rights and wrongs. The people of Japan are faced with economic pressure, and I want you to know that we have but the choice between submission to this pressure or breaking the chains that it invokes. We want you to realize this as well as the situation in which all Japanese find themselves as the result of the four-year incident in China; the President recently expressed cognizance of the latter situation.

FROM: WASHINGTON (NOMURA)
 TO: TOKYO
 DECEMBER 2, 1941
 (PURPLE)
 #1232 (PART 2 OF 2)

Furthermore, I would have you know that in replying to the recent American proposals, the Imperial Government is giving the most profound consideration to this important question which had to do with our national destiny.[?]" Under-Secretary of State WELLES said: "I am well

take publicity

aware of that." I continued: "We cannot overemphasize the fact that, insofar as Japan is concerned, it is virtually impossible for her to accept the new American proposals as they now stand. Our proposals proffered on the 21st of June and the proposals of September 25th, representing our greatest conciliations based on the previous proposal, still stand. In spite of the fact that the agreement of both sides was in the offing, it has come to naught. At this late juncture to give a thoughtful consideration to the new proposals certainly will not make for a smooth and speedy settlement of the negotiations. Recently, we promised to evacuate our troops from French Indo-China in the event of a settlement of the Sino-Japanese Incident and the establishment of a just peace in the Far East. In [the event of] the settlement of fundamental questions, the [kinds] of [problems you mentioned today] would naturally dissolve." The Under-Secretary assiduously heard us out and then said: "The American proposals of the 26th were brought about by the necessity to clarify the position of the United States because of the internal situation here." [2] Then he continued: "In regard to the opinions you have expressed, I will make it a point immediately to confer with the Secretary."

I got the impression from the manner in which he spoke that he hoped Japan in her reply to the American proposals of the 26th would leave this much room.

Judging by my interview with Secretary of State HULL on the 1st and my conversations of today, it is clear that the United States, too, is anxious to peacefully conclude the current difficult situation. I am convinced that they would like to bring about a speedy settlement. Therefore, please bear well in mind this fact in your considerations of our reply to the new American proposals and to my separate wire #1233.

FROM: TOKYO (TOGO)
TO: WASHINGTON
DECEMBER 2, 1941
(PURPLE)
#867 (STRICTLY SECRET)

(CORRECTED TRANSLATION)

1. Among the telegraphic codes with which your office is equipped burn all but those now used with the machine and one copy each of "O" code (Oite) and abbreviating code (L). (Burn also the various other codes which you have in your custody.)

2. Stop at once using one code machine unit and destroy it completely.

3. When you have finished this, wire me back the one word "haruna."
4. At the time and in the manner you deem most proper dispose of all files of messages coming and going and all other secret documents.
5. Burn all the codes which Telegraphic official KOSAKA brought you. . . .

FROM: WASHINGTON
TO: TOKYO
DECEMBER 3, 1941
(PURPLE)
#1223

Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military action between Great Britain and the United States, with or without a declaration of war, is a definite certainty in the event of an occupation of Thailand.

FROM: WASHINGTON
TO: TOKYO
DECEMBER 5, 1941
(PURPLE)
#1268

From Councillor of Embassy Iguchi to the Chief of the Communication Section:

We have completed destruction of codes, but since the U.S.-Japanese negotiations are still continuing I request your approval of our desire to delay for a while yet the destruction of the one code machine.

FROM: TOKYO
TO: WASHINGTON
DECEMBER 6, 1941
(PURPLE)
#901

1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the 26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the United States contained in my separate message #902 (in English).

2. This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in fourteen parts and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure. The situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I want you please to keep it secret for the time being.

3. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States, I will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you in the meantime to put it in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to present it to the Americans just as soon as you receive instructions.

Imperial Conference

December 1, 1941

We can date Japan's final decision for war to the December 1 conference of its leaders in the presence of the emperor. As you will read in the record of the conference, they agreed that given the failure of the negotiations in Washington to arrive at any settlement by the end of November, the nation would have to proceed with its original plan of action. The navy (the Combined Fleet) was told to prepare for war immediately. Its commander, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, ordered the task force that had been assembled to plan the Pearl Harbor attack "to climb Mount Niitaka," a code that had been agreed upon as the go-ahead signal.

That strategy had been devised by Admiral Yamamoto as the only plausible way to fight a war with a nation far richer and mightier than Japan. The idea was to strike the first blow in order to disable U.S. warships in Hawaii (where they had been kept since 1940) long enough for Japanese forces to consolidate their position in Asia (including Southeast Asia, which Japan invaded and occupied simultaneously with the Pearl Harbor attack).

Compare the imperial conferences of November 5 and December 1. The participants were the same, but in December they were more willing to sanction war as the only way out of the impasse. ~~What had changed?~~ Were the Japanese justified in believing the futility of further negotiation with the United States? Even if that were the case, could they have considered other options than a war which, as the document indicates, they knew would be an extremely difficult, even hopeless, undertaking? From these discussions, can you discern that Japanese officials were willing to accept some compromises with the United States? What role did the emperor seem to play in the official decision? Is there any clue as to his attitude?

Nobutaka Ike, *Japan's Decision for War: Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1967), 263-64, 270-74, 279-83.

Agenda: Failure of Negotiations with the United States Based on the "Essentials for Carrying Out the Empire's Policies" Approved on November 5; Declaration of War on the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands.

Statement by Prime Minister (Tojo) - *diplomacy - impossible*

With your permission, I will begin the proceedings today.

On the basis of the Imperial Conference decision of November 5, the Army and Navy, on the one hand, devoted themselves to the task of getting everything ready for military operations; while the Government, on the other hand, used every means at its disposal and made every effort to improve diplomatic relations with the United States. The United States not only refused to make even one concession with respect to the position she had maintained in the past, but also stipulated new conditions, after having formed an alliance with Great Britain, the Netherlands, and China. The United States demanded complete and unconditional withdrawal of troops from China, withdrawal of our recognition of the Nanking Government, and the reduction of the Tripartite Pact to a dead letter. This not only belittled the dignity of our Empire and made it impossible for us to harvest the fruits of the China Incident, but also threatened the very existence of our Empire. It became evident that we could not achieve our goals by means of diplomacy.

At the same time, the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and China increased their economic and military pressure against us; and we have now reached the point where we can no longer allow the situation to continue, from the point of view of both our national power and our projected military operations. Moreover, the requirements with respect to military operations will not permit an extension of time. Under the circumstances, our Empire has no alternative but to begin war against the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands in order to resolve the present crisis and assure survival.

We have been engaged in the China Incident for more than four years, and now we are going to get involved in a great war. We are indeed dismayed that we have caused His Majesty to worry.

But, on further reflection, I am thoroughly convinced that our military power today is far stronger than it was before the China Incident; that the morale of the officers and men of the Army and Navy is high; that unity in domestic politics is greater; that there is willingness on the part of individuals to make sacrifices for the nation as a whole; and that, as a

result, we can anticipate that we will overcome the crisis that confronts the nation.

I should, therefore, like to have you discuss the proposal on the agenda today. I now turn the meeting over to other Ministers and to officers of the Supreme Command, who will make statements about diplomatic negotiations, military affairs, and other matters.

Statement by Foreign Minister Tōgō on Japanese-American Negotiations

... I understand that our two Ambassadors pointed out the unreasonable character of these provisions [the Hull note] and lodged a strong protest; but Secretary Hull indicated no willingness to compromise. It appears that when our two Ambassadors met with the President on the 27th, the President stated that he still hoped that Japanese-American negotiations could be brought to a successful conclusion; but he added that cold water had been dashed on the efforts because Japanese forces had moved into southern Indochina in July while the negotiations were going on, and he felt that negotiations were still hampered, according to recent reports. He said that even if the two countries should attempt to break the deadlock with a *modus vivendi*, such a temporary solution would ultimately be useless as long as the two countries did not agree on basic principles.

There are several provisions in the American proposal that we could accept: the problem of commerce (Provisions 6, 7, and 8) and the abolition of extraterritoriality in China (Provision 5). But our Empire could not agree to those on China and French Indochina (Provisions 2 and 3), withdrawal of recognition of the National Government (Provision 4), non-recognition of the Tripartite Pact (Provision 9), and the multilateral nonaggression pact (Provision 1). Compared to previous American proposals, this one is a conspicuous retrogression; and we had to recognize that it was an unreasonable proposal, which completely disregarded the negotiations that had gone on for half a year.

In short, the United States Government has persistently adhered to its traditional doctrines and principles, ignored realities in East Asia, and tried to force on our Empire principles that she herself could not easily carry out. Despite the fact that we made a number of concessions, she maintained her original position throughout the negotiations, lasting for seven months, and refused to budge even one step. I believe that America's policy toward Japan has consistently been to thwart the establish-

rigidity
of
the U.S.

ment of a New Order in East Asia, which is our immutable policy. We must recognize that if we were to accept their present proposal, the international position of our Empire would be reduced to a status lower than it was prior to the Manchurian Incident, and our very survival would inevitably be threatened. *

First, China under Chiang's control would increasingly come to rely on Britain and the United States; our Empire would betray its faith toward the National Government of China, and our friendship with China would be marred for a long time to come. We would be forced to retreat completely from the mainland, and as a result our position in Manchuria would necessarily be weakened. Any hope of settling the China Incident would be swept away, root and branch.

Second, Britain and the United States would gain control over these regions. The prestige of our Empire would fall to the ground, and our role as stabilizer would be destroyed. Our great undertaking, the establishment of a New Order in East Asia, would be nipped in the bud.

Third, the Tripartite Pact would be reduced to a dead letter, and the reputation of our Empire abroad would decline.

Fourth, the attempt to control our Empire by including the Soviet Union in a multilateral agreement would magnify our problems along the northern border.

Fifth, the principle of nondiscrimination in trade, and other principles, should not necessarily be rejected out of hand; but the attempt to apply them only to the Pacific area is nothing but a way of carrying out a policy to benefit Britain and the United States, and this limited application would present a great obstacle to our acquiring vital materials.

In short, one must say that it was virtually impossible for us to accept their proposal; and even if we were to continue negotiations on the basis of this proposal in order to get the United States to withdraw it, it would be almost impossible for us to obtain what we seek.

Statement by Navy Chief of Staff Nagano

... The United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands have steadily strengthened their defenses; and they have gradually become better prepared, especially in the South Pacific. However, we judge that their present state of preparedness is not greatly different from what we had anticipated; and hence we are convinced that it will present no hindrance to our launching military and naval operations, and that we will be able to proceed as we have planned.

With regard to the Soviet Union, we are maintaining strict vigilance, along with appropriate diplomatic measures; but at present, judging from the deployment of their forces, we need not feel a sense of insecurity.

In this most serious crisis since the founding of our country all of the officers and men in the task forces of the Army and Navy have extremely high morale and are prepared to lay down their lives for their country. Once the Imperial Command is given, they will undertake their assignments. I hope Your Majesty will feel assured on this point.

Statement by Minister for Home Affairs Tōjō

I would like to speak on popular movements relating to Japanese-American problems and on measures for dealing with these movements.

When we take an overall view of popular opinion relating to Japanese-American problems, we conclude that the people in general are aware that our nation, in view of the present world situation, stands at a crossroad, one road leading to glory and the other to decline. They have shown an extraordinary interest in the diplomatic negotiations being carried out by the Government. Even though the Americans have given no indication that they would reconsider, and even though this has led to a rupture in diplomatic negotiations and [will lead] to the outbreak of war, they are prepared to accept this as an inevitable development. They are displaying the spirit characteristic of the Japanese people; and they are truly determined to undergo all manner of hardships, and to overcome adversity by united action.

* The so-called nationalistic organizations have advocated a strong foreign policy; and once diplomatic negotiations end in failure, they will very likely demand that we move southward at once. Even the owners of small and medium-sized enterprises, whose livelihood has been much affected by the recent strengthening of economic controls — to say nothing of the laboring and peasant classes — are clearly aware of the position in which our country finds itself, and their spirits are high. It appears that they tend to want the Government to take an unambiguous position in executing a strong policy. There are, however, some within our large nation who would like to avoid war as much as possible at this time; but even these people have made up their minds that as long as the United States refuses to acknowledge our legitimate position, does not remove the economic blockade, and refuses to abandon her policy of oppressing Japan, our moving southward is inevitable; and if this action leads to a clash between Japan and the United States, this also cannot be helped.

*

To ensure that we will be able to maintain internal security in case an emergency situation arises following the rupture of Japanese-American negotiations, we have begun to make detailed plans for the more stringent measures that will be taken. Preparations for some of these are completed, and we are beginning to implement them:

First, we have especially strengthened our controls over those who are antiwar and antimilitary, such as Communists, rebellious Koreans, certain religious leaders, and others who we fear might be a threat to the public order. We believe that in some cases we might have to subject some of them to preventive arrest.

Second, there are the nationalistic organizations. Some of these tend to be very excitable; they are rash, and they may resort to violence. We believe they should be kept under observation and control; it may be necessary to temporarily detain those who would disturb the public peace. Accordingly, we plan to do everything to provide adequate protection for the Senior Statesmen and those political and financial leaders who are regarded by extremists as being pro-British and pro-American, as well as for foreign diplomats and their staffs, and for law-abiding foreigners.

Third, there is the control of rumors. We must be prepared for many rumors, given the serious nature of the situation. To stabilize the views held by the people, it will be necessary to guide public opinion, and at the same time to exercise rather strict controls over it.

Fourth, as for foreigners of whom there is some suspicion, we have completed all of our investigations; we believe it will be necessary to round them up and detain them when the time comes.

Fifth, with respect to various crimes that will arise in the confusion of war, we have finished conferring with the Minister of Justice. We have given thought to various measures, especially making penalties more stringent, simplifying criminal trial procedure, and so on.

Sixth, we have already completed plans and preparations for the mobilization and deployment of police officials and firemen, who will be responsible for dealing with emergencies.

Seventh, we can anticipate that in a period of emergency the people are bound to be uneasy for a time because of food and monetary problems. We are paying particular attention to trends in attitudes among the people.

We have touched on the main points concerning the maintenance of public peace and security. We officials of the Ministry of Home Affairs are cooperating with other agencies concerned, and we anticipate that all measures for dealing with the emergency will prove to be adequate. . . .

[There followed questions and answers] . . .

[President of the Privy Council] *Hara*: It appears, according to a radio broadcast, that our two Ambassadors are to confer with Hull today. If this is true, who took the initiative in these negotiations? If I assume that our side sought to confer with Hull, then why did we take this step?

[Foreign Minister] *Tōgō*: They have not told us when the meeting is to take place. Having studied the American proposal, we cannot let it go by without taking further action. I have ordered the two Ambassadors: "Tell the United States that the Japanese proposal of November 25 was a just one; that we find it difficult to understand the position the United States has taken in the past, and that she ought to reexamine her stand."¹ Because of this, I think it is quite conceivable that our Ambassadors might have sought a meeting with Hull.²

Hara: I would like to question the Supreme Command. It is indeed gratifying that preparations for commencing hostilities have been completed. According to recent reports from Britain and the United States, those countries are stepping up their military preparedness in the Far East. It appears that they are increasing the number of warships. If this is so, how much of an increase is there? Will it have an adverse effect on our operations?

Nagano, Navy Chief of Staff: The distribution of American strength is still 40 percent in the Atlantic and 60 percent in the Pacific. Recent activity is confined to Great Britain. . . .

Because Germany and Italy have become somewhat less active, and particularly because the Italian Navy has become passive, the British Navy has recently acquired reserve power and is gradually adding to its strength in the Orient. . . .

The purpose of this increase is to protect commerce in the Indian Ocean, to prepare for hostilities against Japan, and to protect the ships from German and Italian submarines. Some people say that the increase in the number of battleships, in particular, was brought about by their transfer to this area in order to avoid damage by German planes. As for the strengthening of land forces, it appears certain that 2,000 Canadian troops were landed in Hong Kong.

¹This must be in error. Tōgō was probably referring to the Japanese note of November 20.

²The Japanese Ambassadors met with Secretary Hull that day and discussed the possibility that the United States might reexamine her position; but Hull firmly stated that the American proposal of November 26 must stand.

Thus there has been some strengthening of their forces; but this does not call for changes in the deployment of our forces. It will have no effect on our operations.

Hara: What is the situation with reference to the Army? May I assume that the increase in the number of enemy troops is still within the limits anticipated by the Supreme Command?

Sugiyama, Army Chief of Staff: There has been a 2,000-man reinforcement of Hong Kong, as reported by Navy Chief of Staff Nagano. Since our previous Imperial Conference they have landed about 6,000 to 7,000 men in Singapore; and there are reports of additional troops in Burma. But there appears to have been no large-scale buildup.

We have assumed in our planning to date that something like this would occur. It will have no effect on our operations, since we have set up everything in such a way that an increase of this magnitude will be of no consequence.

Hara: Will Thailand ally herself with Japan or with Great Britain? What is the outlook here? What's going to happen if Thailand opposes us? What are you going to do?

Tōjō: Concerning Thailand, it is our thought, based on the policy approved by the Imperial Conference of November 5, that we will deal with the situation just prior to our sending in troops. It is uncertain which side Thailand will choose. Thailand herself is in a quandary. It is our hope to bring her in on our side by peaceful means; in order to do this, early [aggressive] action is undesirable, but late action will also have harmful effects. Accordingly, we intend to broach the matter just before we begin the war, and to make her agree to our demands. It is our plan to do everything to prevent her from resisting, even though we may have to use force if worse comes to worst.

Hara: The Minister of Home Affairs has just told us in some detail what effect the war will have on the domestic scene. There is one thing I don't understand, and that is what will happen in the event of air raids. It's admirable that you are providing a good deal of training for emergencies, such as air-raid drills, in order to avoid damage as much as possible. But in the event of a conflagration, can we bring it under control, given the kind of buildings in Tokyo, even though we may try to prevent it from spreading? What are we going to do if a large fire should break out in Tokyo? Do you have a plan to cope with it?

Suzuki, Director of the Planning Board: Let me tell you some of the things we currently have in mind. First, we have enough food stored. Next, we hope that some of the people whose homes are burned can

seek refuge elsewhere. As for those who must remain, we are planning to put up simple shelters.

Hara: It is not enough merely to have given some thought to the matter. Your plans are inadequate. I hope that you will be fully prepared. I won't ask any more questions.

Now I will give my views.

In negotiating with the United States, our Empire hoped to maintain peace by making one concession after another. But to our surprise, the American position from beginning to end was to say what Chiang Kai-shek wanted her to say, and to emphasize those ideals that she had stated in the past. The United States is being utterly conceited, obstinate, and disrespectful. It is regrettable indeed. We simply cannot tolerate such an attitude.

If we were to give in, we would give up in one stroke not only our gains in the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars, but also the benefits of the Manchurian Incident. This we cannot do. We are loath to compel our people to suffer even greater hardships, on top of what they have endured during the four years since the China Incident. But it is clear that the existence of our country is being threatened, that the great achievements of the Emperor Meiji would all come to naught, and that there is nothing else we can do. Therefore, I believe that if negotiations with the United States are hopeless, then the commencement of war, in accordance with the decision of the previous Imperial Conference, is inevitable.

I would like to make a final comment: there is no doubt that initial operations will result in victory for us. In a long-term war, however, it is necessary to win victories on the one hand, while, on the other hand, we keep the people in a tranquil state of mind. This is indeed the greatest undertaking since the opening of our country in the 19th century. We cannot avoid a long-term war this time, but I believe that we must somehow get around this and bring about an early settlement. In order to do this, we will need to start thinking now about how to end the war. Our nation, governed by our magnificent national structure [*kokutai*], is, from a spiritual point of view, certainly unsurpassed in all the world. But in the course of a long-term war, there will be some people who will fall into erroneous ways. Moreover, foreign countries will be actively engaged in trying to undermine the morale of the people. It is conceivable that even patriotic individuals will on occasion attempt to do the same. It will be very difficult to deal with these people. I believe that it is particularly important to pay attention

to our psychological solidarity. We must be very concerned about this. Be sure you make no mistakes in handling the inner turmoil of the people.

I believe that the proposal before us cannot be avoided in the light of present circumstances, and I put my trust in officers and men whose loyalty is supreme. I urge you to make every effort to keep the people in a tranquil state of mind, in order to carry on a long-term war.

Tōjō: The Government is fully aware of the importance of your remarks and views, and is doing everything it can along these lines. We are fully prepared for a long war. We would also like to do everything we can in the future to bring the war to an early conclusion. We also intend, in the event of a long war, to do our utmost to keep the people tranquil, and particularly to maintain the social order, prevent social disorganization, and block foreign conspiracies.

We have now completed our questions and remarks. I judge that there are no objections to the proposal before us.

I would now like to make one final comment. At the moment our Empire stands at the threshold of glory or oblivion. We tremble with fear in the presence of His Majesty. We subjects are keenly aware of the great responsibility we must assume from this point on. Once His Majesty reaches a decision to commence hostilities, we will all strive to repay our obligations to him, bring the Government and the military ever closer together, resolve that the nation will go on to victory, make an all-out effort to achieve our war aims, and set His Majesty's mind at ease.

I now adjourn the meeting.

[During today's Conference, His Majesty nodded in agreement with the statements being made, and displayed no signs of uneasiness. He seemed to be in an excellent mood, and we were filled with awe.]

JAPAN'S DECEMBER 7 NOTE

Having decided on war, on December 7 the Japanese government instructed its embassy in Washington to submit to the State Department a lengthy memorandum detailing the reasons why Japan saw no alternative but to terminate bilateral negotiations. The memorandum was not a declaration of war. Japan's official declaration of war was issued at 11 A.M. on December 8, Tokyo time (9 P.M. on December 7, Washington time).

Nor was the Japanese note strictly speaking a formal notification breaking off diplomatic relations, which international law customarily requires of a nation going to war against another. Even so, the fact that this memorandum was delivered to the State Department after the Pearl Harbor attack had taken place infuriated the Americans.

This was not a simple case of deception, however. The note was drafted for delivery to the United States because many Japanese, including Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, who had planned the Pearl Harbor strategy, believed it was important to notify the U.S. government of the termination of negotiations before an actual attack took place. The Foreign Ministry in Tokyo obliged and composed a long message, but it consisted of seven sections and was sent in fourteen separate telegrams. As you will note in this document, there is no inkling until you get to the final section that this is a grave diplomatic note, terminating all negotiations. The embassy had not been notified of the home government's decision for war, but its staff must have realized something serious was going to happen, since they were instructed to decode, translate into English, and retype the message without using secretarial assistance, that is to say, without obtaining the help of American typists. The fourteenth cable, the concluding part of the message, did not arrive until the early morning of December 7, and it was followed by another telegram, reaching the embassy around 11 A.M., instructing the ambassadors to deliver the entire memorandum to the State Department at 1 P.M. (7:30 A.M. Hawaii time).

If the note had been delivered at that time, it would have preceded the Pearl Harbor attack by twenty-five minutes. The attack would still have been considered a surprise, a "sneak" act carried out before a formal declaration of a break in relations, and would have inflamed U.S. opinion, but at least the Japanese diplomats would have been spared the embarrassment of presenting the note after a state of war had come into existence. However, the note was not brought to Secretary Hull until 2:20 P.M., nearly one hour after the first Japanese bombs had been dropped on Pearl Harbor.

There were several reasons for the delay. For one thing, the fourteen-part telegram was too long to be decoded and retyped quickly. The embassy had been instructed to destroy two out of its three decoding machines, so the whole process took time. Besides, Japanese embassy personnel proved to be poor typists, causing additional delay. There were gaps in the telegrams received, and the embassy had to wait for clarification. By the time the fourteenth telegram arrived, past 3 A.M., most of the embassy staff had gone home, and it was not until after

11 A.M. on December 7 that the entire message had been decoded and copied. It was only then that the Japanese diplomats grasped the gravity of the situation. Around 12:30 P.M., the message had finally been retyped, and at 2:05 P.M. Nomura and Kurusu took it to the State Department. Secretary of State Hull was incensed, not only because he knew the Pearl Harbor attack had already taken place, but also because the message he received merely terminated negotiations; it did not declare war.

The picture is complicated because, thanks to the Magic intercepts, the top leaders in Washington knew the contents of the last-minute Japanese message. It had been decoded by 5:30 A.M.—nearly eight hours before the Pearl Harbor attack. Why did President Roosevelt, who received the decoded text by 9 A.M. and is said to have remarked, "This means war," not do anything to alert his military commanders in Hawaii and elsewhere? Such a question inevitably leads to a theory, held by some advocates even today, that there was a conspiracy in Washington to keep these commanders in the dark. The United States needed Japan's surprise attack to incense American citizens so they would eagerly accept a war with Japan and its ally, Germany. This conspiracy theory is not accepted by most authorities, but there is no doubt that a failure of communication took place between Washington and the military leaders elsewhere. A timely forewarning might have prevented the Pearl Harbor disaster. We must recognize, however, that although the leaders in Washington expected an impending war, they had little or no idea that the Japanese would attack Hawaii. Their attention was focused on a possible Japanese offensive in Southeast Asia, against Malaya, for instance, not against Hawaii. Even so, the commander of the U.S. forces in the Philippines, General Douglas MacArthur, was never instructed to disperse aircraft or otherwise prepare for a Japanese attack.

If you had been in the president's position and had the information that he had on the morning of December 7, what might you have done? If you had been one of the Japanese ambassadors and received instructions to deliver this important message to the State Department, could you have done anything to mitigate the impending disaster? Why did the Japanese government fail to foresee that such a sloppy handling of the final memorandum would infuriate the Americans and unite them, like nothing else, in a war of revenge? Finally, to what extent would it be possible to say that the Japanese memorandum and Hull's response indicated a serious gap in U.S. and Japanese perceptions of the situation in Asia and the Pacific in 1941—such a serious gap that no peaceful solution of their differences would have been possible? Some writers have suggested that at bottom there was a cultural clash between the two

countries, a clash between two contrasting belief systems and ways of life. Would you agree? Were there profound differences in the two countries' perceptions of the world, of international affairs, and of themselves so that nothing short of a wholesale transformation in Japanese attitudes would have satisfied the Americans?

KICHISABURŌ NOMURA

Memorandum

December 7, 1941

1. The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order that the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific Area and thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has continued negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the Government of the United States regarding the adjustment and advancement of Japanese-American relations and the stabilization of the Pacific Area.

The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views concerning the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as the measures the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during these eight months.

2. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the stability of East Asia and to promote world peace and thereby to enable all nations to find each its proper place in the world.

Ever since the China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of China to comprehend Japan's true intentions, the Japanese Government has striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent the extension of war-like disturbances. It was also to that end that in September last year Japan concluded the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy.

However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every possible measure to assist the Chungking régime so as to obstruct

The following selections are from *Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943), 832-38.

the establishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan's constructive endeavours toward the stabilization of East Asia. Exerting pressure on the Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indo-China, they have attempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration to the ideal of common prosperity in cooperation with these regions. Furthermore, when Japan in accordance with its protocol with France took measures of joint defence of French Indo-China, both [the] American and British Governments, willfully misinterpreted it as a threat to their own possessions, and inducing the Netherlands Government to follow suit, they enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing economic relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these countries have strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers the very existence of the Empire.

Nevertheless, to facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed, in August last, to meet the President of the United States for a discussion of important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific area. However, the American Government, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that the meeting should take place after an agreement of view had been reached on fundamental and essential questions.

3. Subsequently, on September 25th the Japanese Government submitted a proposal based on the formula proposed by the American Government, taking fully into consideration past American claims and also incorporating Japanese views. Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement of view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal, moderating still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of difficulty in the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a settlement. But the American Government, adhering steadfastly to its original assertions, failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotiation made no progress.

Therefore, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations, submitted on November 20th still another proposal in order to arrive at an equitable solution of the more essential and urgent questions which, simplifying its previous proposal, stipulated the following points:

- (1) The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to dispatch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, in the Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.

(2) Both Governments shall cooperate with the view to securing the acquisition in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and commodities of which the two countries are in need.

(3) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets.

The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quantity of oil.

(4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.

(5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific Area; and it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.

As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its readiness to accept the offer of the President of the United States to act as "introducer" of peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an undertaking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the restoration of Sino-Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct negotiations.

The American Government not only rejected the above-mentioned new proposal, but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-shek; and in spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer of the President to act as so-called "introducer" of peace between Japan and China, pleading that time was not yet ripe for it. Finally on November 26th, in an attitude to impose upon the Japanese Government those principles it has persistently maintained, the American Government made a proposal totally ignoring Japanese claims, which is a source of profound regret to the Japanese Government.

4. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best to reach a settlement, for which it made all possible concessions often in spite of great difficulties. As for the China question which constituted an important subject of the negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude. As for the principle of non-discrimination in international commerce, advocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed its desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world, and declared that along with the actual practice of this principle in the world, the Japanese Gov-

ernment would endeavour to apply the same in the Pacific Area including China, and made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding from China economic activities of third powers pursued on an equitable basis. Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French Indo-China, the Japanese Government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China as a measure of easing the situation.

It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciated by the American Government.

On the other hand, the American Government, always holding fast to theories in disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical principles, caused undue delay in the negotiation. It is difficult to understand this attitude of the American Government and the Japanese Government desires to call the attention of the American Government especially to the following points:

1. The American government advocates in the name of world peace those principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese Government the acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by discovering a mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality of the situation and mutual appreciation of one another's position. An attitude such as ignores realities and imposes one's selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the purpose of facilitating the consummation of negotiations.

Of the various principles put forward by the American Government as a basis of the Japanese-American Agreement, there are some which the Japanese Government is ready to accept in principle, but in view of the world's actual conditions, it seems only a utopian ideal on the part of the American Government to attempt to force their immediate adoption.

Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact between Japan, United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, the Netherlands and Thailand, which is patterned after the old concept of collective security, is far removed from the realities of East Asia.

2. The American proposal contained a stipulation which states — "Both Governments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded with any third power or powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of

peace throughout the Pacific area." It is presumed that the above provision has been proposed with a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations under the Tripartite Pact when the United States participates in the War in Europe, and, as such, it cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government.

The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be said to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on the one hand, to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific Area, it is engaged, on the other hand, in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of self-defense, Germany and Italy, two Powers that are striving to establish a new order in Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many principles upon which the American Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific Area through peaceful means.

3. Whereas the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds, objects to settle international issues through military pressure, it is exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations should be condemned as it is at times more inhumane than military pressure.
4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government desires to maintain and strengthen, in coalition with Great Britain and other Powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied not only in China but in other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that the countries of East Asia for the past hundred years or more have been compelled to observe the *status quo* under the Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice themselves to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan's fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world.

The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French Indo-China is a good exemplification of the above-mentioned American policy. That the six countries, — Japan, the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, China and Thailand, — excepting France, should undertake among themselves to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China and equality of treatment in trade and commerce would be

tantamount to placing that territory under the joint guarantee of the Governments of those six countries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese Government in that such an arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indo-China of a system similar to the Nine Power Treaty structure which is the chief factor responsible for the present predicament of East Asia.

5. All the items demanded of Japan by the American Government regarding China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional application of the principle of non-discrimination in international commerce ignored the actual conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan's position as the stabilizing factor of East Asia. The attitude of the American Government in demanding Japan not to support militarily, politically or economically any régime other than the régime at Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence of the Nanking Government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiation. This demand of the American Government falling, as it does, in line with its above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the Chungking régime, demonstrates clearly the intention of the American Government to obstruct the restoration of normal relations between Japan and China and the return of peace to East Asia.

5. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such as those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of yen and dollar exchange, or the abolition of extra-territorial rights in China. On the other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in the four years of the China Affair, menaces the Empire's existence itself and disparages its honour and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese Government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation.

6. The Japanese Government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the negotiation, proposed simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiation, agreements to be signed with Great Britain and other interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American Government. However, since the American Government has made the proposal of November 26th as a result of frequent consultation with Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands and Chungking, and presumably by catering to the wishes of the Chungking régime in the

questions of China, it must be concluded that all these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring Japan's position.

7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a new order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiation. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.

[WASHINGTON.] *December 7, 1941.*

JOSEPH W. BALLANTINE

Memorandum

December 7, 1941

The Japanese Ambassador asked for an appointment to see the Secretary at 1:00 P.M., but later telephoned and asked that the appointment be postponed to 1:45 as the Ambassador was not quite ready. The Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu arrived at the Department at 2:05 P.M. and were received by the Secretary at 2:20.

The Japanese Ambassador stated that he had been instructed to deliver at 1:00 P.M. the document which he handed the Secretary, but that he was sorry that he had been delayed owing to the need of more time to decode the message. The Secretary asked why he had specified one o'clock. The Ambassador replied that he did not know but that was his instruction.

The Secretary said that anyway he was receiving the message at two o'clock.

After the Secretary had read two or three pages he asked the Ambassador whether this document was presented under instructions of the

Japanese Government. The Ambassador replied that it was. The Secretary as soon as he had finished reading the document turned to the Japanese Ambassador and said,

"I must say that in all my conversations with you [the Japanese Ambassador] during the last nine months I have never uttered one word of untruth. This is borne out absolutely by the record. In all my fifty years of public service I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions—infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any Government on this planet was capable of uttering them."

The Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu then took their leave without making any comment.

A copy of the paper which was handed to the Secretary by the Japanese Ambassador is attached.

A Declaration of War That Was Never Sent

December ___th, 1941

Shortly before the Pearl Harbor bombing, the Japanese Foreign Ministry drafted a declaration of war for possible delivery to the U.S. embassy in Tokyo prior to the attack. The document was drafted in English and thus contains some awkward expressions. This declaration was, however, never presented to the U.S. embassy. If it had, some scholars argue, it would have spared Japan from the opprobrium of having perpetrated a treacherous attack. Do you agree?

Your Excellency:

I have the honour, under instructions from my Government, to inform Your Excellency that as the hostile measures taken by the United States have seriously jeopardized the security, and therefore existence, of Japan, they have been constrained to resort to measures of self-defense and **consequently there now exists a state of war between the two countries.**

I am also directed to leave with Your Excellency a copy of the Statement of my Government which sets forth their views concerning the rupture of our relations.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

Statement of the Japanese Government

Being earnestly desirous of the peace of the Pacific, the Japanese Government have consistently pursued a policy of promoting friendly relations with Great Britain and the United States. These relations, however, have suffered a progressive deterioration in recent years largely through the unresponsive attitude of these Powers who have failed to understand the realities of the situation prevailing in our part of the world.

Our cardinal policy aims at inaugurating a new order in Greater East Asia throughout which we are striving to ensure and enhance a common prosperity. It is essentially a policy of peace designed to cultivate the friendship among, and increase the welfare of, the peoples of this vast region. It is thus a policy calculated to serve the interests of these peoples, redounding ultimately to the benefit of the whole mankind.

Great Britain and the United States, however, have willfully ~~mis-~~ understood our aims and aspirations and, in collusion with other hostile countries, have endeavoured, openly and covertly, to oppose and obstruct the peaceful execution of our constructive policy. The Anglo-Saxon Powers have not scrupled to render active assistances to the Chungking régime, a mere pawn in their game of Imperialist politics, prolonging the latter's futile struggle to the untold misery of China's teeming millions who are becoming increasingly anxious for peace with Japan. By aiding the Chungking régime these Powers have greatly impeded the restoration of tranquility in China and by thus opposing our efforts for a speedy settlement of the China Affair, they have more than forfeited the good will of our people. Anxious, however, to maintain amicable relations with them, Japan has, displaying utmost patience, persevered in the face of provocations hoping that they will reconsider and repair their attitude. It is highly regrettable that these Powers should have failed to respond to our policy and should have, on the contrary, resorted to unfriendly measures, some of them very severe and stringent, vis-à-vis this country.

In these circumstances, Japan concluded the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy, two leading Powers of Europe who, fully sharing our views, have pledged their willing cooperation in establishing a new order

in Greater East Asia. But our association with the Axis Powers has added yet another cause of alienation in our relations with the so-called Democratic Powers who have begun to entertain unwarranted misapprehensions regarding our policy and purposes, despite our repeated assurances that we seek no quarrel with them. Far from harbouring any aggressive design, Japan was, as stated above, bent upon the peaceful initiation of an era of common prosperity throughout the Greater East Asia.

It will be recalled that in August last year Japanese forces were dispatched to Northern French Indo-China in connection with the prosecution of the China Affair. Later on, in summer this year, our forces made a peaceful entry into the Southern region in virtue of the Protocols for the Joint Defense of French Indo-China in order to cope with the grave situation developing in the South-western Pacific, due to the rapid augmentation of military measures by the United States, Great Britain and her allies and associates. These Powers chose to regard our peaceful advance into Southern French Indo-China as a menace to their territories and froze our assets in their respective countries, a measure tantamount to a wholesale rupture of economic relations. They have since even gone the length of establishing encircling positions against Japan which, creating an unprecedented tension in the Pacific, has greatly exacerbated their relations with us. The increasing pressure they have brought to bear upon Japan has as its aim no other than our economic strangulation. Sometimes, economic warfare is admittedly more cruel and disastrous than an open resort to arms. Thus the ruthless measures of economic attrition now directed against us constitute a really serious threat, affecting as they deeply do, the very existence of our Empire. In other words, we, as a nation, are faced with the question of life and death. We could not acquiesce in these hostile measures, as it would spell the decline and downfall of our nation.

Finding ourselves in such a predicament, we still patiently endeavoured to seek a peaceful way out of it. The negotiations at Washington are a case in point.

Our Government have, since April last, conducted protracted negotiations with the American Government with a view to bringing about a friendly and fundamental adjustment of the Japanese-American relations. We were afraid that the steady deterioration of our relations would, if left without a timely check, drift toward an inevitable catastrophe, an awful eventuality entailing immense suffering not only on the countries in the Pacific basin but on the entire mankind as well. We were convinced that, good will animating both sides, there should be no question

that is not amenable to amicable settlement. We, therefore, exercised utmost patience and, in the spirit of compromise, proposed many a formula, often involving great sacrifices on our part, to meet the desires of the American Government which were, we much regret to say, not always reasonable nor practicable. In fact, we went to the last possible limit of concessions, short of compromising the honour and prestige as a great Power, in order to satisfy the United States. But the latter has persistently maintained a very rigid attitude, making not the slightest gesture to respond to our sincere efforts to reach a friendly settlement. In short, the American Government were singularly lacking in the spirit of mutual accommodation which is indispensable to a successful conclusion of any international negotiations. They maintained, throughout the course of negotiations lasting more than seven months, their original position from which they stubbornly refused to withdraw even an inch. Thus, it has finally come to the present pass where it can no longer serve any useful purpose by continuing further negotiations. Our untiring and unsparring efforts have been frustrated through the uncompromising attitude of the American Government and we have now been forced, although with great reluctance, to abandon the negotiations and, with that, renounce our cherished desire to come to a friendly understanding with the United States.

With the breakdown of the negotiations, we have thus been led to give up, at last and finally, the hope to find an escape, through peaceful means, from our predicament. At the same time, the hostile ring encircling our Empire is being steadily strengthened day after day, gravely threatening our safety and security. The economic warfare, in its most relentless form, is also being prosecuted with renewed energy against this country. In short, the concerted pressure of the hostile Powers is such that our national existence is now in serious jeopardy. Standing at the cross-roads of her destiny, Japan decided to defend her prime right of existence, a course that offered the only possible way of survival. Our patience finally exhausted and our destiny at stake, the nation has risen, as one man, to meet the challenge. Steeped in the conviction that right always will triumph, our hundred million peoples have girt on the sword of justice, anxious to defend the fatherland and eager to vindicate our glorious cause.




Figure 1. The Japanese take Manchuria, despite treaty pledges — a U.S. press view of Japanese aggression in China.
The Granger Collection, New York.

On the next two pages

Figure 2. *Left page:* Japanese and German officials celebrate the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact, October 1940 (Army Minister Tōjō in uniform at the center, Foreign Minister Matsuoka raising his glass, fourth from the right).
UPI/Corbis-Bettmann.

Figure 3. *Right page, top:* Roosevelt and Churchill at the Atlantic Conference, August 1941.
The National Archives/Corbis.

Figure 4. *Right page, bottom:* Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu after a meeting with Secretary of State Hull, November 1941.
UPI/Corbis-Bettmann.